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that Word in his controversy with Latomus, and the paradox of the God who is
hidden in His revelation as a counter to Erasmus' peculiar insistence on the
perspicuity of Scripture. It is contended that Philip Melanchthon agrees sub¬
stantially in the positions thus taken by Luther.
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this central hermeneutical concern, although their precise movement from the
center might in cases vary according to their objectives and tasks and personal
predilections.
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis attempts to clarify and describe the role of the
Biblical interpreter in the work of exposition of the Scripture by observ¬
ing the hermeneutics of Luther and Melanchthon. Since the historians
of interpretation have but vaguely referred to such functions as faith
within this process, inquiry is directed toward the explication of this
term. Inasmuch as allegations of subjectivity have been generously
made against the two reformers there is an apologetic factor woven in,
seeking to establish a valid subjective element without opening the
doors to subjectivity.
The aim of the historical section is to give a proper background
to the main body of the work. The development of allegory is described
through analysis of Philo and Origen. Attention is given to the con¬
trasting views of the Antiochenes. The expository contributions of
Augustine are considered and the subsequent developments in the later
middle ages. Throughout the historical chapter special consideration is
given to the recognized role of the interpreter and to the presuppositions
on the nature of history as a shaping force in hermeneutics.
Some of the basic hermeneutical positions of Martin Luther are
reflected through a delineation of three major controversies in which
he engaged relatively early in his reforming career. Through a brief
study of his clash with Latomus the point is made that Luther rejected
allegory along with the non-historical presuppositions which in fact
left the expositor free for a destructive subjectivity. The study of the
controversy between Luther and Erasmus reveals Luther's rejection of
that type of historicism which believes that human language is
completely capable of carrying the divine message. The Schwarmer
set before Luther a theology based on ananti-historical ground which
exalts the subjectivity of religious experience. Luther rejects this
attitude and emphasizes the centrality of the given Word of God in
history, as previously he has stressed the vitality of that Word in his
controversy with Latomus, and the paradox of the God who is hidden in
His revelation as a counter to Erasmus' peculiar insistence on the
perspicuity of Scripture. It is contended that Philip Melanchthon
agrees substantially in the positions thus taken by Luther.
The primary affirmation of the dissertation is set forth in the
following paragraph: "The subjective element of hermeneutics for
Luther and Melanchthon consists in this: that the saving work of God,
graciously applied to the interpreter in the midst of human history, is
accepted as the heuristic paradigm for the understanding of God's
living Word to men. It is important that this saving work be seen as
bringing man into the new life of faith and hope, that this work has
already established a new reality together with openness to the ultimate
fulfilment of the work and will of God. "
The component elements of this central paragraph are illustrated
in the works of both Luther and Melanchthon, with the conclusion that
both men agree in this central hermeneutical concern, although their
precise movement from the center might in cases vary according to
their objectives and tasks and personal predilections.
It is contended that this description of the subjective element
in the hermeneutics of Luther and Melanchthon is consistent with their
general theological position and in agreement with the evidences in
their respective extant works; that the thesis is in itself coherent as
a structure; that the thesis is applicable with significant profit to the
expository enterprise; that it is of ecumenical acceptability as
evidenced by kindred statements from representative theologians and
churchmen.
PREFACE
The topic for this dissertation grew out of a compiex of concerns
and interests. My responsibilities as a teacher of courses in religion
in a church-related liberal arts college posed continuing questions as
to the proper mode of understanding and as to the training for under¬
standing of the Scriptures. Standing in the Lutheran tradition I had a
vested interest in the theology of the two great reformers, Luther and
Melanchthon. The continuing, tantalizing problem of the theological
consanguinity of these two figures gave zest to the research.
In the course of my research it became evident that many other
scholars were pursuing studies either directly related to my work or
impinging closely on it. Hermeneutics moved rapidly from a sphere of
tertiary importance to a position claiming the role of theological
propacleutic. Historiography, history, history and eschatology became
vital issues for both professional historians and theologians. The
bibliography of secondary sources thus mounted in geometric proportion.
Any remote possibility of canvassing this vast field became an utter
impossibility, and I make no claim to any but a preliminary appreciation
of the implications of much of this recent development.
I have worked largely with the primary sources in the works of
Luther and Melanchthon. Reformation scholars are currently producing
a large amount of new editings and translations of the works of both
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Luther and Melanchthon. The critical work involved in this production
may not properly be overlooked, therefore I have drawn on all the
translations known to me and have accepted the resulting apparent
haphazardness of reference in order to achieve the net gain of the newer
criticism. A correlation backward to the classic collections of the
Reformation materials would, to my mind, have been pro forma and
inessential to the basic concerns of establishing evidence. In the area
of secondary materials I have attempted to make a distinction so as to
rely more heavily on the works of Reformation specialists. I have,
nevertheless, felt free to elaborate by a more random sampling of other
cogent references from a broader selection of writers.
For consistency in style I have had constant reference to A
Manual for Writers by Kate L. Turabian, which is recognized by the
University of Chicago and other American universities as definitive.
In matters of orthography and punctuation I beg leave to be guided by
standard American guides. Citations in Latin and German have been
included without translation. In the case of citations from
Scandinavian materials I have translated for the convenience of my
readers. Deviations from these normal practices will be indicated in
the footnotes.
The librarians and staffs of several libraries have been helpful
beyond the minimum requirements of their positions. I wish to
acknowledge my gratitude to the institutions which have made materials
available, and the staffs of New College, the University of Edinburgh;
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the University of Aarhus, Denmark; Luther Theological Seminary, St.
Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A.; and St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota,
U.S.A.
During the time that I have been employed in these researches
a series of organic breakdowns of my eyes has left me with limited
visual ability and tolerance for close work. Permission from the
University and my adviser to continue working over an extended term
was itself the greatest encouragement to make the effort. Family,
friends and colleagues have been instrumental in giving me a more
healthy attitude to the problem and in building my desire to continue
what was begun in more promising days.
My special appreciation must be expressed to my supervisor at
New College, Professor Thomas F. Torrance,for his assistance and
encouragement. My study term at the University of Aarhus, Denmark,
was marked by significant contacts with Professor Regin Prenter and
Professor K. E. L)2>gstrup and I owe them a great debt. To my present
colleagues and friends in the academic world I express my thanks for a
climate of scholarship and a community of concern.
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In every work of Biblical exposition a person, an individual,
is involved. Every hermeneutical system must be applied and ultimately
appraised by a person, by an individual. That individual person as the
subject, the thinking agent, is a most important ingredient in any
hermeneutical analysis. The following study is concerned to clarify
the nature and function of the Christian believing individual in the
context of the expository task.
The title of this thesis labels this segment of the problematic
of hermeneutics as "the subjective element. " The material immediately
following in this introduction is a preliminary definition of the concept.
All the following paragraphs should be viewed as a contribution to a
more careful definition and delimitation of the subjective element.
The word "subjective" is held in low repute in theological
circles. It conjures up a vision of the most biased non-objectivity,
and the term will most often be used in its pejorative connotation.
Since no more adequate term seemed ready to hand, the alternative
was necessarily to be accepted, to refurbish the term in its present
association and state an apologetic for its delimited connotations here.
1
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Allusive References to the Subjective Element
Our problem is complicated by the fact that there is an un¬
examined acceptance of the principle of a subjective element, or a
tacit recognition which is never elucidated formally in many serious
considerations of the hermeneutical problem. Thus, for example,
Robert M. Grant can insist that interpretation has a subjective aspect:
The interpretation of any written record of human
thought is the exposition of its author's meaning in
terms of our own thought forms. Though we may try
to think his thought after him, ultimately our own
mind must determine the way in which we express his
meaning. Interpretation is always subjective as well
as objective. *
Questioning the validity of contemporary interpretation,
Professor Grant writes: "Is the fault not in our methods but in our¬
selves? Have we sacrificed imagination and faith for a somewhat
2
illusory reputation as scientists?"
Clearly, a wider range of cognates for "subjective" must be
accepted in comprehending both the problem and the resolution. Grant's
use of "faith" is an obvious and significant indication of a line of
thought to be pursued. T. W. Manson incorporated faith in a complex
of development of his perspective:
The essential thing is that this kind of interpretation
should be the product of deep spiritual insight which
^Robert M. Grant, The Bible in the Church (New York: The
Macmillan Co. , 1960), pp. 2-3.
^Grant, Bible in the Church, 4.
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starts from, and builds upon the plain meaning of the
text. ... In this field there is no substitute for
sincere faith, intellectual integrity, and spiritual
insight. *
Personal faith is implied and the faith of the church is explicit
in H. Cunliffe-Jones' statement:
The meaning of the conviction that Jesus is Lord
is given by the Bible--but not by the Bible only but
by the Bible as interpreted by a living faith. Great
emphasis has been laid in recent years on the
objective study and teaching of Christian truth. But
this can only carry a limited way. At some point or
other the Biblical evidence must be interpreted by a
theological conviction, which arises out of the
Biblical material, which sets it all in a new illu¬
mination, but is not strictly given by an objective
study of the Bible, but by the Bible in the light of
the present affirmation of faith by an obedient
Church. 2
Starting with New Testament references, Leonhard Goppelt
moves to very modern "existence" terminology in supporting the same
argument for the believing church as interpreter:
The NT writings themselves assert that only he
understands their message who accepts it as a believing
member of the church and obeys it (Mark 4:11; John
7:16 f.; 2 Cor. 3:15f.). This claim is made not only
because understanding is always conditioned on common
experience, but because the center of the Scripture is
the hidden self-disclosure of God. In other words, it
is impossible first to try to establish historically what
^"T. W. Manson, "The Failure of Liberalism to Interpret the
Bible as the Word of God, " The Interpretation of the Bible, ed. C. W.
Dugmore (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1944),
pp. 106-7.
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H. Cunliffe-Jones, The Authority of the Biblical Revelation
(London: James Clarke & Co., Ltd., 1945), p. 112.
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is being said here, and then to demand believing
acceptance of the message; because the only way to
grasp the meaning of the text is to accept it as the
message of God. This is possible only for those
who have their existence within the church of Christ.
It is therefore not accidental that in the final
analysis the hermeneutical principles differ today
according to the self-understanding of the churches
to which the interpreters belong. ^
The subjective element may well be scrutinized also under the
more traditional heading of the work of the Holy Spirit on and in the
2
believer. Regin Prenter's significant dissertation, Spiritus Creator,
setting forth an "objective" view of Luther's teachings on the Holy
Spirit, contains also such a "subjective" passage as the section on
3
Anfechtung experience. In carefully guarded terms Gerhard Ebeling
incorporates the problem of the Spirit's role in the problem of under¬
standing:
PNEUMA als Subjekt und Medium der Auslegung.
Man kann das mit diesem Begriff gegebene
weiterzweigte Problem kurz auf die Formel bringen:
wie ein inspirierter Text durch einem inspirierten
Ausleger andere inspiriert.^
"''Leonhard Goppelt, "Bible Study, " The Lutheran Encyclopedia,
ed. Julius Boeensieck, I (1965), 243-4.
2
Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator: Studier i Luthers Teoloqi
(2. udg.; K^benhavn: Samlerens Forlag, 1946).
^Prenter, Spiritus, 213-17.
^Gerhard Ebeling, Evangelische Evangelienauslegunq: Eine
Untersuchunq zu Luthers Hermeneutik ("Forschungen zur Geschichte
und Lehre des Protestanismus, " herausgegeben von Ernst Wolf.
10.R. B.I.; Miinchen: Evangelischer Verlag Albert Lempp, 1942),
p. 92.
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Die Offenbarung in der Verborgenheit wird
gegenwartig durch den heiligen Geist, welcher
nicht neben dem Zeugnis als Hilfsmittel des
Verstehens erst aus anderer Quelle hinzukommen
muss, sondern der sich allein in dem Wort mitteilt,
das er wiederum selbst erst mitteilt. Hier wird
also im Gang unserer Untersuchung die Drage akut,
inwiefern der heilige Geist Voraussetzung und
Erfordernis zu "geistlicher" Auslegung ist. Es
geht nicht urn aufstellung subjektiver psychologischer
Vorbedingungen, sondern um Aufhellung objektiver
Bedingtheiten des Verstehens, wenn das Verstehen
der Vernunft bestritten und dem Glauben allein
zugesprochen wird und zwar dem Glauben, der in
der Anfechtung zur Erfahrung kommt. ^
The statements of conservative or fundamentalist Christians
are far more likely to elicit the charge of subjectivity, but are
legitimate matter for consideration. The adjectives "personal"and
"spiritual" are key descriptions for their point of view. The statement
of Bernard Ramm is in keeping with the American fundamentalist outlook
and expression:
Finally, what are the qualifications of a good inter¬
preter? First are the spiritual qualifications. From
the conservative Protestant standpoint this cannot
be debated. ... If the Bible is a spiritual book, then
those most likely to apprehend its truth are spiritual
people.^
The element of the personal is also evident in Cunliffe-Jones:
For when we read the Bible as Christian believers
we must not only acknowledge the personal claim,
but we must also learn to write a personal
^"Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 375.
2
Bernard Ramm, Protestant Biblical Interpretation: A Textbook
of Hermeneutics for Conservative Protestants (Boston: W. A. Wilde
Co. , 1960) , p . 7 .
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commentary. The commentary which we ourselves
write—in life, and in words only as appropriated in
life—is not a substitute for the public setting forth
of the witness of the Bible to Jesus our Lord. But
it is of the greatest importance to ourselves,
because it is the measure of our real appropriation
of the message which is the word of life to ourselves,
and our hope as we face the future. ^
It is only fair to permit Pxc{, Cunliffe-Jones to remove himself
from the company of the radically conservative by quoting the summary
statements of his book:
For it is only when, by means of the constant inter¬
action of the historical and theological study of the
Bible, we gain a theological interpretation of the
Bible which we can trust in its broad outlines as a
means of putting us in the place where we can hear
the living God, clothed in His Gospel, speaking
to us, that we can truly understand and obey the
authority of the Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments in their testimony to Divine Revelation
in Jesus Christ our Lord. ^
"Where we can hear the living God. . . " is a clause remind¬
ing us sharply of the theological systems of the mid-twentieth century
characterized by ideas of "encounter" or confrontation. It is in¬
escapable in such systems that the hearing person be studied as the
recipient of the revelation. So John Baillie asserts:
We must remind ourselves again that revelation
has place only within the relationship between the
Holy Spirit of God and the individual human soul.
Nothing is the vehicle of revelation for me unless




no Christian who hears God speaking to him through
every passage of the Bible. . . . Nevertheless it
is always our duly to ask ourselves whether the
defect may not be in ourselves rather than in the
text, whether even here it is not we who are not
willing to listen rather than that nothing significant
is being said.*
Although Professor Baillie here moves quickly to a problem of the canon
the emphasis on the responsibility of the individual hearer is integral
to his thought and is not to be overlooked.
Very succinctly and with a vital imagery Emil Brunner sets a
subjective element over against distant objectivity:
You can't understand the cross of Christ without
going there into the front line where God meets
you. It cannot be understood objectively from
O
the safe distance of objectivity.
One final citation in this sequence will help to verify the claim
that a subjective element is widely recognized, and further will
delineate aspects of that subjective quality:
Interpretations become theological exegesis by
understanding the words of biblical writings as
God's Word. This happens when the Word
personally hits the mark for the reader or
listener--and exegete, too. In order to under¬
stand the Bible one must not only discover what
is meant, but also who was meant, namely none
other than the reader and exegete himself. This
readiness to know that I am meant is faith. In
other words, the Bible is rightly interpreted as
■'•John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 119.
2
Emil Brunner, Faith, Hope, and Love (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 26-27.
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God's Word only when the exegete is ready to
surrender himself to the Word who here speaks,
which is to receive, in what he seeks to
interpret, the judgment of God upon himself. *
From this range of citations it is evident that the problem of the
subjective element in hermeneutics is directly related to the question
of the nature of faith, the faith-life and the hearing of faith. If faith
is a pre-condition of understanding, how does this faith operate in the
work of exposition and what method is consonant with the faith-
principle? And if, as Wilhelm Herrmann of Marburg said "we must
already be renewed and redeemed by revelation before we can enter
o
into the thought-world of Scripture, " how is this special kind of
hermeneutical circle to be entered?
The Hazards of Subjectivity
The intensity of the problem is augmented by the self-evident
hazards of unrestrained subjectivity. Is exposition to be guided by a
kind of spiritual intuition only? Is the individualism of the subject
to become a privatist, impregnable fortress? Is this matter of the
subjective to be rejected as emotionalism, as irrational or anti-rational,
as non-historical and non-objective? Terms such as these are
"'•Werner Elert, "The Authority of the Bible in the Church, "
The Lutheran Church Quarterly, XX, 4 (October, 1947), 416.
^Wilhelm Herrmann, Per Beqriff der Offenbaruna (1887); re¬
printed in OffenbarmT^jjnHJA/und^ (Giessen: 1908), pp. 9f. Quoted
in Baillie, The Idea of Revelation, 33.
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employed not only as descriptive of the difficulties involved, but as
allegations of improper procedures in the exposition of the Scripture.
The words of caution of Cunliffe-Jones concerning the "perils of
subjectivity" are well-advised.
In a very perceptive passage, Henry S. Nash voices both a
warning against subjectivity in the exegete, including the "critical"
and suggests a corrective to the tendency:
The task that lies ahead is the deep study of
individual documents. This is all the more
necessary because the wide gaps in our knowledge
of the Apostolic Age make constructive synthesis
as tempting as it is dangerous. The other great
need is that the student shall be on guard against
the personal equation. The critical individual of
modern Christianity is not wholly competent to
understand the men of the Bible, far whom religion
was a superb passion and the corporate life
instinctive. He needs also to remember that the
distinction between metaphysics and religion,
which has become a necessary element of thought,
was wholly foreign to the men of the New Testament.
The "critical" exegete may be, in some ways, quite
J
as naive as the patristic exegete. "
Certain aspects of contemporary Lutheran problems of inter¬
pretation are evident in a set of lectures originally addressed to a
predominantly Lutheran group of pastors. The published lectures con¬
stitute an apologetic for a new hermeneutical perspective, and contain
^"Cunliffe-Jones , Authority, 94.
^Henry S. Nash, "Exegesis or Hermeneutics, " The New Schaff-
Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley
Jackson, IV (1958), 247.
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the pejorative on subjectivity and a typically Luther an use of the
"letter" as corrective:
In other words, without the letter, without that
kind of understanding which biblical criticism has
for its object, subjectivity, personal experience,
theological exegesis--all run rampant. *
Although the delimitations of this thesis exclude a thorough
constructive statement, it is apparent that part of the problem involved
will be to imply or suggest at the very least some balancing factors, or
correctives to the unwarranted subjectivity of interpretation. The con¬
cluding chapter will incorporate this application of the principles set
forth in the body of the work.
The Focus on the Reformation
The complexity of the subjective problem and all its implied
ramifications defies simple solutions or the application of a
methodological model derived from a historical personage or historical
period. It would seem unwise to adduce either a person or an era as
a major contribution to the resolution of the dilemma posed above, but
this must nevertheless be essayed.
The unique position of the theology of the Reformation for every
sector of the Christian Church, continuing to the present moment, is
accepted without question. What is not so self-evident is the role of
i
*RoyA. Harrisville, His Hidden Grace: An Essay in Biblical
Criticism (New York: Abingdon Press, 1965), p. 66.
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the hermeneutics of the Reformation in bringing about the sweeping
changes of the sixteenth century and in redirecting the Biblical ex¬
position. This consensus is the basis for the selection of one segment
of Reformation hermeneutics for this study. The underlying thesis is
that as the theological presuppositions of the Reformers resulted in new
systematic formulations, so those same presuppositions engendered
a new hermeneutics.
This principle of coherence, involving an antecedent
hermeneutical shift,is suggested by Bernard Ramm:
Although historians admit that the West was ripe
for the Reformation due to several impending forces,
it nonetheless was a hermeneutical reformation
before it was either theological or ecclesiastical. ^
Gerhard Ebeling concurs in the judgment:
One has realized that the primary impulse for
reformation which originated in the quiet years
of Luther's beginnings was a reform of academic
studies and of the university under the sign of a
new hermeneutics. This is the correct element in
Karl Bauer's book on Die Wittenberger
Universitatstheologie und die Anfange der
Deutschen Reformation (1928). . . . The growth
of a new hermeneutics can already be noticed
prior to the years 1516-1518 in the midst of the
o
involvement in the traditional hermeneutics.
Luther and Melanchthon as Central Figures
The further limitation of the scope of this inquiry to the figures
^Ramm , Biblical Interpretation, 30.
^Gerhard Ebeling, "The New Hermeneutics and the Early Luther, "
Theology Today, XXI (April, 1964), 36.
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of Luther and Melanchthon requires some preliminary justification.
Ebeling makes a most significant transition from his declaration that
the Reformation hermeneutics marks a turning-point /Einschnitt/ to
immediate consideration of Luther's contribution. Even conceding a
professional interest in Luther on Ebeling's part, his judgment is
weighty. * In similar fashion, Robert M. Grant treats of the Bible and
the Reformation and states, "Protestant interpretation. . . owes its
2
life to the spirit of the Reformation, " a red proceeds to analyze the
development more closeiy with the starting point "as we find it
3
especially in the work of Martin Luther. "
The appraisal of Frederic W. Farrar is almost extravagant in
praise of Luther over against the other contenders for exegetical laurels
in the Reformation:
God endows His chosen instruments with such
gifts as they specially need. It required a personality
far different from that of Erasmus to faring about that
emancipation of Christendom from sacerdotal tyranny
and false exegesis which was the essence of the
Reformation. Revolutions have usually been wrought
by men whose sympathies were all the more intense
and concentrated from their very narrowness, not by
men of delicate refinement and many—sided powers
of appreciation. The genius of Erasmus, ana the
learning of Melanchthon, would have produced but
^"G. Ebeling, "Hermeneutik, " Die Religion in Geschichte und
Gegenwart, ed. Hans Frhr. v. Campenhausen et al. , 3. ed. , Vol.
Ill, p. 251.
^Grant, Bible in the Church, 109.
3
Grant, Bible in the Church, 110.
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small results without the Titanic force of Luther,
the sovereign good sense of Zwingli, the remorseless
logic of Calvin;--and of these three the greatest was
MARTIN LUTHER.1
In less oratorical style, Farrar points to the enduring quality of Luther's
exegesis: "In his Prefaces and in all his other works he enunciated
rules to which the complete revolution of exegetic methods in modern
2
times has been principally due.
Testimonies to the expository genius of Melanchthon are more
difficult to accumulate, and his inclusion in this study may seem
superfluous. Farrar makes only a few brief, scattered references to
Master Philip, Grant does not mention him. Professor Ebeling stands
in the same tradition when he makes only passing mention of him. Is
he then, to be considered only a lowly foil to the commanding presence
of Luther?
Several developments negate so harsh a judgment on
Melanchthon. For over a decade there has been a strong resurgence
of interest in the Preceptor of Germany, from a wide variety of per¬
spectives; the bibliography of this thesis will reflect only too small a
fraction of the total of new biographies and theological analyses.
Under the general editorship of Robert Stupperich a very carefully edited
Studienausgabe of Melanchthon's works, although a sharp abridgement,
^Frederic W. Farrar, History of Interpretation (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1961), pp. 322-23.
2
Farrar, History, 3 24.
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has made primary materials available to scholars with less than a
commanding interest in his writings. The twenty-eight volume of the
Bretschneider Corpus Reformatorum which contained Melanchthon's
works, long out of print, was reprinted in 1963.
Significantly, Melanchthon began to develop his own circle of
hermeneutical analysts. The Stuppejrich circle formed one sector of
the groups. Elsewhere, Hansjorg Sick, Lowell Green and Adolf Sperl
gave attention to specifically hermeneutical questions.
But even more decisive, most decisive, is the evaluation of the
oldest and most capable Melanchthon scholar of all: Martin Luther
himself. If no subsequent theologian had said a commendatory word
for Master Philip, if no one had bothered to search out from dusty and
unused volumes the doctrinal and exegetical works of Melanchthon,
then the task would still cry out to be done. Luther, too, could be
extravagant in his praise, and he was--about Melanchthon. Luther
knew that the reform of the Church, the pure teaching of the Word,
must eventually pass to other hands than his, and he was content to
see and groom the heir apparent to the role of leader—Melanchthon.
There is no escaping the fact that Luther stands as the
dominant figure in our inquiry. The sheer fact of seniority in age, in
academic position and in identification with the nascent reform move¬
ment places him in this position. From this point onward a long catena
of questions arises: Just how and what did Melanchthon learn from
Luther? How faithfully did he perpetuate the Reformation motifs?
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How clearly did he perceive the delicate nuances of Luther's thoughts?
How closely did his experience of the grace of Christ in the Gospel
resemble that of Luther in his Copernican. revolution of faith? From the
special perspective of this enterprise perhaps some new light may yet
be shed on these old questions.
Lest the ground seem to be rendered unproductive of fresh fruit
because of the trampling of all the Luther researchers, some suggestion
of need for this type of restudy should be submitted. Again we turn to
Gerhard Ebeling for counsel:
The hermeneutical revolution which occurred in
Luther's thinking has been largely buried again
even in the Protestant tradition and still hides
within itself hermeneutical understanding which
has not yet been unearthed. *
If some freshness of approach can be expected from the juxtaposition
of the subjective with the hermeneutical problem, and of Luther and
Melanchthon, we may also hope to fulfil some of the objective ex¬
pressed by Joseph Sittler:
The current search for a proper theological
method is surely due to the fact that our generation
finds older "Explanations" simply nox clear,
intelligible, or in just proportion. There is a
"disharmony between traditional explanations and
current needs." Statements of one period are
"felt as fact" in virtue of their congruity with
^"Ebeling, Theology Today, XXI, Mo. 1, 44.
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the spirit, practice, and basic assumptions of a
time; they are not "felt as fact" by another period, "
That these two men will furnish material for the study of the
problem of the subjective is assured in both cases. Many theologians
declare that Luther's basic contribution to religious thought was the
affirmation of the right of private judgment. Luther's insistence on
the priesthood of all believers suggests an expository responsibility
which somehow is universal to the rank and file of believers, thus in
some degree minimizing technical skills in favor of a faith function.
In the history of the Reformation, beginning most dramatically at the
Diet of Worms, Luther was forced to stand solitary, confronted on all
sides by the question, "Who are you to defy the Holy Church? " His
consciousness of this challenge, and his resolute probing for a
personal integrity in answering it, further indicates the centrality of
the subjective element in his religious life and in his work.
Melanchthon was faced by the same questionings. Though his
position seems in retrospect less dramatic, any biography must give
a portrayal of an almost relentless attack on Melanchthon at the con¬
ference tables where he came to be more involved than Luther.
Whether express or implicit, the question, "Who are you?" was never
far from Melanchthon either. The common judgment that his exposition
of Scripture was much more a matter of the head and less of the heart
^Joseph Sittler, The Ecology of Faith (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1961), p. 20.
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than was Luther's adds the spice of potential contrast to this research.
The final judgment as to Melanchthon's objectivity or subjectivity
should be deferred until more evidence is brought to bear.
The choice, on these grounds, of Luther and Melanchthon as
prime case histories for hermeneutics does not imply a search for an
ultimate contemporary model. The Reformation era is so complex, so
vital, so decisive a period that it furnishes the broadest possible
basis for inquiry. Therefore, a consideration of the problems and
terminology of that period may give, if not a norm, at the least valuable
examples and illustrations of hermeneutical perspectives and may
provoke some highly profitable and creative thought for the analysis
of contemporary methods of Biblical exposition.
The Limitation of the Focus Within Hermeneutics
Certain lines of inquiry, validly related to an analysis of the
methods of interpretation, must be scrutinized as to the propriety of
their inclusion in this project. These lines concern metaphysics or
the philosophy of religion, epistemoiogy, the scope of exegesis, and
general hermeneutics over against special or Biblical hermeneutics.
None of the above topics can be rigidly excluded from a study
such as this one. Questions of metaphysics and epistemoiogy become
valuable analytical probes. Exegesis and general hermeneutics have
a close relationship to special hermeneutics, but distinctions must
then be drawn as to their unique definitions and spheres.
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In the present state of scholarly work in hermeneutics, it is
almost commonplace to see metaphysical presuppositions set forth as
essential to the analysis of understanding. Thus the close nexus be¬
tween the thought of Heidegger and the Mew Testament work of Bultmann
is at issue in much of the "new hermeneutic. " The effect of such a
coordination is either to pervert historical studies by marshalling in¬
valid norms, invalid because they do not relate to the time of the
object of study, or to transpose the problem into an area which is only
preliminary to the Biblical hermeneuticai problem. Both of these
alternatives, hopefully, may be avoided by attempting to involve
metaphysical questions only as subsequent, incidental questions of
analysis of conclusions. The Platonism or neo-Platonism or
existentialism of the reformers may be of some significance to their
hermeneuticai views, but it is not the business of this inquiry to
decide just which "ism" best describes the presuppositions under
which they operated.
The rejection of this area of inquiry as a primary concern may
appear arbitrary and subjective. However, a stronger case can be
made against the proponents of a metaphysical, philosophy of religion
view. Gustaf Aulen does precisely this in the introduction to his
dogmatics. * The attempt must be made to understand the faith and its
^Gustaf Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church, trans. Eric
Wahlstrom (2d. Eng. ed.; Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1962),
pp. 7ff.
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workings from within, even though analysis will reveal the latent
metaphysic under which every man operates, which metaphysic he may
have absorbed unconsciously from his cultural environment.
The perspective of fides guaerens intellectum supplants
metaphysical schemata with doctrines of God, of creation, of man and
of history. In like manner, philosophical considerations on the
possibilities of knowing are supplanted by the doctrine of the en¬
lightenment of man by the Holy Spirit through the Word. Thus the
tedious, endless and unconvincing debate about the possibility of
revelation and of man's grasping the revealed is obviated. The long
consensus in the Church of this general principle of the knowability
of God cancels the accusation that the rejection of the niceties of
epistemology as normative is a bravado piece of Gordian knot-cutting.
Inquiries into the nature of language, of speech, must also be subsumed
under the head of epistemology. Some of the studies in this area may
certainly be accepted as ancillary and may give a fresh analytical
perspective, but conclusions drawn thereby may hardly be applied
absolutely to the sixteenth century.
Exegesis, as the process of interpreting a text, precedes
hermeneutics as practice precedes theory. Exegeted materials must
be the data for a historical study of hermeneutics. Once the range of
permissible exegetical procedures has been conceded in principle, the
precise operation and development of skills is not the concern of a
hermeneutical study. Questions of the canon, of textual variants, of
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linguistic problems relate to hermeneutics only if these problems reveal
uniquely an express or an unexamined hermeneutical principle.
The problem of the distinction between general and special or
Biblical hermeneutics is not easily drawn with precision. The post-
Renaissance Western world has absorbed much of the literary criticism
which characterized the great cultural movement of Renaissance
Humanism. The Bible moved into the wider field of world literature,
and was subjected to literary scrutiny qua literature. The higher
criticism of the Scripture openly acknowledged its indebtedness to
literary analysis. Some of our present confusion may stem from a con¬
fusion of exegesis and hermeneutics, a confusion which has not been
clarified by distinctions such as are set forth in the preceding paragraph.
The perspective accepted as a working basis for this study is
that there is a proper distinction between general hermeneutical
principles and Biblical. The following statement from the Catholic
Encyclopedia may be incomplete and dogmatic, but it does make the
essential point of distinctiveness: "The sacred character of the Bible
demands additional rules of interpretation which are not applicable
to profane writings. This separation does not deny the possibility
of significant contributions to the understanding of Biblical literature
from the application of general literary hermeneutics. Some con¬
siderations of subjectivity in reading literature are also found in purely
*"A. J. Maas, "Hermeneutics," Catholic Encyclopedia, ed.
Charles G. Herbermann etal. , VII, 1908 , 271.
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literary analyses. ^
The reluctance to make a sharper distinction between general
and Biblical hermeneutics may stem from a lack of appreciation of the
penultimate character of literature. A personal comment of Ernst Fuchs
seems germane to this argument. In the course of the first Consultation
on Hermeneutics at Drew University in 1962, there had been much dis¬
cussion of such literary giants as Holderiin and Rilke and the American
Robert Frost. Queried about his earlier interest in the German poets,
Fuchs commented in the hearing of this writer, "All that is past. Now
I only try to understand what the New Testament says. "
The foregoing delimitation of the problem areas is not an
attempt at a simplicist reduction of the problem. A. J. Maas correctly
writes "Hermeneutics does not supply a deficiency of natural ability,
9
nor does it rectify false philosophical principles or perverse passions."
There is no denying of the complexity also of a Biblical hermeneutic,
there is only a stronger affirmation that this complexity is singular
and unique to this special area.
''"Paul Valery, quoted on p. 37, W. H. Auden, The Dyer's Hand
(New York: Random House, 19 62) : "One only reads well that which one
reads with some quite personal purpose. It may be to acquire some
power. It can be out of hatred for the author. "
^Catholic Encyclopedia, VII, 271.
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The Method for the Research
The delimitations sketched above have been largely negative in
character. Stated positively, the method involves historical and
systematic development and appraisal. This betokens first descriptive,
then critical statement.
Since Reformation studies are so frequently charged with
denominational and theological bias, and a problem involving subjectivity
demands an even greater effort for objectivity, the approach by historical
study is of the greatest importance. This method is urged by Prenter^
2and Wingren. Uuras Saarnivaara emphasizes the genetic factor in the
history; "The new Luther-study proceeds according to a historico-
genetic method, paying particular attention to Luther's spiritual and
3
theological development."
The data for such a historical study are manifold. The con¬
tingent biographical factors of economic and sociological status, of
education and spiritual development are not to be underestimated. The
relationship of hermeneutics to exegesis as drawn above demands the
prime use of exegetical writings. Some specific statements on the
^Prenter, Spiritus, pp. 11 ff.
2
Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict: Nvgren—Barth--
Bultmann, trans. Eric H. Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press,
1958), pp. 150 ff. , pas sim .
3
Uuras Saarnivaara, "Some Questions concerning Recent Luther
Research, " The Lutheran Quarterly, I (February, 1949), 92.
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special aspect of the hermeneutical problem must be adduced, but
allusions and implications which only suggest support for this
project's thesis must also be accepted in evidence. Direct statements
of hermeneutical principle from Luther and Melanchthon, together with
their statements in systematic and polemic declarations which have a
bearing on the topic,are also historical data. From secondary sources,
that is, from other scholars, another level of statements may be drawn
having historical significance.
To introduce systematic considerations at this point in the
method is not to relegate systematics to a secondary role because of
the sequence, nor exalt it to a primary role because of the critical
function. Tests must be made of the conclusions from history and by
history. Some of these questions, obviously of a systematic
character, are: Are these conclusions consistent with the data adduced
and with the total theological position of Luther and Melanchthon?
Is there a coherence of thought which admits these conclusions into
the totality, or are the conclusions suspect as deviating from fully
developed and self-conscious theological statements of the re¬
formers?
Inescapably, such a systematic evaluation becomes affected
by the writer's history, the history of the twentieth century. No study
of the ways of thought of the sixteenth century, or some mysterious
mental time machine can eradicate the time differential. The "new
hermeneutic" has raised questions never anticipated in the sixteenth
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century; historiography has asked more penetrating questions of the
nature of human existence in history; studies in eschatoiogy since the
Reformation have raised issues and suggested alternatives far removed
from the specter of the Turks at the gates of Vienna. Insofar as these
developments enhance an understanding of systematic questions they
are admissible to method, insofar as they threaten to read back into
a by-gone era factors that did not operate at that time, they are to be
handled with the greatest caution and safeguards against anachronistic
judgments.
Somewhat the same difficulty is involved in the irresistible
urge to make some kind of translation of the hermeneutical principles
of Luther and Melanchthon to this present age. In a time of ecumenical
dialogue, it would be fascinating to adduce the words of the Reformers
in the Roman Catholic—Protestant dialogue on the nature of the
Scripture and its interpretation. It would be for many a superb achieve¬
ment to be able to judge the Lutheranism or non-Lutheranism of the
Bultmannites and post-Bultmannites, from the ipsissima verba of
Luther and Melanchthon. Here again, while the temptation will be
irresistible to attempt some brief, hopefully provocative, applications
of the conclusions to contemporary issues in hermeneutics, the writer
will be the first to recognize the tentative character of such attempts
to suggest today's norms in terms of yesterday's history.
CHAPTER II
A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF HERMENEUTICS
BEFORE THE REFORMATION
Since Luther and Melanchthon were both historically-minded
and historically-oriented it is proper to study carefully their historical
backgrounds. Their common belief in the primacy of Scripture drove
them back to the ancient record of the Old and New Testaments. Luther
taught Peter Lombard's Sentences, was intrigued by the Mystics of the
Church, came to regard Augustine very highly, and like other inter¬
preters of his day, employed the existing traditional glosses and
scholia on the Scripture. Out of his Humanist background, Melanchthon
accepted the programmatic ad fontes, and perhaps more self-consciously
consulted the works of his predecessors in interpretation.
In order to avoid repeated disruption in the continuity of the
major argument by lengthy historical sections, this chapter of selective
history is inserted to set a fuller background to the sixteenth century
hermeneutics. It is intentionally selective in terms of the persons and
the motifs set forth. The choices have been made on the basis of those
topics most precisely related to the discussion following.
The range of groups or individuals selected includes: Jewish
interpreters, Philo, the Alexandrian as over against the Antiochene
tradition, Origen, Augustine of Hippo, Nicholas of Lyra, Gabriel Biel,
and Jacques Lefevre d'Etaples. The motifs developed, necessarily
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varied because of the differences of emphasis in the interpreters dealt
with, are the nature and working of faith in the interpretation, with its
corollary in evidences of subjectivity in interpretation; the role of the
individual as related to the community of the believers; and the develop¬
ment of the four-fold sense of Scripture.
In a sense, if we were to examine the totality of Christian
hermeneutical history, we should begin with the New Testament writers'
interpretation of the Old Testament materials. How did the apostle
Paul most self-consciously and critically interpret the message of the
Scriptures in which he had been instructed from his youth? How did
the other writers of the New Testament canon relate the material and
relate to the corpus of the Old Testament? We pass by such questions
because pragmatically the interpreters we are studying demonstrate
their principles of interpretation on an already accepted Biblical canon.
It is, nevertheless, essential to clarify two points lying as
presuppositions to our historical and descriptive inquiry throughout the
ensuing pages, whether set forth in precise terms or not. These two
presuppositions are: 1. It was the interpretation of the Old Testa¬
ment Scripture by the New Testament writers which determined and
defined what the Christian faith was and was to continue to be.
2. This Christian faith was Christocentric. That is, further, there
was not only recorded the appearance of a Messiah, but there was an
Incarnation. This incarnation said something precisely about the
nature of the world and of history, about man in his nature, about man
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and his salvation, about man and his knowledge of God. All subsequent
Biblical interpretation stands under the judgment of this
Christocentricity. ^
The Rabbis and Philo
In view of the emphasis, particularly the contemporary emphasis,
on the excellence of Hebraic thought modes in juxtaposition with
Hellenic thought-forms, we might expect some quite meaningful
exemplars to stem from Jewish Biblical interpretation. It is self-evident
that the Jewish Christians, like Paul, who contributed to the New
Testament corpus, give evidence of this excellence, but we have de¬
clined methodologically to deal with this material. There is, of course,
within the pages of the New Testament a great deal of dialogue based
on the conflicts of interpretations of the Scriptures. The early sermons
in Acts and the confrontations of the apostles with Jews in the Temple
and in the synagogues are illustrative. Typically, it is the Christ as
the rock of offense who opens the cleft; He can not be seen in relation
to the Old Testament, hence He and the presumptive kingdom are to be
rejected.
An analysis of the interpretation by the later rabbis of the
Scripture as canonized by the Christian community would be more
^E. G. Ignatius vs. Gnostic Judaism as summarized by Jean
Danielou, The Theology of Jewish Christianity, tr. and ed. John A.
Baker (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1964), p. 40.
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specialized than we could here attempt. Besides the technical factors
of knowledge of languages and texts which would be required there are
the significant variants of time and place and of differing theological
positions among the rabbis which make such a study too formidable.
As Solomon Schechter says, "Whatever the faults of the Rabbis were,
consistency was not one of them."^ Our judgments, then, must in¬
evitably be both incomplete and faulty since we are left to the alterna¬
tive of generalization.
Millar Burrows conforms to our expectations in his statement of
typical themes in Israel's view of her history: "In human history the
one, eternal, living God is working out his own sovereign purpose for
2the good of his creatures. The purpose of God is a moral purpose. "
However, the emphasis on the moral aspect deteriorates into the petty
strictures which are certainly a part, even if not the whole, of rabbinic
interpretation. The Pauline judgment on works is undoubtedly a con¬
sequence of this tendency.
The premise that "God is working" was assumed in Judaism to
the extent that it did not require self-conscious examination among
the Jews where tradition was strong. There it assumed the character
■'■Solomon Schechter, Aspects of Rabbinic Theology (New York:
Schocken Books, 1961), p. 46.
2
Millar Burrows, Ancient Israel, The Idea of History in the
Ancient Near East (American Oriental Series, Vol. 38, Henry M.
Hoenigswald, ed. , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp.
128-130.
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of doctrine. On this presupposition cosmology and anthropology took
on a strong character of realism, as J. Pedersen maintains. The world
and history were accepted for what they are, man was seen as a
totality. This is evident, but not self-evident, in the descriptive
1
designation of man as soul. That ambiguous word does not there mean
what it subsequently was given to mean in Platonism, Neo-Platonism
or Philonism. The soul was the totality of man, such that thinking,
2
willing and doing were all related to it explicitly. Here there is no
dichotomy nor trichotomy, nor is thinking considered a theoretical
functioning. In spite of the qualification which Thorleif Boman makes
to guard against an over-Platonizing analysis of Hebrew thought he
goes too far in his claim that a Platonic Idea concept is latent in
3
Hebraic thought and in Pedersen's analysis of the soul.
The application of doctrine to life required some very special
exegesis. The written. law was divinely revealed and every word,
every letter, was significant. By a systematic, logical process the
implications of this unchangeable law could be extracted to resolve
the dilemmas of moral decision posed by changing situations both in
^Johs. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, 4 vols. (Oxford:
Geoffrey Gummerlege, Oxford University Press, 1926) I, p. 100.
^Pedersen, Israel, I, 99-110.
3
Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, tr. J.
Moreau (The Library of History and Doctrine; Philadelphia: The West¬
minster Press, 1960), pp. 67-73.
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the homeland and in the Diaspora. Hillel, who came out of a
Babylonian background,developed his seven hermeneutical rules to
effect this juristic exegesis."'' The application of these and other
rabbinic rules often seems puerile to us, drawing as they may in ex¬
treme instances upon the trivia of grammar, spellings, etymologies,
even punctuation. The principles are applied with forbidding legalism
to questions which seem pure casuistry.
In spite of this threat to vitality, rabbinic interpreters found in
2the Scripture a "living letter" which gave to the Jews moral strength,
resistance to persecution, preservation of the family, in other words,
3
tropologically, the letter mediated the power of the Scripture. The
religious spirit of the interpreter evidently transcended the strict letter
of his method.
The view of history and of man's role in history is more funda¬
mental to our inquiry and of prime importance in appraising the nature
of rabbinic exposition of Scripture, including the appraisal of the
possibility or probability of the incarnation as divine activity.
George Foot Moore, Judaism: In the first Centuries of the
Christian Era—the Age of the Tannaim , 3 Vols. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962) I, pp. 77-78. For Hillel's rules, v. Hermann
L. Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash. tr. n. n. (New
York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 93-94.
2
Joseph Klaussner, From Tesus to Paul, tr. William F.




Joseph Klaussner's assertion that there is in Judaism "such faith
in life and such strong optimism""'' has a noble ring to it. That ring is
negated, however, by other statements which can imply only that man
is responsible as an individual isolate, and that his apocalyptic hope
2
is not to be fulfilled within history.
As to the isolation of the individual into private responsibility,
Schechter cites that most prestigious ancient rabbi, Hillel "who said,
'If I am not for myself, who is for me, and being for myself, what am
I? 1 which is explained to mean, 'I must work out my own salvation, yet
how weak are my unaided efforts!' We see Joseph Klaussner as a
twentieth century counterpart of the Hillel type of viewpoint. Although
Klaussner's analysis in From Jesus to Paul seems a curiously biased
and tortuous interpretation of New Testament materials we recognize
that he manifests a masterly awareness of the data which he combines
with his thoroughly Jewisftposition. Klaussner rules out the possibility
of a universal atonement including the redemption of nature by the
Christ-Messiah, and again exalts the unfettered human spirit and the
4
"joy in living and the potent energies of man aspiring to greatness. "
One might well paraphrase this kind of statement to suggest that the
^Klaussner, From Jesus to Paul, 525.
2
Burrows, Ancient Israel, 130.
^Schechter, Rabbinic Theology, 182-3.
4
Klaussner, From Jesus to Paul, 526-7.
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redemptive work, the Messianic work will be done on this earth, in this
history, by pious man himself, or it will not be done at all.
Before proceeding to the next point in this historical overview,
we may well consider a sub-thesis which seems to have validity. It
is already evident that the issues we are describing have been studied
over against alternatives, that the statements have been at times
highly apologetic, at other times strongly polemical. The inescapable
exemplars of hermeneutical development are those rising out of dramatic
confrontations with Jews, or pagans, or ultimately with other Christians
informed by opposing presuppositions. Thus we move naturally first
to the apologetic position of Philo.
Philo
Although he was a Jew and wrote as a Jewish apologist, Philo
made a remarkable impression on Christian exegesis. We may ascribe
to him the initiation of the allegorical interpretation which found its
Christian expression in Origen. Other lesser expositors learned from
him even before the time of Origen. The dominance of allegorical
method in the following centuries, and the pointed attacks of the re¬
formers against the method, make Philo a central, though suspicious,
figure in this brief history.
Sensitive to the criticism of the Jews in Alexandria, particularly
that of the officious Romans, Philo attempted to prove that "the in¬
sights of Judaism, properly understood, do not differ from the highest
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insights of Greek philosophy. God revealed himself to the chosen
people of Israel, but he revealed himself in no radically different way
from the way in which he revealed himself to the Greeks."''' In a sense,
then, Philo and Paul are apostles to the Gentiles, although they differ
2
ultimately from one another, and both differ from the rabbinic exegesis.
It would be a mistake to consider Philo merely an eclectic or
an imitator. He is indebted to Heraclitus, to the Stoics, and above all,
to Plato. Klaussner makes a strong case for his originality by the
3
working in of elements from Judaism. We must note here that all of
Philo's antecedents, both Jewish and Hellenistic, were familiar with
allegorical interpretation and gave unusual place to the method. Philo
adapted and developed the tradition.
Allegory before Plato may have had more of a positive rather
A
than an apologetic character. The defence of the Homeric materials
over against the charge of immorality or denigration of the gods was
accomplished by allegory, but even more there was widespread use of
the method to arrive at moral or tropological conclusions, for the
^Grant, Bible in the Church, 52.
2
Grant, Bible in the Church, 30.
3
Klaussner, From Jesus to Paul, 181.
4
J. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation, " Classical
Quarterly, XXIII, (July-October, 1929), 142.
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upbuilding of virtue. * The Stoics and other philosophers may have used
allegory, and we may construe this as an abuse, in order to find
2
sanction for their ideas in accepted and highly regarded literature.
Such uses clearly indicate that the mode of interpretation might be
determined by presuppositions either examined or unexamined.
Plato's use of allegory, while it was certainly not central to
his method, was derivative from his primary understandings of the
universe. For Plato, understanding came through aialectice, through
3discursive reasoning. Granted that poets had obviously stated some
truths, but had not arrived at those truths dialectically, some ex¬
planation must be made for the phenomenon. The poet did not himself
4
know the intention of his thought. This non-historical writing must
have been the result of direct inspiration and could be understood not
by rational analysis, but by allegorizing only, and even then one
might not be sure of the correctness of the interpretation. As we shall
mention shortly, Philo went beyond Plato in his confidence in the
potential validity of allegory, but the major emphasis here as Danielou
says, is that "the work of Philo exhibits the first attempt to apply to
*Tate, Classical Quarterly, XXIII, Nos. 3, 4, 145.
^Tate, Classical Quarterly, XXIII, Nos. 3, 4, 144.
3
J. Tate, "On the History of Allegorism, " Classical Quarterly,
XXVIII, (April, 1934), 114.
^Tate, Classical Quarterly, XXIII, Nos. 3, 4, 149.
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Scripture the exegetical methods of Hellenism. "
Plato's difficulty with the truths taught by poets is analogous to
Philo's dilemma over against an inspired, authoritative, but non-
dialectical Scripture. His problem was further complicated by his
Jewish concept of God, as Klaussner points out:
Also, the question of contact between deity--pure
spirituality--and impure matter is for a monotheistic
Jew a more difficult question than it is for a Greek
philosopher, whose monotheism is a theoretical
principle of existence and not a principle of life
(a "living God"—fashioner and creator, "the first
and the last"--the God of society and the God of
history.) ^
Philo resolved the problem by developing the idea of mediators:
the Logos, his angelology, the Powers, Wisdom and the like.
Klaussner sees this method as avoiding the hazards of "corporealism"
which was associated in his mind with the later Christian
3
"corporealizing" of Philo's Logos into the Christ of the Christians.
Through Sophia as the Hodos the way leads from the cosmos to the
heavenly world. ^ Klaussner's conclusion is couched in more typically
^Danielou, Theology of Jewish Christianity, 37.
2
Klaussner, From Jesus to Paul, 182.
^Klaussner, From Jesus to Paul, 183, 184, 188.
4
Sidney G. Sowers, The Hermeneutics of Philo and Hebrews :
A Comparison of the Interpretation of the Old Testament in Philo
Judaeus and the Epistle to the Hebrews, (Basel Studies of Theology,
ed. the Faculty of Theology, Basel, No. 1; Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1965),
p. 108.
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mystical language of "rapture" and "ecstasy" which is further seen as
typical Jewish mysticism.
Just as allegory from its earliest beginning had posited a new
O
cosmology so Philo interpreted the book of Genesis as a cosmogony,
not a history. The predilection for this problem of the nature of
creation and the nature of nature, as well as the disproportionate in¬
terest in the book of Genesis, is illustrative of the continuing central
concerns of the allegorists. In the world thus seen, sense, as a
lower human function, is limited in terms of ability to apprehend not
only Being, but also past and future. Thus Philo writes in the
Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis ii:
Perception by itself is now, subsisting only in
relation to the present time. For whereas past,
present, and future are within the scope of the
mind, as it grasps things present, remembers
things past, and looks forward to things future,
perception, on the other hand, has no power either
to reach out to future things by experiencing some¬
thing corresponding to hope or expectation, nor
does it remember things past, but it is so con¬
stituted as to be affected only by that which is
present and sets it in motion at the moment. . . .4
^Klaussner, From Jesus to Paul, 96.
J. Tate, "The Beginnings of Greek Allegory, " Classical Review,
XLI, (December, 1927), 215.
^Philo, Works, F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, 10 Vols.
(Loeb Classical Library; London; Wm. Heinemann Ltd.), I, 1929-62,
p. 2, 7.
4Philo, Works, I, 251.
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In such a cosmos discursive reason has lost its primacy to that
strange and indefinable mind or spirit or whatever it variously is
designated, which alone can rise to the knowledge of ultimate truths.
Were it not for gifts of grace promised in the enterprise of knowing
truth and doing good"'' (a doctrine not unlike that of Plato concerning
9
poets' reception of right doctrines through the Graces") one sees little
hope for any clarity or authority in such understanding.
Philo is not to be turned aside, however. Plato had been
willing to treat both objectionable and unobjectionable passages
3
allegorically but Philo sees the spiritual sense in all of the Scripture,
4
so it is all to be understood allegorically. Surely this is the most
dynamic element in Philo, the element which was to dominate exegesis
for hundreds of years. Plato could be quizzical, even skeptical, about
allegory,^ Philo urged a programmatic consistency. Although Miss
^Klaussner, From Tesus to Paul, 190.
^Tate, Classical Quarterly, XXIII, Nos. 3, 4, 148. For Philo's
understanding of "grace", especially his hypostatising of the concept, v.
Thomas F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers,
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1959),
pp. 6-10.
^Tate, Classical Quarterly, XXIII, Nos. 3, 4, 146-47.
%ean Danielou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 183.
^Tate, Classical Quarterly, XXIII, Nos. 3, 4, 154.
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Smalley's allegation of "fantasy" in the following paragraph is
marvellously well taken, the thirteenth century was not the final end
of Philonic influence.
At some time in the thirteenth century commentators
step back 'through the looking-glass', out of their
world of reflections into everyday life. The first im¬
pulse seems to come from religious experience. We
can see the Philo tradition losing its appeal, and
collapsing into sheer fantasy, even before Maimonides
and Aristotle supplant and discredit it. The scholars
rationalize and hasten something which is already
happening. The 'letter' of Scripture has captured not
only their reason but their affection too. ^
This dominance in the realm of exegesis parallels Philo's in¬
fluence in philosophy. H. A. Wolfson considers the next seventeen
centuries the age of Philo, and contends that nothing new happened in
2
philosophy until Spinoza tried to free philosophy from Scripture." The
philosophers' problem of knowledge had become the problem of the
knowledge of the revealed Scripture and the problem of the relationship
3
of knowledge and faith.
In a seminal paragraph Wolfson analyzes the development out
of Philo in terms which sharpen our theological perspective on the
ensuing centuries:
•*-Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 308.
9
Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious
Philosophy in Tudaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2 Vols. , (Structure and
Growth of Philosophical Systems from Plato to Spinoza; Third printing,
rev.; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), II,
459-60.
3Wolfson, Philo, I, 152-58.
39
Three different views appeared in each of these
three religious philosophies—Christian, Moslem,
Jewish with regard to the relation between
philosophy and Scripture--views which expressed
themselves in the form of three distinct definitions
of faith. There was a double-faith theory, according
to which true faith is either assent to Scripture
without the aid of philosophy or assent to Scripture
with the aid of philosophy. There was a single-
faith'theory of the rationalist type, according to
which true faith is the assent to Scripture with the
aid of philosophy. There was also a single-faith
theory of the authoritarian type, according to which
true faith is assent to Scripture without the aid of
philosophy. According to all these conceptions of
faith, even the double-faith theory and the single-
faith theory of the rationalist type, Scripture is still
the mistress and philosophy the handmaid. i
In view of the preceding testimonies, Philo's influence on the exegetes
of the church must be assumed, even where it is not so specified. It
will be our concern to indicate extremes of servility or independence
and notable borrowings rather than the usual acceptance of Philonic
presuppositions.
Origen
The affinities between Philo and Origen are more than symbolized
in their common origins from Alexandria. Philo was a part of the Jewish
Diaspora, Origen was a part of that growing Christian community out¬
side Palestine and in constant contact with the Hellenistic worid of
thought. Miss Smalley writes:
^Wolfson, Philo, I, 156.
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It was natural that towards the end of this century
and beginning of the next Alexandria should be¬
come a point of fusion for Christian and Philonic
exegesis. We can see the process at work in
Origen, who praised Philo, while regarding him¬
self as a disciple and continuator of St. Paul;
he combated and borrowed from both Jewish rabbis
and gnostic heretics. *
Anders Nygren ascribes to Origen a central roie in the establishment of
Alexandrian theology and holds him responsible for incorporating the
Eros motif, as a Hellenizing factor, into Christian theology, which
says substantively what other interpreters say methodologically about
2
Origen's relation to Hellenistic thought.
The difficulty of establishing a consensus on the underlying view¬
points of Origen is indicated already in Milburn's statement that
"Origen, at any rate, chose St. Paul rather than Philo as the justifica¬
tion for his allegorizings. " ^ Danielou, in his major work on Origen,
makes clear that we must start with the figure of the apostle and
missionary who uses philosophy to communicate with his time, in
other words, to form an apologetic.^
■'"Smalley, Study of the Bible, 6.
2
Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. Philip S. Watson
(Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1953), p. 253.
3
R. L. P. Milburn, Early Christian Interpretations of History,
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 45.
4 '
Jean Danielou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 73.
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Origen confirms this understanding in the opening lines of the De
Principiis:
Since, in our investigation of matters of such
importance, not satisfied with the common opinions,
and with the clear evidence of visible things, we
take in addition, for the proof of our statements,
testimonies from what are believed by us to be
divine writings, viz. , from that which is called the
Old Testament, and that which is styled the New,
and endeavour by reason to confirm our faith. . . *
In carrying out this program it must be admitted that Origen was guided
2
by a "churchly instinct" as Ebeling puts it and that he was cognizant
of the Rule of Faith. In the Preface of De Principiis we read:
Seeing there are many who think they hold the
opinions of Christ, and yet some of these think
differently from their predecessors, yet as the
teaching of the Ghurch, transmitted in orderly
succession from the apostles, and remaining in
the Churches to the present day, is still pre¬
served, that alone is to be accepted as truth
which differs in no respect from ecclesiastical
and apostolical tradition.^
Danielou again asserts adamantly that Origen never lost hold of the
rule of faith. ^ The subsequent conflict of opinions as to Origen's
orthodoxy must be judged in light of the task he set himself. Since
'''Origen, Works, Vol. IV, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, ea. Alex¬
ander Roberts and James Donaldson (New York: The Christian Literature
Company, 1890), p. 349.
^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 117.
^Origen, Works , IV, 239.
^Danielou, Oriqen, IV, 8.
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the Rule had not said everything, and there were significant questions
being asked, Origen wished to go on to make tentative answers to
theological questions which ought to be answered. * On these uncharted
ways he encountered heresy charges.
Origen's contribution to theology was notable in the application
of his competence to hermeneutical problems. His De Principiis con¬
tains much of theory, and Contra Celsum much of application. There
is such a close relationship of the parts of the central concept that a
neat separation into outline form is virtually impossible. Ebeling has
suggested a division which is adequate to our use and we shall pursue
2
our analysis under the three headings he employs.
Origen views the whole Scripture as a teaching of law, thus
placing it in a rationalized, de-historicized Mystery-concept. The
legal concept is underscored in relating Moses and Jesus Christ as
3
legislators bringing "saving doctrine. " The result of faith is the
moral improvement of man, "to have become reformed and improved in
their habits, through the belief that men are chastised for sins, and
4
honoured for good works. " The emphasis on this element led Hal Koch
*v. R. A. Norris, Jr., God and World in Early Christian
Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1965), p. 140.
^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 113-17.
^Origen, Works, N, 349.
^Origen, Works, N, 400.
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to characterize Origen's theology as a "pedagogical idealism."'''
Niebuhr analyzes Origen's doctrine of salvation as a typical Hellenizing,
Alexandrian bridging of the chasm between created and Uncreated by
2
knowledge.
The end of this knowledge is contemplation, comprehension of
the mysteries. Here is the Christian mystic's view of God, notably
not a hearing of the Word of God in the world, but a seeing, a point
4
which will have considerable importance in our later analyses.
The entire Scripture, Origen asserts not only as his personal
judgment but as the conviction of the Church, is a mystery with a
spiritual meaning:
That the Scriptures were written by the Spirit of
God, and have a meaning, not such only as is
apparent at first sight, but also another, which
escapes the notice of most. For those (words)
which are written are the forms of certain mysteries,
and the images of divine things. Respecting which
there is one opinion throughout the whole Church,
that the whole law is indeed spiritual; but that the
spiritual meaning which the law conveys is not
known to all.
'"Commented on in Nygren, Agape and Eros, 386, n. 3.
2
Reinhold Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, 2 Vols. , (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), II, p. 58.
3Norris, God and World, 133, 137.
^Smalley, Study of the Bible, 1.
^Origen, Works, IV, 241.
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And again:
For, with respect to holy Scripture, our opinion is
that the whole of it has a "spiritual, " but not the
whole a "bodily" meaning, because the bodily
meaning is in many places proved to be
impossible. ^
In the breadth of'these statements his relation to Philo is self-evident.
The result of this spiritualizing is to de-historicize, to deny
the validity of history except as a point of connection for the
2
spiritual. The phraseology chosen by analysts varies within a narrow
range from Patterson, "widening even further the gulf separating the
methods and materials of historia from the study of the true actions of
God in behalf of his creatures" to Milburn's judgment that Origen
edges away from the claim that God makes use of historical events. ^
To consider both nature and history sacramental, as Milburn does,
admittedly leaves unresolved the problem that the "precise relationship
between objective facts and the faith which transfigures is not easily
expressed in the clear-cut formulae of logic. "^ But, as Nygren points
out, when Origen conceives of the creation as existing for penal
*Origen, Works, IV, 369.
^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 113, 114.
3
L. G. Patterson, God and History in Early Christian Thought,
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1967), p. 55.
^Milburn, Early Christian Interpretations, 47.
^Milburn, Early Christian Interpretations, 53. cf. Smalley,
Study of the Bible, 7 .
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purposes, an atonement in history can have no real meaning. * The
efforts of Origen to concede a value to history and preserve his pre¬
supposition of the spiritual nature of the Scripture, without conceding
too much to the Gnostics, requires at times what Ebeling aptly terms
2
"ein genialer Gedankensprung. "
Origen's concept of the nature of "flesh" is Ebeling's second
division. Following Plato's ideas, man is seen to be composed of
three parts, body, soul and spirit. Scripture parallels this trichotomy:
For as man consists of body, and soul, and
spirit, so in the same way does Scripture, which
has been arranged to be given by God for the
salvation of men. ^
This basic statement is construed more explicitly:
Since then Scripture itself also consists as it were of a
visible body, and of the soul in it that is perceived
and understood, and of the spirit which is according
to the patterns and shadow of the heavenly things--
come, let us call on Him who made for Scripture body
and soul and spirit, a body for them that came before
us, a soul for us, and a spirit for them that in the age to
come shall inherit life eternal, and shall attain to the
heavenly and true things of the law; and so let us for the
present search not the letter but the soul. And if we are
able, we shall ascend also to the spirit, in our account
of the sacrifices whereof we have just read.^
^Nygren, Agape and Eros, 385.
2
Ebeling, Ev. Evang. ,114.
^Origen, Works, IV, 359.
4
Origen, Selections, Selections from Early Writers: Illustrative
of Church History to the Time of Constantine, ed. Henry Melvill
Gwatkin, (London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1958), p. 133.
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How this outlook is related backward to Paul and forward to the develop¬
ment of hermeneutical principles is sketched by Grant:
Origen interprets this passage in the light of Paul's
three-fold analysis of human personality (I Thess.
5:23) into "spirit, soul, and body," and concludes
that there is a "bodily" or literal sense, a "soul" or
moral sense, and a "spiritual" or allegorical-
mystical sense in scripture. In actual practice, how¬
ever, Origen rarely makes use of the moral sense as
distinct from the other two senses, and he ordinarily
distinguishes merely between the "letter" and the
"spirit" (2 Cor. 3:6). ^
In view of later developments, Origen's strong emphasis on the future
hope should not be obscured by a generalizing of "spiritual" inter¬
pretation, for here is an adumbration of the anagogical sense of the
later interpreters.
Danielou traces the essentials of the foregoing trichotomy view
to Philo and proceeds to sketch the resulting dual interpretation of
2
Scripture. For the ordinary Christians, simple, and even dull of
thought, the literal meaning is all that can be apprehended, but for
the wise, the knowledgable, the perfect, the spiritual meaning is in¬
tended. Thus:
Now it ought to be known that the holy apostles,
in preaching the faith of Christ, delivered themselves
with the utmost clearness on certain points which
they believed to be necessary to every one, even to
those who seemed somewhat dull in the investigation
of divine knowledge; leaving, however, the grounds
of their statements to be examined into by those who
should deserve the excellent gifts of the Spirit, and
"'"Grant, Bible in the Church, 68-69.
2
Danielou, Origen, 178-91; cf. Nygren, Agape and Eros, 380.
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who, especially by means of the Holy Spirit Him¬
self, should obtain the gift of language, of wisdom,
and of knowledge: while on other subjects they
merely stated the fact that things were so, keeping
silence as to the manner or origin of their existence;
clearly in order that the more zealous of their
successors, who should be lovers of wisdom, might
have a subject of exercise on which to display the
fruit of their talents,--those persons, I mean, who
should prepare themselves to be fit and worthy
receivers of wisdom. ^
Our third subdivision is in a sense a summary of the preceding
and an extension into method. The emphasis on the spirit and the
spiritual meaning is derived from the idea that what is evident is only
the shadow of reality, and the way to expose the reality is by means
of allegorical interpretation.
There are some unpleasant aspects in the elaboration of the
concept of those who are "perfect" and competent to probe the
mysteries. It appears that God will be known by those who do what
o
they can to find Him, a concept altogether too close to doing "quod
in se est. " Origen does not absolve himself from this brand of semi-
Pelagianism when he writes: "the principles of our faith, harmonizing
3
with the general ideas implanted in our minds at birth. . . " It is true
4
that Origen stoutly affirms the priority of the revelation of God to man *
^"Origen, Works, IV, 239. cf. 355.
2 ,
Danielou, Origen, 108.
^Origen, Works, IV, 480.
^Norris, God and World , 133.
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and that the work is dependent on a grace or charisma under prayer for
guidance, but these factors do not obviate the allegations of too much
involvement with Hellenistic thought patterns, a denigration of the
physical body and temporal life, and the construction of an intellectual-
spiritual hierarchy within the Church. ^ The results of the method, so
far as Christology is concerned, are fundamental to the ensuing debates
2
as Prenter states" but heretically subordinationist in the judgment of
3
Barth. Moreover, in another highly sensitive doctrinal point,
eschatology, the result is the abandonment of a primitive eschatology
in which, notably, God works, to a natural outworking, a continuum of
development, an apokatastasis.
Some further appraisal should here be made of this man, justly
termed "the father of interpreters. "^ The fact that he was condemned
as a heretic may even be construed as a not unusual incident in the
troubled days when the Church attempted to clarify its position and
*v. Grant, Bible in the Church, 69; Smalley, St udy of the
Bible, 12.
2 " M i»
Regin Prenter, Schopfung una Erlosung: Dogmatik, (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), p. 321.
JKarl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. T. Thomson et al. ,
4 Vols. in 12 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), I 1, p. 405.




many bishops who made the venture of theological statement were
accused thus by their brethren. For a man of the broad curiosities of
Origen it was inevitable that he should raise new issues which could
not be explicated neatly, and that a man of his brilliant gifts should
1
be a bit "too clever. " On the other hand, that thorough-going
9
Christian piety of Origen's drove him" to powerful polemic and apologetic,
to a monumental educational task, and thus to the preservation of
Christian values in most troublous times, and the avoidance of greater
3
hazards. Our review of Augustine will reveal that that great saint
could not ignore Origen and his methods either.
The special purpose of this brief historical survey is a pro¬
viding of context for the analysis of the hermeneutics of Luther and
Melanchthon. Their judgments on Origen, then, have particular
relevance. Ebeling cites one element of Luther's critique of the
allegorizing of Origen as allegorizing contrary to the Scripture, that
A
would be, against the plain sense of other Scripture. Further, Ebeling
comments on the difference in the scqpus, that in Origen and those
who follow him it is philosophy rather than Christ, the Church, faith
^"Morris, God and World, 156.
^Grant, Bible in the Church, 71-72.
Milburn, Early Christian Interpretations, 52.
4
Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 300.
50
and the office of the ministry that is central. * We have seen that
Origen considered his thinking Pauline, but Luther contradicts this
assumption by pointing out that Paul used allegory only to point to
2
Christ. A partial collection of Luther's description of Origen's
3
exegesis includes the epithets "his ideas are silly, " "amazing
twaddle,"^ and "senseless allegories. " Luther considered Origen
0
so dangerous because others followed him so closely, and Jerome,
7
for example, accused of "Origenizing" does not have an individuality,
but is one of the condemned group of allegorizers. Apropos of one of
our recurring themes, Luther says that Origen failed to perceive that
g
Moses was writing a history.
Melanchthon's reaction to Origen is less immediately access¬
ible. His recognition of the great importance of Origen is indicated
•^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 354. The citations are W.A. XLII: 368,
16-19 and W.A. XLII: 377, 20-22.
2
Martin Luther, Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, 36 Vols. (St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House; Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press,
1955 —), XXVI, p. 433. /Am. Ed/7
^Luther, Am. Ed., 1,91.
^Luther, Am. Ed., I, 98.
^Luther, Am. Ed., I, 122.
6Luther, Am. Ed. XXVI, 180-81.
7
Martin Luther, Luther's Correspondence and other Contemporary
Letters, trans, and ed. Preserved Smith, 2 Vols. (Philadelphia: Lutheran
Publication Society, 1913-18), I, p. 69. /Correspondence?
^Luther, Am. Ed. I, 90.
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in his labelling of the period following the apostles as the age of
1 2
Origen. Melanchthon approved of Origen's conclusions on baptism
3
and disapproved of his understanding of the letter of Scripture.
The Antiochenes
Over against the Alexandrian school of interpretation and of
theology as dominated by Origen, stands the Antiochene. Any attempt
to describe this perspective will be frustrated by the complexity of the
patterns and by the mystery of the ineffectiveness of this thinking on
dogma and hermeneutics. We shall elaborate on the meaning of this
sentence in the conclusion of this brief section.
A succinct statement by Grant will give a perspective on this
group of theologian-expositors:
The school of Antioch insisted on the historical
reality of the biblical revelation. They were un¬
willing to lose it in a world of symbols and shadows.
They were more Aristotelian than Platonist. Where
the Alexandrines use the word "theory" as
equivalent to allegorical interpretation, the Antiochene
exegetes use it for a sense of scripture higher or
deeper than the literal or historical meaning, but
firmly based on the letter. This understanding does
not deny the literal meaning of scripture but is
grounded on it, as an image is based on the thing
■'■Robert Stupperich, Melanchthon, tr. Robert H. Fischer
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955), p. 95.
2
Philip Melanchthon, On Christian Doctrine, trans, and ed.
Clyde Leonard Manschreck (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),
p. 210.
Melanchthon, Christian Doctrine, 201.
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represented and points toward it. Both image and
thing are comprehensible at the same time. There
is no hidden meaning which only a gnostic can
comprehend. '
Although the schools of Antioch and Alexandria are not to be
2
viewed as always and in all things opposed to one another, the first,
most typical element in the depiction of the Antiochene is the jux¬
taposition with the Origenistic, Alexandrian ways of thought and in¬
terpretation. By contrast, then, the Antiochene hermeneutic insisted
on the literal, the historical, in scripture. By this method it was hoped
3the abuses of allegorism and the "crude literalism. . .of the .Arabians"
could be avoided. With a remarkable insight into the methods employed
much later in literary criticism, the Antiocnenes understood the literal
sense to involve an understanding of metaphorical language, and an
4
understanding of the intention of the original writer of the passage. "
Since they did accept a spiritual sense above the literal, they had to
clarify this relationship, and employed the typological in a limited
way to materials such as the Old Testament prophecies.
A highly determinative factor in both the method and the problem
of Antiochene exegesis is the strongly Christological factor, opposed
■'•Grant, Bible in the Church, 76-77.
^Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan et al. ,
7 Vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), III, p. 201, n. 2.
^Smalley, Study of the Bible, 14.
^Smalley, Study of the Bible, 14.
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to the cosmological generalizing of the Alexandrians. We shall see
this distinctive mark reappearing in the following paragraphs.
Both the temporal and the geographical context play important
roles in the history of Antiochene thought. The high period is that
following on the external Christianization of the Empire by Constantine.
In retrospect it appears that this development allowed, perhaps even
encouraged the Church to indulge in the luxury of internal squabbling
which cannot be dignified as high level theological debate. Antioch in
Syria lay close enough to Constantinople to be aligned hierarchically
with that church center. When Alexandria and Rome levelled their
attacks at the claims of the see of Constantinople, Antioch was tarred
with the same brush. Perhaps, under such circumstances, Antioch
could not have expected a fair hearing.
Although Ignatius of Antioch (ob. c. 110) is seldom mentioned
as a forerunner of the Antiochene school, he manifests some theological
traits typical of those who two centuries later were to give honor to the
see. His emphasis on the concrete facts of the history of Jesus Christ,
and his Christological center, are emphasized in this passage from the
letter to the Trallians:
Stop your ears therefore when anyone speaks to you
that stands apart from Jesus Christ, from David's
scion and Mary's Son, who was really born and ate
and drank, really persecuted by Pontius Pilate,
really crucified and died while heaven and earth
and the underworld looked on; who also really rose
from the dead, since His Father raised Him up,—
His Father, who will likewise raise us also who
54
believe in Him through Jesus Christ, apart from
whom we have no real life. ^
Nygren, too, is satisfied with Ignatius' emphasis on the cross of
2
Christ and the Agape motif. Cyril Richardson confirms the foregoing
thesis strikingly in the words, "Ignatius. . .refused to deny the in¬
carnation. In his passionate devotion to the Lord Jesus Christ Ignatius
wanted a real, living man, not an ethereal bodiless spirit, with whom
3
ne could have fellowship." Incidentally, the context of this quotation
is a longer development of what is essentially a Hebraic mode of
understanding the wholeness of man as body and spirit, a concept not
unrelated to the historical view we are analyzing in the Antiochenes.
Theodore of Mopsuestia (ob. 428) is the central figure of the
Antiochene school. Since the general descriptions of characteristics
apply quite uniformly to him, we shall not duplicate the material. We
must underscore that he showed an awareness of the need for a dis-
4
tinctively literary criticism. Theodore also demonstrated those
elements of the Antiochene method which tended to bring it into
^Ignatius of Antioch, "To the Trallians, " The Epistles of St.
Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, trans. James A. Kleist
(No. 1 of the series, Ancient Christian Writers; Westminster, Maryland:
The Newman Press, 1961), pp. 77-78.
2
Nygren, Agape and Eros, 261.
3
Cyril Charles Richardson, The Christianity of Ignatius of
Antioch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), p. 49.
4
Smalley, Study of the Bible, 15.
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disfavor, and this material we shall treat below. The relative obscurity
into which he fell is to be attributed partly to the censure he invited,
partly to the accidents of time and place, but over against these
denigrating forces is the accident that saw some of his work of ex¬
position of Paul's epistles ascribed to Ambrose, under whose reputation
the works survived, were respected and widely cited. *
Two other personalities of the Antiochene group should be
mentioned briefly. The unknown man who wrote between 366 and 384,
?
designated Ambrosiaster, also employed the historical method. The
great Chrysostom is also to be reckoned among the Antiochenes in his
Biblical understanding, although as a preacher he was not so governed
by systematic considerations or exegetical niceties. The fact remains,
nevertheless, that his works were widely read and appreciated in both
East and West, and that they contained elements of literal-historical
interpretation.^
M. L. W. Laistner points to three reasons for the discrediting
of the work of Theodore and other Antiochenes. The first is the
allegation of Nestorianism, or a heterodox Christology, which we must
deal with at greater length; the second is Theodore's rejection of the
"'"Smalley, Study of the Bible, 17.
^Smalley, Study of the Bible, p. 22. M. L. W. Laistner,
"Antiochene Exegesis in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, "
Harvard Theological Review XL, (January, 1947), pp. 19-31.
3
Smalley, Study of the Bible, p. 18.
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teaching on predestination, which does not seem to have been a vital
criticism; the third, the rejection of certain books in the canon, a
problem to which again we must give further attention. ^
Whether the subsequent condemnation of Theodore's Christology
was justified or not, the fact remains that he invited trouble by the
classic enterprise of trying to explicate the inexplicable relationship
of the human and divine in Christ. Here the Aristotelian rationalism
manifests itself, working toward a logical statement, and ignoring the
soteriological character of the Christology which might have protected
2
against the heterodox. Prenter's judgment against Theodore's
Christology is "Denn diese Auffassung trennt den irdischen Menschen
" it 3
Jesus Christus von der gottlichen Majestat." The dubious nature of
Antiochene Christology is further complicated by a charge of
Pelagianism. ^ Both the nature of Christ and the nature and potential
of man are treated in a heterodox, Pelagianizing manner when Theodore
views grace as a reward.
Perhaps it was an over-zealous concern for the witness to
^Laistner, Harvard Theological Review, XL, 1, 20.
2
Harnack, History of Dogma, IV, 166.
^Prenter, Schopfung una Erlosung, 328.
^Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 156.
^Harnack, History of Dogma, IV, 164, n. 2.
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Christ that eventuated in a questioning of the canonicity of certain
books of both the Old and New Testaments by the Antiochenes. The
rationalism which is an undercurrent in their thought would, of course,
tend in the same direction. Whatever the causes, the results were
frowned upon, and this high-handed treatment of the canon became
one more charge on the long list of accusations. ^
Less central to the controversy, but significant in the mass of
hostile judgments are these further critiques. Miss Smalley puts it
2
most mildly in saying that the West simply preferred allegory. The
eclecticism, vagueness and confusion of the Antiochene method un¬
doubtedly was discouraging and some of the anthropomorphisms employed
3
were considered improper to the majesty of God.
The further problems of analysis in their broader scope are
well stated by Ebeling:
. . .Es ware eine reizvolle Aufgabe, den Einflussen
alexandrinischer und antiochenischer Exegese
nachgehend die ganzen trinitarischen und
christologischen Streitigkeiten als einen Kampf um
das hermeneutische Problem zu entfalten. Man
durfte auch dem eigentlichen Anliegen dieser Kampfe
gerechter werden, wenn man sie nicht so sehr nach
ihren ausseren Symptomen als Geschichte
dogmatischer Formeln, sondern vielmehr nach ihrem
eigentlichen Motiv als Stuck Geschichte exegetischer
Bemuhung um die heilige Schrift sieht, d.h. unter dem
^•Harnack, History of Dogma, III, 193, 196 n. 3.
^Smalley, Study of the Bible, 19.
^Harnack, History of Dogma, IV, 345; III, 200.
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Gesichtspunkt der Vergegenwartigung der Offenbarung
in der Vergangenheit. Die christologischen Formeln
sind doch nichts anderes als Versuche—ob mit
tauglichen Mitteln, 1st eine andere Frage—einerseits
die Historizitat Jesu Christi zu sichern gegen die
Verallgemeinerung der Offenbarung zu einem
spekulativen Prinzip, una andererseits die
Selbstvergegenwartigung der geschichtlichen Offenbarung
zu betonen gegenuber einer bloss historischen
Ruckerinnerung una gesetzlich verstandenen Nachbildung
dieser Offenbarung.' In den altkirchlichen
Auseinandersetzungen gehen die diesbezuglichen Linien
in komplizierten verworrenneit durcheinander. ^
Although the Alexandrian emphases persisted with greater
strength even after both Origenistic and Antiochene exegesis had been
condemned at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in Constantinople in 553,
2
and the Antiochene emphasis paled away, one great tribute must be
paid this group. Harnack, in italics, says: "They held up before the
Church the picture of the historical Christ at a time when the Church
-3
in its doctrinal formulae was going further away from Him.'
And yet, like some stream disappearing into the desert, the
historical, literal interpretation as a self-sufficient program virtually
^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 118.
^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 118.
3
Harnack, History of Dogma, IV, 170. Supplementary valuable
information on the chief early exponents of Alexandrian and Antiochene
exegesis with complete bibliographies are to be found Passim in
Johannes Quasten, Patrologv, Vol. Ill The Golden Age of Greek
Patristic Literature (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1963).
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disappeared in the Church. Even the restoration under the Victorines
was temporary. ^
Augustine
The amazing disappearance of the Antiochene emphasis is more
than matched by the survival and wide dissemination of the work of
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. His extensive influence on hermeneutics,
which we shall review more precisely at the end of this section, is
all the more remarkable in view of a judgment like that of Farrar, that
he was "greater as an Apologist and as a Theologian than as an in-
O
terpreter of Scripture. " The power of interpretation to influence the
subsequent understanding of the Scripture is illustrated by Nygren's
judgment on Augustine's contribution in the Eros-Agape development:
"After Augustine the Christian idea of love is no longer the same as
before. . .Augustine's idea of love. . .even puts the New Testament view
3
of love in the shade." Professor Gordon Rupp's judgment must also be
underscored: "It is arguable that the most important single sixteenth-
4
century voice came from the past—that of St. Augustine. "
^-Smalley, Study of the Bible, 357.
^Farrar, History, 234.
3
Nygren, Agape and Eros, 450.
^E. G. Rupp, "The Bible in the Age of the Reformation, " The
Church's Use of the Bible: Past and Present, ed. D. E. Nineham,
(London: S. P. C.K. , 1963), p. 73.
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Were it not for the necessity laid upon us, and attested by the
nexus of Augustinian hermeneutics and Luther-Melanchthon problems,
we would have preferred to avoid the survey of this area in its richness
and complexity. It is moderately cheering to discover that Portalie
agrees that "an overall judgment of Augustine's exegesis is difficult
to formulate, so diverse are the aspects of his work. " * Although the
attitude of Baroque Jesuitism cited by Barth seems to manifest a
partisan perversity, its conclusions are credible to the frustrated
researcher:
His real views are so recondite and confused that
we can only assume either that he does not want
to be understood, or that he had not sufficient
command of language for the purpose; and in
addition he is of a passionate nature and inclined
2
to extremes, ebbing and flowing like the ocean.
In view of the endlessly seminal quality of the works, an obviously
more perceptive and appropriate analysis is made by Gilson:
Perhaps the lack of order we find in Augustine is
due merely to the fact that it has an order different
from that we expect. Instead of the synthetic,
linear order displayed by doctrines which follow the
process of the intellect, we find a method of ex¬
position necessarily different because it is suited
to a doctrine whose center is grace and charity. If
we are dealing not so much with knowledge but with
love, then the philosopher's task is not so much to
■'■Eugene Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine,
trans. Ralph J. Bastian (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960),
p. 123.
2Barth, C. D. , I, 2, p. 558.
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cause knowledge as to cause love. Now in order to
arouse love we do not prove, we show.
To attempt to understand these difficult and complex works
without scanning the historical background would be both foolhardy and
impossible. The preceding paragraphs of this chapter may be seen in
the light of Oberman's judgment that in Augustine "the concerns of
Origen and Chrysostom had been reconciled; the schools of Alexandria
2
and Antioch had found a common heir. " The role of the recurrently
influential Origen in this history is variously assessed. Ernst Hoffman
3
terms Origen merely a forerunner of Augustine in view of the distinctive
contributions which Augustine made. Grant notes that Origen was
4
bitterly attacked by the later interpreter. It is evident that A.ugustine
was neither an eclectic nor a slavish imitater.
The influence of individual predecessors was supplemented by
more general forces which were active in the culture of Augustine's
time. Thus Harnack judges that "in the course of the fifth century, a
^Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine,
trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 236 .
2
Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation:
The Shape of Late Medieval Thought (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1966), p. 283.
3
Ernst Hoffmann, "Platonism in Augustine's Philosophy of
History, " Philosophy and History; Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer,
ed. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton, (New York: Harper & Row,
1963), p. 179.
^Grant, Bible in the Church, 70.
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sort of common sense established itself, which could be taken as
forming. . .a middle line between the exegetic methods of Chrysostom
and Cyril of Alexandria. " Barth analyzes the predilection of the
Western church as to substantive concerns thus:
In relative distinction from the aim of the trinitarian
and christological dogmas of the early Church, it
/Neo-Protestantism?wished to see and to understand
not only God in His relation to man but also man in
his relation to God. We may say that even in the
early days this was always the special desire of the
Western Church and it found its active representative
especially in Augustine. 2
By contrast to the wide variety of analyses drawn from data such
as that in the lines immediately preceding, the events of Augustine's
personal life and time were given unambiguous and definite interpreta¬
tion by Augustine himself. The primary literary evidences are the
Confessions, on the personal side, and the City of God and the
polemical/apologetic tracts in the broader relations. Gilson concludes
that Augustine himself gave such significance to his own history that
3
his doctrine was a continuous commentary on it. Put in other words
by Gilson, "His doctrine is the metaphysics of his own conversion
4
and remains preeminently the metaphysics of conversion. " The
^•Harnack, History of Dogma, III, 200.
2Barth, C. D. , 1/2, 208.
2Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 227.
^Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 240. v. also J. V. Langmead
Casserley, The Christian in Philosophy, (London: Faber & Faber
Limited, 1949), p. 44.
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possibility inherent in such a position of assuming an unbridled sub¬
jectivity was effectively countermanded by two factors: the constant
polemic directed against Augustine, and his own exceptional dialectical
competence acting in self-appraisal and self-criticism.
Augustine's favorable attitude to allegorism was a significant
illustration of the interrelationship of personal history and doctrine.
The Manichean criticisms of the Christian understandings of the
Scripture and particularly of the Old Testament were based on a
literalism which to Augustine seemed incontrovertible. But then
Ambrose's brilliant allegorizing impressed him as an effective way
through the dilemma of interpretation, and the totality of the preaching
was played in to the final conversion of Augustine. That sedes
doctrinae, II Cor. 3:6, with its juxtaposition of letter and spirit
became vitally important to him. *
Thus he can use the most offensively typical style and material
of allegory, and defend it on the basis of its presumed greater power
to communicate:
And yet, I don't know why, I feel greater pleasure
in contemplating holy men, when I view them as the
teeth of the Church, tearing men away from their
errors, and bringing them into the Church's body,
with all their harshness softened down, just as if
they had been torn off and masticated by the teeth.
It is with the greatest pleasure, too, that I recognize
them under the figure of sheep that have been shorn,
■'•Ebeling, Ev. Evanq. , 119; Grant, Bible in the Church,
9 If. "" "" ~
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laying down the burthens of the world like fleeches,
and coming up from the washing, i.e. , from baptism,
and all bearing twins, i.e. , the twin commandments
of love, and none among them barren in that holy
fruit. 1
The persistent usage of name and number symbolisms is exhibited a
2
few pages later in the same work.
In spite of such occasional displays of standard allegorization,
Augustine can hardly be considered typical of the group which Farrar
castigates:
In the days of Augustine the method had degenerated
into an artistic method of displaying ingenuity and
supporting ecclesiasticism. It had become the re¬
source of a faithlessness which declined to admit of
an ignorance which failed to appreciate, and of an
indolence which refused to solve the real difficulties
2
in which the sacred book abounds.
We are more impressed with the weight of Grant's judgment that for
Augustine "allegorical method was only a stepping-stone toward a final
interpretation of scripture, " and that he moved more and more toward a
4
literal understanding.
There are even broader applications of the personal principle
to the hermeneutics of Augustine. It is not only that Augustine
■'"Augustine, Christian Doctrine ii. 6. (Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. , Philip Schaff, Buffalo: The
Christian Literature Company, 1887), II, 6, p. 537.
2
Augustine Christian Doctrine ii. 16.
^Farrar, History, 239.
^Grant, Bible in the Church, 93.
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discovered the value of the individual as Richardson states"'' but it is
a normative role of individual thought which may be designated a
"religious subjectivism" or "religious idealism," thus qualified:
Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi: in interiore homine
habitat Veritas. Actual being, knowing, willing, the actual
esse, nosse, velle constitute the unshakable point of
departure for all theory; for the mind knows nothing better
than what is present in it, and nothing is more present in
it than itself. These sentences establish the primacy of
the religious experience above all the dogmatic con¬
clusions of a metaphysical doctrine of the soul and of
God.2
Such statements lead further to the judgment that "each man sees the
truth common to all only to the extent that it becomes the truth of his
own mind. "
It would be easy and fatal to move from such premises to the
conclusion that truth is truth for the individual. Although references
may be found which seem to tolerate a multiplicity of interpretations
with no possibility of reconciliation or value judgment, there are at
least three countermanding forces operative in Augustine to avert such
confusions. The one is the role of tradition and the church, with which
we shall deal later. Another is the element of certainty inherent in
•'■Alan Richardson, History Sacred and Profance (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1964), p. 62.
2
Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance
Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963),
pp. 127-128. V. also Casserley, Christian in Philosophy, 44.
3
Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 245.
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the knowing:
The Augustinian soul discovers an invincible certitude
and a guarantee of the possibility of certitude in
general in the very act whereby it apprehends itself.
Hence, one of the prime characteristics of metaphysical
Augustinianism is that the certainty with which the soul
apprehends itself is the first of all certitudes and the
criterion of truth. ^
The third force is the position of the self over against God. "The
essence of Augustine's theism, this immediate self-consciousness is
not a consciousness of the self alone. . . .My self-consciousness. . .
2
carries with it an immediate apprehension of the Creator."
In that position before God, Augustine is fully aware of the
Biblical, realistic fact of man's sinfulness and its effect on man's
ability to know God. "The heavenly Father intervenes to meet the
needs of sin-blinded souls by offering to their faith, on the authority
of God, the truth which they are as sinners incapable of ascertaining
for themselves. This is the essence of Augustine's doctrine of
3
revelation." The application of this principle to a near-Biblicist
point of view needs no further elaboration here. Related to the problem
of the material of revelation is the issue of interpretation. The clouded
intelligence of sinful man needs God's grace in the work of interpreting:
•'"Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 244.
2
Casserley, Christian in Philosophy, 44.
3
Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and
Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 162.
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And presumptuous it would undoubtedly be, if I were
counting on my own strength; but since my hope of
accomplishing the work rests on Him who has already
supplied me with many thoughts on this subject, I
do not fear but that He will go on to supply what is
yet wanting when once I have begun to use what He
has already given. . . .Now, just as that bread
increase in the very act of breaking it, so those
thoughts which the Lord has already vouchsafed to
me with a view to undertaking this work will, as
soon as I begin to impart them to others, be multiplied
by His grace. ^
Since Augustine himself distinguished the inhabitants of the
O
two cities by their difference in love" we may see the condition of
sinful man as lacking in love to God and the new man as the recipient
of love—caritas—from God. That spiritual understanding results from
this bestowal of love Augustine establishes thus:
If, therefore, it was mainly for this purpose that
Christ came, to wit, that man might learn how
much God loves him; and that he might learn this,
to the intent that he might be kindled to the love of
Him by whom he was first loved, and might also
love his neighbor at the command and showing of
Him who became our neighbor. . . .According to this
revealing, on the other hand, spiritual men,--among
whom we reckon at once those then who knocked in
piety and found even hidden things opened to them, . . .
understanding in a spiritual fashion, have been made
free through the love wherewith they have been gifted.
As to the purpose for which Scripture is given we note "the end of the
^Augustine Christian Doctrine i. 1.
2
John M. Headley, Luther's View of Church History (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1963), p. 68.
Augustine On the Catechising of the Uninstructed iv. 8.
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Law, and of all Holy Scripture, is the love of an object which is to be
enjoyed."* This objective is in sharp contrast with the search for
wisdom which characterized so many of Augustine's predecessors. In
place of that speculative, cosmological knowledge Augustine sees the
Scripture concerned about "die existentielle Liebesgemeinschaft mit
o
Gott" as Ebeling states it. Again, the time of the achievement of
this communion must be left for consideration below.
That Augustine intended caritas to be the scopus of Biblical
understanding is indicated in the frequently quoted passage:
Whoever, then, thinks that he understands the Holy
Scriptures, or any part of them, but puts such an
interpretation upon them as does not tend to build up
this two-fold love of God and our neighbor, does not
yet understand them as he ought. If, on the other
hand, a man draws a meaning from them that may be
used for the building up of love, even though he does
not happen upon the precise meaning which the author
whom he reads intended to express in that place, his
error is not pernicious, and he is wholly clear from
the charge of deception.
Granted the general concept, caritas, then, as central, the fact still
remains that the elements united under the concept are, as Nygren
4
says, combined less logically than psychologically. Burnaby, for
example, draws out the idea of caritas as the vision of God, and
"''Augustine Christian Doctrine i. 35 .
2
Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 121.
3
Augustine Christian Doctrine i. 36 .
4
Nygren, Agape and Eros, 452.
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relates it to the menacing specter of Neo-Platonism in Augustine. ^
Further evidences of the presence of this persistent intruder will be
submitted below.
Another vital area of questioning is raised by Nygren's blunt
statement:
It is beyond question that when Augustine speaks
of Caritas, he always thinks primarily of love to
God. It is vital to keep this in mind if we are to
avoid being misled by the rich variety of his view
of love. ^
Whether this challenge is valid or not may be determined by some
analysis of Augustine's understanding of the centraiity of Christ and
his view of history and what happens in it.
We may well conclude with Burnaby that in Augustine "the faith
which cleanses us. . .is the faith in the fact and purpose of the
3
Incarnation." Note this element and the phrase "in time" in the
following:
Behold, then, why the Son of God was sent; nay
rather, behold what it is for the Son of God to be
sent. Whatever things they were which were
wrought in time, with a view to produce faith,
whereby we might be cleansed so as to contemplate
truth, in things that have a beginning, which have
been put forth from eternity, and are referred back
to eternity: these were either testimonies of this
■'■John Burnaby, Amor Dei (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1947), p. 35.
o
Nygren, Agape and Eros, 452-53.
3
Burnaby, Amor Dei, 76.
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mission, or they were the mission itself of the Son
of God.
But we observe not many lines following this passage the curious
Platonic interpretation of the Incarnation stated thus:
Or how does He say this, too, "He that hath my
commandments, and keepeth them. . .1 will love him,
and will manifest myself to him, " at a time when He
was manifest before the eyes of men; unless because
He was offering that flesh, which the Word was made
in the fullness of time, to be accepted by our faith;
but was keeping back the Word itself, by whom all
things were made, to be contemplated in eternity by
the mind when cleansed by faith? ^
Again, there is an evangelical elegance in such an exposition as this:
For the mere syllables of Christ's name, and the
Christian sacraments, are of no profit, where faith
in Christ is itself resisted. For faith in Christ is
to believe in Him that justifieth the ungodly; to
believe on the Mediator, without whose interposition
we cannot be reconciled unto God; to believe in the
Saviour, who came to seek and to save that which
was lost; to believe in Him who said, "Without me
ye can do nothing.
Augustine's notable sermon on Matthew 20:39 seems to be of the
same character. With fine homiletical skill, Augustine sketches the
elements of incarnation meaning in "Jesus passed by. " Here is the
birth from the Virgin, the infant suckling, boyhood, youth, man's full
stature, miracles, death and resurrection. The jarring note is struck
in the analysis of what this "passing by" means for man. "Now what
^Augustine On the Trinity iv. 19.
2
Augustine On the Trinity iv. 19.
3
Augustine On the Gospel of Tohn, Tractate iiii.10.
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is it, Brethren, 'to cry out' unto Christ, but to correspond to the grace
of Christ by good works? " This is the type of evidence from which
Niebuhr must have concluded that Augustine failed to see redemption
2
as a dramatic act of God.
Without adducing further primary citations, we may well point
out some conclusions as to the place of Jesus Christ in the theology
of Augustine. Althaus, viewing Augustine as Luther's closest fore¬
runner in the understanding that we meet the Father in the man Jesus,
nevertheless judges "for Augustine it is only one point among many
3
others. " Thomas F. Torrance has stated that Augustine's mistake was
"to detach grace from the person of Christ and to think of it as acting
4
impersonally upon man. "
E. Thestrup Pedersen's line of analysis is the distinction
between Christ as example and Christ as sacrament. He argues that
Luther properly inverted Augustine's order to make the sacramental
primary.^ A consequence of the primacy of the exemplar concept in
^Augustine Sermon on Matthew 20:30 xxxviii.9, 12.
2
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 100-101.
3
Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C.
Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 183.
4
Torrance, Doctrine of Grace, 33, n.2.
^E. Thestrup Pedersen, Luther som Skriftfortolker: En studie i
Luthers skriftsyn hermentik og eksegese (Kz^benhavn: Nyt Nordisk
Forlag, 1959), pp. 151-52.
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Augustine is that grace is viewed as a power looking forward to the
final judgment."'' It is this concept, when transcribed into
hermeneutical perspectives, which we see so strongly emphasized in
Augustine's views of progressiveness, of growth toward understanding.
This process is precisely stated in the work On Christian
Doctrine, where so much of Augustine's hermeneutical position may be
read:
Wherefore, since it is our duty fully to enjoy the truth
which lives unchangeably, and since the triune God
takes counsel in this truth for the things which he has
made, the soul must be purified that it may have power
to perceive that light, and to rest in it when it is
perceived. And let us look upon this purification
as a kind of journey or voyage to our native land. For
it is not by change of place that we can come nearer
to Him who is in every place, but by the cultivation
of pure desires and virtuous habits.^
In response to a specific question, Augustine wrote this answer which
forms a commentary on the "journey" toward "purification" enunciated
above:
And perhaps there may be, nay, beyond all question
there are, written in the sacred books, counsels by
the knowledge of which the man of God may so
discharge his duties to the Church in the things of
God, or at least so keep a conscience void of offence
in the midst of ungodly men, whether living or dying,
as to secure that life for which alone humble and
meek Christian hearts sigh is not lost. But how can
this be done, except, as the Lord Himself tells us,
^Pedersen, Skrftfortolker, 263.
o
Augustine Christian Doctrine i. 10 .
7 3
by asking, seeking, knocking, that is, by praying,
reading and weeping?
Seen from another typically Augustinian point of view, what we
are here describing may be related to humility. As Gilson puts it:
Reduced to its abstract form, Augustine's experience
may be said to amount to a discovery of humility.
Errors of understanding are bound up with the corruption
of the heart through pride, and man only finds the
?
truth which brings happiness by subjecting his intellect
to faith and his will to grace, in humility. ^
The interplay of these factors is supported by the evidence of Augustine's
most frequently quoted Scripture verses: Rom. 7:22-25 ". . .Who will
deliver me. . . unhappy man that I am!. . . the grace of god. " (at least
225 times.) Rom. 5:5 "The charity of God has been poured out in our
hearts through the Holy Spirit." (201 times.) I Cor. 4:7 "What have
3
you got that you have not received? " (120 times.)
Inevitably enmeshed in every analysis of Augustine is some
facet of the problem of history. We have touched on this complex
issue previously in connection with Christology and soteriology. We
must now attempt a fuller exposition in order to establish the limits
of possibility for the interpreter and to set a critical base for further
appraisal of his hermeneutic.
■'"Augustine Letter xxi. 4.
2
Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 227.
3
Henri Marrou, St, Augustine and his Influence through the
Ages, trans. Patrick Hepburne-Scott (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1957), p. 84.
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To be fair to his predecessors, and to understand the magnitude
of the break-through in the understanding of history with Augustine,
we must be very careful to recall the situation to which he was heir.
The Hellenistic, cyclical, chronicle type of history which was prevalent,
intrinsically negated the Hebraic-Christian view of time, of reality and
of the concrete events of the history of salvation. What we have seen
in Philo and Origen has been an accomodation to this point of view.
As a consequence, as J. N. D. Kelly says of the Latin Fathers: "What
was perhaps the greatest gap in their understanding of the Bible /was/
their failure to appreciate the significance of history. " ^ It follows
naturally from this that "Augustine found the historical character of
Christianity baffling in the context of this Greek heritage" as Carl
2
Michalson states. In two pregnant sentences, Alan Richardson in¬
dicates the nexus of the historical problem, to which Augustine
addressed himself as we have seen above, and the radical breakthrough
which he effected to a new era:
The basic difference between the Greek and the
Hebrew view is that the Hebrews regarded history
as the locus of man's knowledge of himself and
of God in a way which the Greeks did not. The
triumph of the Hebraic-Christian view over the
classical, achieved by the time of Augustine,
J. N. D. Kelly, "The Bible and the Latin Fathers, " The
Church's Use of the Bible, ed. Nineham, 54.
2
Carl Michalson, The Hinge of History; An Existential Approach
to the Christian Faith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p.
171.
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made possible the ultimate emergence, after many
centuries, of modern scientific historiography.^
The primary factor of contingency, seriously employed,dominates
the fresh outlook on history. Although John Baillie was addressing
himself to the problem of the natural sciences when he spoke the
words, the historical references are so analogous to our problem that
a lengthy quotation is in order here:
Modern science could not have come into being until
the ancient pagan conception of the natural world had
given place to the Christian. The reason why ancient
science was so little observational, and hardly at all
experimental, was that in holding so fast to the
intelligibility of the world it failed to do justice to
its contingency. . . .The world-process. . .would
follow. . .a cyclical course, and some of them /the
Greek scientists'/ even thought they knew the length
of time that each cycle would take to accomplish
itself. . . .What Christianity did was, as it were,
to roll the circle of time out flat. The rectilinear
conception of time, which we all now take for
granted, was introduced into Western thought by
Christianity. Moreover, a Christian thinker like
St. Augustine is well aware of the radical change
which this imports. He is fully conscious that the
new faith stands for a disruption of the pattern which
pagan science had imposed upon the course of nature.
And he is particularly conscious of the element of
contingency in nature which the Christian doctrine of
creation forces us to recognize. ^
The contingency which for Augustine is the "unique" event
"'"A. Richardson, History, 58-59.
o
John Baillie, Natural Science and the Spiritual Life (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. 25-26.
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which "shatters" history as Headley puts it* is the Incarnation.
Principal Burleigh couches the same idea in the terms "the clue and the
2
climax of history. " In Augustine's own words:
Far be it from any true believer to suppose that by
these words of Solomon those cycles are meant, in
which, according to these philosophers, the same
periods and events of time are repeated. . .For once
Christ died for our sins; and, rising from the dead,
He dieth no more. "Death hath no more dominion
over Him.And that, too, which follows, is, I
think, appropriate enough: "The wicked walk in a
circle;" not because their life is to recur by means
of these circles, which these philosophers imagine,
but because the path in^which their false doctrine
now runs is circuitous.
The cyclical view was meaningless because what had happened
would happen again, what was, both had been and would be. The
straightened-out lineal history gave meaning to past, present and
future. The model is given in The City of God with its sweeping
survey of the past and its tremendous concern with the eternal future.
No longer can the historian work with Croce's "fragment of chain. "
History is to be studied in its totality; the prospect is opened for a
4
truly universal history. The way is open for establishing periods in
'''Headley, Luther's View, 107.
^John Henderson Seaforth Burleigh, The City of God: A Study of
St. Augustine's Philosophy (London: Nisbet, 1949), p. 194.
3
Augustine The City of God xii. 13. Cf. Burleigh, City of God,
205.
4
Burleigh, City of God, 194.
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history: there are basically two, the one before Christ and the other
after Christ, but more refined definitions may also be drawn. ' In this
historical continuum the historical cosmology, the drama of sin and
2
grace is played out. Nature is real both in the creation and in man.
Unfortunately, this kind of stress may also work adversely to essential
concepts. Thus, Israel loses significance in herself, since her history
3
is only preface to the celestial City which it darkly foreshadows.
The monocular view of the dividing point in the Christ-event has done
something else to Augustine's perspective. Professor Burleigh has
noted it in a passage which remarkably adumbrates a major concern of
contemporary historiography:
Christ. . .has inaugurated the present Age in the new
Christian sense. . .Yet one may feel that St. Augustine
has not made as much as he might have done of this
conception, at any rate in the specifically historical
books. Christocentric they undoubtedly are, but they
are also so exclusively Biblical that the epochal
significance of the Coming of Christ for secular no
less than for sacred history is little observed. *
Still, the linear view keeps clear that history is moving toward
something. Burleigh's analysis is: "History as such has an end rather
^
Burleigh, City of God, 208.
^Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 239.
^Burleigh, City of God, 197.
4
Burleigh, City of God, 208.
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than a goal. It is a process rather than a progress. " * Ernst Hoffman's
summary reads:
God. . .aims in history at a definitive meaning, at a
decision, at a victory; and this He will in His
omnipotence accomplish; the decision will fall out
as He wills. It will so fall out that earthly history,
be it as example, be it as warning, be it as it may,
shall prove itself to be the prelude to eternity. 3
Now a further distinctive viewpoint in Augustine must be set
forth—the understanding of the very nature of time itself. Karl Barth
levels his criticism at Augustine by correlating him closely with
Heidegger:
Augustine, like Heidegger, regards time definitively
and unequivocally as a self-determination of man's
existence as a creature. Man possesses time by
taking it for himself, in fact, by creating it. . . .Reality
lies with this existence, with the act of man's animus,
with "temporality" as the possibility <^f man's
existence, but not with time as such.
Eric Rust does not give so absolute an existentialist interpreta¬
tion to Augustine's position, but recognizes that for Augustine "time
found its true reality in the soul" and grounded that "reality in its
relation to God. In the same section of his analysis Rust states
■'•Burleigh, City of God, 214.
2
Hoffmann, "Augustine"s Philosophy of History, " 185.
3Barth, C. D. , 1/2, 46.
4
Eric C. Rust, Towards a Theological Understanding of History
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 214.
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"past, present, and future, . . .all are compresent in the soul. " This
comports with the statement of Hoffmann just following the excerpt
cited above: "God has resolved so to order it that this decision comes
about not through outward human events but in human souls." We see
the significance of this analysis when we remember that Augustine's
3
view of the self establishes the person as a microcosm within the
macrocosm of the world. As the individual person, then, relates to
time, so also does the world.
This emphasis on the reality of time only in the soul would
seem to encourage, even to dictate, such an existentialist view as
Barth deprecated throughout Augustine. Patterson's resolution of the
problem is somewhat different, however. He does say, first:
Thus it may be observed as one peculiar result of
Augustine's Latin adaptations of Greek Christian
ideas that he thinks of the new life of communion
with Christ as so clearly combining present ful¬
fillment and future promise that its fundamentally
eschatological character is often obscured.^
Clearly, "eschatological" in the last line means futurist eschatology,
Modifying and elucidation follows shortly thereafter:
^Rust, Theological Understanding, 213.
2
Hoffmann, "Augustine's Philosophy of History, " 185.
3
v. Owen Barfield, Saving the Appearances: A Study in History,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1965), p. 78.
Patterson, God and History, 114.
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It should be clear from this work that every reference
to the coming of Christ is a reference to the immediate
presence of a life which is to be lived in its fullness
only in the future. Augustine's peculiar foreshortening
of the distance between present and future is, in fact,
a result of the transformation of the contemporary
Greek Christian interest in the achievement of per¬
fection by the soul into a characteristically Latin
Christian call to heed the challenge posed by present
events. *
In addition, the importance of the given revelation, which Reinhold
O
Niebuhr sees preventing Augustine from falling into mysticism, here
avert a subjectivist existentialism.
Augustine draws upon the revelation, and perhaps makes more
use of the polarity homiletically than systematically of a present and
a future, more exactly "evil present and better future." Thus, then,
the peroration of one of the tractates:
For here we are born and die: let us not love this
world; let us migrate hence by love; by love let us
dwell above, by that love by which we love God.
In this sojourn of our life let us meditate on
nothing else, but that here we shall not always be,
and that by good living we shall prepare place for
ourselves there, whence we shall never migrate.^
Similarly, in the sermon on Jesus' passing by cited earlier:
By faith we perceive Christ "passing by" in the
temporal economy, so we may attain to the
knowledge of Him as "standing still" in His
^Patterson, God and History, 115.
2
Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny, 158.
O
JAugustine Tractate on John 7:37-39 , xxxii. 9 .
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unchangeable Eternity.""'"
The emphasis on the future is so strong that it is designated "other-
worldliness" in a pejorative sense by both Wilburn and Burnaby. Thus
Wilburn:
Too other-worldly are Augustine's statements that the
supreme good is not to be found in this life, that in
history we have no hold on salvation and can only
wait for it in hope, and that the church merely wanders
like a stranger on earth. ^
And Burnaby notes: "No Christian Father is more uncompromising in his
3
other-worldliness than is Augustine." Whether this other-worldliness
is due to Platonic influence as Burnaby alleges in his next sentence,
may be questionable.
Typically, Augustine's key to understanding the Scripture,
caritas, should be the catalyst for the antithesis of present--future.
This is what Burnaby maintains:
Love—this is what Augustine means—is the confounder
of all antitheses. It breaks the line between the here
and the hereafter, between change and the changeless,
time and eternity. It is peace in conflict, contempla¬
tion in the midst of action, sight piercing through
faith. For in love the divine meets the human: heaven
comes to earth when Christ is born, and man rejoices
in the Truth. ^
""Augustine Sermon on Matt. 20:30, xxxviii.14.
^Ralph G. Wilburn, The Historical Shape of Faith, (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1966), p. 38.
3
Burnaby, Amor Dei, 29.
4
Burnaby, Amor Dei, 82.
32
These are good words, and homiletically undoubtedly effective. How¬
ever, the bold acceptance of the paradoxical element in the time con¬
cept, of which Luther was to make so significant a point, as Pauck says
in his introduction to the Lectures on Romans, this simul. . . et, "cannot
be found in Augustine's writings. " ^
We must do more than simply point to the ambiguities of caritas
talk in resolving the question of the connection between present and
future, time and eternity, man and God, Scriptural words and the living
word. Certainly Augustine was aware of the complexity of the problem
as a result of his own thinking and because of the polemics directed
against Christian intelligence and Christian interpretation. In On
Christian Doctrine, where theory precedes homiletical application, the
steps to wisdom are set out as fear, piety, knowledge, resolution,
2
counsel, purification of heart, wisdom. We must note first that these
steps are all theological rather than psychological or strictly
epistemological. Of their essential meaning we have dealt briefly in
early sections of this unit. Knowledge, in the listing here, is in¬
terpreted as the caritas scopus. The transition from an apparent
emphasis on moral purification to illumination and faith, in other words
from experience to understanding, is well made by Gilson:
*Luther: Lectures on Romans, trans, and ed. Wilhelm Pauck,
(The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XV.; Philadelphia: The West¬
minster Press, 1961), p. xliv.
2
Augustine On Christian Doctrine ii. 7 .
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Let us remember at the outset that the Augustinian
doctrine of the relations between faith and reason
gives formal expression to a moral experience and
for that reason refuses to separate illumination of
the mind from purification of the heart. In its
essence, Augustinian faith is both an adherence of
the mind to supernatural truth and a humble surrender
of the whole man to the grace of Christ. . . .The
adherence of the mind to God's authority implies
humility, but humility in turn presupposes a con¬
fidence in God, and this in itself is an act of love
and charity.
Our concern at this point is faith, as Augustine himself says: "The
action of piety is faith, the fruit of faith understanding, that we may
2
come to eternal life, when there will be no reading of Gospel to us. "
And again, on the progression to final sight:
That is the right purpose which starts from faith.
For a certain faith is in some way the starting-
point of knowledge; but a certain knowledge will
not be made perfect, except after this life, when
we shall see face to face.^
This faith for Augustine is something more than arbitrary choice
or alignment. It involves commitment and participation.
What then is "to believe on Him? " By believing
to love Him, by believing to esteem highly, by
believing to go into Him and to be incorporated
in His members . ^
Now commitment and participation may not be partial, therefore the
^Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 31.
2
Augustine Tractate on John 5:24-30 xxii. 2.
3
Augustine On the Trinity ix. 1.
4 '
Augustine Tractate on John 7:14-18 xxix.6. cf. Burnaby,
Amor Dei, 27.
84
resulting knowing must also involve the whole man, as Warfield ex¬
plains .
This kind of faith is held by the individual, hence by individuals
who now live, or have lived, or will live, by the congregatio fidelium.
In some way, which may well differ from theological school to school,
or theologian to theologian, the faith of the believing community, the
2
attitude of the church will become involved in the process of knowing.
Rather perversely and illogically, however, Augustine exempts the
Church, the congregation of believers, from that judgment of pride
which might be expected to work a due humility in the individual
believer as interpreter. Reinhold Niebuhr's criticism is to the point:
He could not conceive of it /the church/as standing
itself under divine judgment. In other words the
church was the historic locus where the contradiction
between the historical and the divine was overcome
in fact; rather than that locus where the judgment and
the mercy of God upon the historical are mediated,
and where, therefore, the contradiction of the historical
and the holy is overcome in principle. . . .The church
does not, in other words, really stand under the
judgment of God. Rather it reigns with Christ.^
What the extension of this idea means in terms of the authority
of the church is indicated in a summary by Warfield:
The entire sense, then, seems to be that what is
taught by the Church on authority, is equally defended
by-the church by reason, through the appropriate organs
of reason. The Church as the pillar and ground of the
Warfield, Studies, 150.
2
Headley, Luther s View, 268.
3
Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny, 138-39.
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truth commends it to faith; the Church, giving a
reason for the faith that is in it, defends it to reason.
The Doctor, in other words, is as truly a manifesta¬
tion of the Church's inherent life as the Bishop him¬
self: reasoning is as inadmissibly her function as
authoritative definition. ^
Here the methodological, subjective aspect is emphasized, what
2
Oberman calls the "practical priority of Augustine's commovere. "
As concerns the material tradition, what is important is the
Rule of Faith. As Grant says, "Augustine is no simple traditionalist,
3
yet he upholds the authority of the rule of faith. " Here Augustine is
very explicit:
If, when attention is given to the passage, it shall
appear to be uncertain in what way it ought to be
punctuated or pronounced, let the reader consult the
rule of faith which he has gathered from the plainer
passages of Scripture, and from the authority of the
Church, and of which I treated at sufficient length
when I was speaking in the first book about things. ^
And again: "Now Scripture asserts nothing but the catholic faith, in
regard to things past, future, and present."^
The authority of the church is also applicable to questions of
^Warfield, Studies, 169-70.
2
Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology:
Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, Massachu¬
setts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 386.
3
Grant, Bible in the Church, 93.
4
Augustine On Christian Doctrine iii.2. v. alsoiii.5.
^Augustine On Christian Doctrine iii. 10.
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the canon.^
Oberman considers that Augustine allows the Church to establish even
an extra scriptural tradition:
In contrast with Irenaeus' condemnation of extra-
scriptural tradition, in Augustine we find mention
of an authoritative extra scriptural oral tradition.
While on the one hand the Church "moves" the
faithful to discover the authority of Scripture,
Scripture on the other hand refers the faithful back
to the authority of the Church with regard to a series
of issues with which the Apostles did not deal in
writing. Augustine refers here to the baptism of
heretics. ^
The passage to which Oberman refers is the early treatise On Baptism,
against the Donatists:
For if none have baptism who entertain false views
about God, it has been proved sufficiently, in my
opinion, that this may happen even within the
Church. "The apostles," indeed, "gave no in¬
junctions on the point," /quoting Cyprian, Ep.
lxxiv.2/but the custom, which is opposed to
Cyprian, may be supposed to have had its origin
in apostolic tradition, just as there are many things
which are observed by the whole Church, and there¬
fore are fairly held to have been enjoined by the
apostles, which yet are not mentioned in their
writings. ^
Such statements leave Augustine vulnerable to the sharp
criticism of a Farrar:
'''Augustine Christian Doctrine ii. 8 .
^Oberman, Harvest, 370-71.
3
Augustine On Baptism, Against the Donatists v. 23.
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He laid down the rule that the Bible must be interpreted
with reference to Church Orthodoxy, and that no
Scriptural expression can be out of accordance with
any other. He therefore, in support of this view,
demanded that all interpretation should be panharmonic,
and he helped to stereotype the current misapplication
of the phrase "the analogy of faith. " *
In a similar view Karl Barth also criticizes the Augustinian view on the
Church as it affects the message of the Word:
The cross of Jesus Christ is lacking in the Augustinian
conception, and therefore it lacks the true divine
trustworthiness. The real civitas Dei on earth, which
is invincible, and can therefore be proclaimed with
confidence, is not the rule of the Church, but the rule
of Him who in this world had to be nailed to the cross.
And for his followers this means the rule of Scripture
and the faith in which such a rule finds obedience.
How we are to reconcile the offensive traditionalism and
ecclesiasticism to which our citations have given support, with the
personalistic, evangelical elements is hard to determine. If we
accept the relativizing of statements like Croce's "every thinking of
history is always adequate to the moment at which it appears and
3
always inadequate to the moment that follows" we may feel the
issue is somewhat resolved. Wilburn applies this form of appraisal
to point out the development of this aspect in Augustinian theology
and its contrast with the other emphasis on the personal:
*Farrar, History, 236.
2Barth, C. D. l/2, 679.
3
Benedetto Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice, trans.
Douglas Ainslie (New York: Russell & Russell, 1960), p. 201.
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Through the Donatist controversy, however, Augustine
was led to attribute to the institutional church, with
its infallible dogma and saving Sacraments, qualities
that in his more spiritual moments of reflection he was
willing to apply only to the spiritual community con¬
stituted by grace, on the one hand, and by faith, hope,
and love, on the other. The concept of the church
that was the heart throb of Augustine's own soul focused
in the reality of God's immediately experienced grace
and the response of faith, hope and love. At heart,
Augustine remained a mystic, not a Sacramentarian.
But as Adolf Harnack has aptly said, "Augustine sub¬
ordinated the notion of the Church and Sacraments to
the spiritual doctrine of God, Christ, the gospel, faith
and love as far as that was at all possible about
400 A. D. 1,1
A less notorious instance of Augustine's concern with the role
of the Church in interpretation, certainly less well understood, is his
O
citation of the seven rules of Tichonius. Farrar sees in them an
3
obnoxious "tropology" by which he evidently means allegory. In his
encyclopedia article Ebeling emphasizes the character of emphasis on
the Geschichtliche:
Diese Skopus-Angabe schliesst fur Augustin die
Verbindung mit einem der Metaphysik entlehnten
Kriterium nicht aus, lasst aber demgegenuber
mehr Raum zur Berucksichtigung des Geschichtlichen,
als es bei Origenes der Fall gewesen war. Dem kam
auch die Ubernahme una Einarbeitung der sieben
Regeln des Ticonius. . . . entgegen: Hinweise auf
Wilburn, Historical Shape, 40.
^Augustine On Christian Doctrine iii. 31-37.
^Farrar, History, 237.
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heilsgeschichtliche Strukturen des Schriftinhaltes
als Schlussel zu dessen Verstandnis. 1
In Evangelische Evanaelienauslaaung Ebeling draws out more incisively
the implications of the Augustinian incorporation of the Tichonius
material. There he makes clear that the dominant motif in all the rules
is some aspect of the Church, in accordance with the point of view
expressed by Tichonius, "nihil describit scriptura praeter ecclesiam. "
Ebeling indicates that the seven rules utilize the historical incidents
of the Church, by analogy, to illuminate other portions of Scripture.
Ebeling points out that a study of the dependence of Augustine on
Tichonius for his doctrine of the church had not been made at the time
of writing /the first edition of Evangelische Evangelienausiegung was
in 1942/and this adequately explains our present lack of grasp of the
issue as well. ^
We have now set forth the foundations of Augustine's position
as it relates to his hermeneutics. We turn now to some brief inquiries
exploring related categories and making some further appraisals.
On the relation of faith to understanding, Augustine does
employ the faith--understanding sequence, as in this tractate:
Dost thou wish to understand? Believe. For God
has said by the prophet: "Except ye believe, ye
shall not understand. ". . .Therefore do not seek to
^Ebeling, "Hermeneutik, " 249.
^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 124-126.
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understand in order to believe, but believe that thou
mayest understand. *
The ambiguity of the crede ut intelliqam in Augustine of which Karl
2
Barth speaks may be seen in some of the following lines of the
tractate, where belief and obedience are commingled:
Therefore when I would counsel the obedience of
believing toward the possibility of understanding,
and say that our Lord Jesus Christ has added this
very thing in the following sentence, we find Him
to have said, "If any man be willing to do His will,
he shall know of the doctrine. " What is "he shall
know? " It is the same thing as "he shall under¬
stand. " But what is "If any man be willing to do
His will? " It is the same thing as to believe. ^
The crucial distinction lies in the definition of faith, and the excerpt
above only partially reflects the possibilities open to faith within the
total context of Augustinianism.
There is a running thread of double distinctions in Augustine.
One of these is the distinction between plain passages of Scripture,
easily interpreted, and obscure passages which are difficult to
comprehend. Augustine has an interesting justification for this
difference in form:
The Holy Spirit has, with admirable wisdom and care
for our welfare, so arranged the Holy Scriptures as
by the plainer passages to satisfy our hunger, and
by the more obscure to stimulate our appetite. For
^Augustine Tractate on John 7:14-18 xxix. 6.
2Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Ouuerens Intellectum, trans. Ian W.
Robertson (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1960), p. 58.
3
Augustine Tractate on John 7:14-18 xxix. 6.
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almost nothing is dug out of those obscure passages
which may not be found set forth in the plainest
language elsewhere.
From this we may conclude that the Scripture will explain itself from
the clearer passages' being applied to the less clear and the obscure.
But the existing literal-figurative dichotomy is not absent in Augustine,
nor negated absolutely by him. He relies on that old dictum of the
"letter that kills" with his special application:
For that teaching which brings to us the command to
live in chastity and righteousness is "the letter that
killeth, " unless accompanied with "the spirit that
giveth life. " For that is not the sole meaning of the
passage, "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth
life, " which merely prescribes that we should not
take in the literal sense any figurative phrase which
in the proper meaning of its words would produce only
nonsense, but should consider what else it signifies,
nourishing the inner man by our spiritual intelligence,
since "being carnally-minded is death, whilst to be
spiritually-minded is life and peace. "^
In contradistinction to the emphasis on the forms of letter and spirit,
which led to a justification of extremes of allegory, Augustine
"separated letter and spirit not formally but according to content— by
which he intended a distinction between a literal and a spiritual
3
understanding." This emphasis on the content develops into a healthy
respect for the meaning which the author intended, rather than what
the interpreter puts into the passage:
'''Augustine On Christian Doctrine ii. 6.
2
Augustine On the Spirit and the Letter ii. 6.
3
Headley, Luther's View, 22.
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For if he takes up rashly a meaning which the author
whom he is reading did not intend, he often falls in
with other statements which he cannot harmonize with
this meaning. And if he admits that these statements
are true and certain, then it follows that the meaning he
put upon the former passage cannot be the true one:
and so it comes to pass, one can hardly tell how, that,
out of love for his own opinion, he begins to feel more
angry with Scripture than he is with himself. *
The close relationship of Luther to Augustine in this matter of the proper
interpretation of 2 Cor. 3:6 and of letter and spirit seen from the point
2of view of content is ably appraised by Ebeling.
In spite of these more clearly defined distinctions in the inter¬
pretation of Scripture, which seem to promise a more historical and
more generally understandable hermeneutic, Augustine permits at times
the perpetuation of the idea of esoteric understanding, given to some,
withheld from others. Thus:
Consider, moreover, the style in which Sacred
Scripture is composed,--how accessible it is to all
men, though its deeper mysteries are penetrable to
very few. The plain truths which it contains it
declares in the artless language of familiar friend¬
ship to the hearts both of the unlearned and of the
learned; but even the truths which it veils in
symbols it does not set forth in stiff and stately
sentences, which a mind somewhat sluggish and un¬
educated might shrink from approaching, as a poor
man shrinks from the presence of the rich; but by
the condescension of its style, it invites all not
only to be fed with the truth which is plain, but
^"Augustine On Christian Doctrine i.37. v. also Grant, Bible
in the Church, 93 .
2
Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , v. especially pp. 287-89.
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also to be exercised by the truth which is concealed. ^
In the Confessions we find the same perspective:
For now those things which heretofore appeared in¬
congruous to me in the Scripture, and used to offend
me, having heard divers of them expounded reason¬
ably, I referred to the depth of the mysteries, and
its authority seemed to me all the more venerable and
worthy of religious belief, in that, while it was
visible for all to read it, it reserved the majesty of
its secret within its profound significance, stooping
to all in the great plainness of its language and
lowliness of its style, yet exercising the application
of such as are not light of heart; that it might receive
all into its common bosom, and through narrow
passages waft over some few towards Thee.
The mystical element in the communication of this divine
truth may be understood as an inner light:
For the word of truth is applied to man externally by
the ministry of a bodily voice, but yet "neither is
he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth;
but God that giveth the increase. " Man indeed hears
the speaker, be he man or angel, but in order that he
may perceive and know that what is said is true, his
mind is internally besprinkled with that light which
remains for ever, and which shines even in darkness.^
That the inner light does not come by some transcendent, mysterious
working would seem to be inferred from what we would designate
vocation. E. Hoffmann puts it this way:
The interpreter must himself have a gift which comes
from God, but he does not possess this gift until he
■'"Augustine Letter to Volusianus cxxxvii. 18.
o
Augustine Confessions vi. 5 .
3
Augustine On Forgiveness of Sins, and Baptism i. 37.
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shares it out: through being passed on it is increased.
The Christian is thus for Augustine something active.
He must be active, in order to be an instrument for
God's activity. The working of God affects only the
doing of something. God does not cease to give us
the gift, if we apply it. ^
For any one concerned with the vexing question of appraising
the purported Platonism or Neo-Platonism of Augustine, the foregoing
section must have dropped numerous clues to be seized upon more or
less avidly. In this seething mass of words and ideas in Augustine
there is something suspicious about the very friendliness toward
allegory, the dubious reality of history, the duality of interpretations,
the very mention of letter and spirit. We may add to this data quite
consciously a repeated stress on seeing the Truth, a concept open to
Platonizing charges. Thus, in the Confessions:
And thus, with the flash of a trembling glance, it
arrived at that which is. And then I saw Thy invisible
things understood by the things that are made. But I
was not able to fix my gaze thereon; and my infirmity
being beaten back, I was thrown again on my accustomed
habits, carrying along with me naught but a loving
memory thereof, and an appetite for what I had, as it
were, smelt the odour of, but was not yet able to eat.
Granted the possibility of Augustine's being carried away by a flight
of oratorical indulgence, the emphasis on seeing in his exposition of
John 5:19 is also very much to the point here:
There is that which thou mayest see, but not that
whereby thou canst see. Thou didst not believe
^E. Hoffmann, "Augustine's Philosophy of History," 184.
2
Augustine Confessions vii, 23.
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me before that there is that which thou mayest see:
thou art now, as by the guidance of reason, brought
to it: thou hast drawn near, strained thine eyes to
see it, throbben, and shrunk back.'''
The ascent of the soul toward God, the "stretching" away from the
body, is accentuated in another tractate:
We may, in some measure stretch out ourselves, not
against God, but towards Him, and lift up our soul,
pouring it out above us, like the Psalmist, to whom
it was said, "Where is thy God? " "On these things, "
saith he, "I meditated, and poured out my soul above
me. " Therefore lei us lift up our soul to God, not
against God; for this also is said, "To Thee, O Lord,
I have lifted up my soul. " And let us lift it up with
His own assistance, for it is heavy. And from what
cause is it heavy? Because the body which is
corrupt weighs down the soul, and the earthly
tabernacle depresses the mind while meditating on
many things. ^
The soul-body dichotomy continues in the following paragraphs of the
tractate also. So Warfield concludes that "one of the main features
of Augustine's philosophy" is "his assertion that the objects of
sensible and intellectual perception alike have indubitable objectivity, "
and that the soul "is connected with the sensible world by the external
senses; on the other hand, with the intelligible world by the sensus
3
intimus which is the intellect." The argument is supported by citing
Augustine's Against the Academics.
'''Augustine Tractate on John 5:19 xviii.11.
2




In his careful and restrained analysis of Platonism in Augustine's
philosophy of history, E. Hoffmann concedes a number of correlations.
In continuity with several elements deaiwith above, this extract is
relevant:
But in a deeper sense Augustine is a Platonist.
Neither as a Platonizing Christian nor as a Christian
adept of Platonism, but as the Plato of Christianity.
What is fundamental in Plato's philosophical thought
lies in the fact that he makes the starting-point of
his whole philosophy the conviction that there is one
unconditionally right way of thinking; hence oniy one
(for truth is one); hence outside of this only false
ways.*
Hoffmann's judgment relates to epistemology directly, but we
cannot ignore here the possibility of ontological involvement as well.
E. Thestrup Pedersen makes the unqualified judgment that neo-
Platonic ontology is "indubitably" /ubestrideliqt/ present in
2
Augustine. In a closely related judgment, Patterson acknowledges
a similarity in cosmology between Augustine and his Greek Christian
contemporaries (already seen to be under Platonic influence), but
wisely qualifies and corrects a too-radical application of this judgment
3
by adding that he holds this cosmology "in a quite different context. "
We must now attempt some sort of resolution of this issue and
make some provisional conclusions. Let us add one further statement,
''"Hoffmann, "Augustine's Philosophy of History, " 178-79.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 122.
^Patterson, God and History, 118.
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that of Thomas F. Torrance:
In the Augustinian tradition the universe was regarded
as a sacramental macrocosm in which the physical and
visible were held to be the counterpart in time to eternal
and heavenly patterns. As such the world had
significance only so far as it reflected or illustrated
eternal patterns, but it was not worthy of attention in
itself. *
We conclude that, in laying the stress on "sacramental" we
avert the possibility of ascribing to Augustine a pure idealism. This,
too, gives the new context for the Greek Christian cosmology for
Augustine. The world is not a perverse riddle, a secret which frustrates
man in his search for understanding. The world has become a sign, a
sacrament, through which we come to know the eternal Truth, and it
has become this through the incarnation in that world of the Word of
Truth, Jesus Christ. As the world is macrocosmic sacrament, so in
microcosmic man is found also the revealing sign, and man is seen
as in Augustine's Confessions as potentially the seeker, who has
sought not unsuccessfully, but to the finding of his rest in God.
The controversy as to the role of philosophical presuppositions
in Augustine is as endless as that on the proper role of philosophy in
theology. Carl Michalson can defend the general principle of the use
of philosophy along with its place in Augustine, saying:
If theology is separable from other spheres it is in¬
sulated against their judgment. . . .One of the rewards
'''Thomas F. Torrance, "The Influence of Reformed Theology on
Modern Scientific Method," Dialog, II (Winter, 1963), 42.
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of that risk /T. e. of openness to philosophy/ is that
the methodological lines by which theological per¬
spective is communicated to other spheres are at
least kept open. 1
But Rudolf Hermann obviously intends to speak pejoratively when he
says: "Aber Latomus kann eben, im Gefolge Augustins und der Schol-
2
astik, nicht anders als anthropologisch-metaphysisch denken. "
Whether we accept the one conclusion or other, the fact remains that a
very high level of some kind of ratiocination is evident in Augustine,
that whatever his thinking is called, it is highly sophisticated. His
own earlier doubt and skepticism is deepened in his personal and
professional life. Lowith's words are effective in analyzing this
activity:
The Christian search for redemptive truth and
certainty of faith is incompatible with classical
irony, skeptical suspense, and ataraxy. Doubt,
too, has become more total and intense through
Christianity than it ever was in antiquity.
Augustine, Pascal, Luther, Kierkegaard—they all
seek and search and doubt in a new, passionate
way. Classical skepticism discussed rational
contradictions with regard to their truth or falsity;
Christian and modern doubt refers to the question
whether man, who sins and errs, can be "in the
"'"Carl Michalson, Wordly Theology (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 58.
2
Rudolf Hermann, "Zur Kontroverse zwischen Luther und Latomus, "
Luther and Melanchthon, ed. Vilmos Vajta (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg
Press, 1961), p. 117.
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truth" at all. ^
It follows from this conclusion, as E. Hoffmann says, that communion
2
with God remained as a problem after Augustine. Another aspect of
Augustine's sophisticated approach to his problem is what J. N. D.
3
Kelly calls "the subtlety and fertility of his. . .imagination. " It is a
truism that such unusual gifts may pose a hazard for the owner, and in
our view they play a major role in the difficulty with which subsequent
theologians apprehended Augustine in all his variety of thought and
expression.
Farrar points out the spectrum of followers of Augustine, and
it is evident that only eclecticism could account for his being held in
equal honor by such extremes as this: "By his dialectic skill and
speculative curiosity he became the father of scholasticism, and at
the same time he gave an impulse to the medieval mystics by his
4
spiritual ardour. " That eclecticism of the Reformers over against
Augustine is undoubtedly in the second line outlined above. The
manifestation in Augustine of "living contact of. . .whole being with
'''Karl Lowith, Nature, History, and Existentialism, ed. Arnold
Levison (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966),
p. 123.
2
Hoffmann, "Augustine's Philosophy of History," 179.
^Kelly, "Bible and Latin Fathers," 53.
^Farrar, History, 23 5.
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the inspired words, " in the phrase of Dean Church quoted by Farrar
is without question the trait which endears Augustine to the
evangelicals. Headley applies this principle to Luther, maintaining
that it is "personal faith and the religious content in the life of the
2
great Christian thinker" which appeals to Luther." Such statements are
commonplace in Luther studies. Pauck puts it: "in his /Luther's/
opinion, Augustine was the Scriptural theologian who had the right
3
comprehension of the nature of sin and grace." Moreover, Melanchthon
says "Luther follows him /Augustine/ throughout in his commentary on
4
Galatians. " On his own part as well, Melanchthon commends
Augustine:
Saint Augustine, a man of both singular genius and
great experience in sacred matters, said that the
apostle does not desire a man of acute understanding
but only an attentive hearer. He who has been in¬
fected with the opinions of carnal philosophy does
not acknowledge the wisdom of Paul. Accordingly,
you will see to it that you bring to this wisdom, first, a
mind that is pure, and then also one that is free from
the opinions of the crowd. ^
"'"Farrar, History, 241.
2




Philip Melanchthon, Selected Writings, ed. Elmer Ellsworth
Flack and Lowell J. Satre (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg




As we might expect, not all students concur in the place which
Augustine deserves. Porta lie, for example, takes pains to qualify his
own fine survey of the work of Augustine with the statement: "The
strictly exegetical work of Augustine does not equal, then, either in
scope or in scientific character, that of St. Jerome.""'' Oberman is
more expansive in stating that "all medieval thinkers" followed him
2
"with varying degrees of fidelity." The amazing number of references
to Augustine in Miss Smalley's work is self-evident proof of the
dominance of Augustine in the medieval church. Inclusion of much of
Augustine's commentary in the Glossa Ordinaria, which was generally
accepted as auctoritas, attests further to this claim of pervasive
influence.
Augustine must have been more fortunate in his friends than
were some other interpreters. At least, mercifully, certain dubious
aspects of his work, such as the possibility for unlimited individualistic
interpretations of equal authority which he opened up, were either over-
3
looked or ignored or forgotten. Perhaps the reason for his wide
acceptation was, as Burleigh has said, that he left "himself ample




^Kelly, "Bible and Latin Fathers, " 53.
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room in the interpretation of Scripture. " x Perhaps also it was the
"common-sense" perspective of the West in matters of doctrine that
2decried too great subtleties and the strange ability of the medieval
peoples to combine the apparent contradictions such as the literal and
symbolical in their approach to phenomena and in their approach to
3
art and literature.
The Problem of Words and Things
Hilary of Poitiers is one of those little-known transitional
figures who are vital links in the development of Western thought. He
was known to and appreciated by Luther both directly through readings
4
and indirectly by citations in Peter Lombard's Sentences. Melanchthon
was somewhat dubious regarding his interpretations as indicated here:
"Haec satis elegantur Hilarius, nescio etiam, an satis probe.
''"Burleigh, City of God, 109.
2j. N. D. Kelly,"The Bible and the Latin Fathers," in Nineham,
Church's Use of the Bible, p. 55.
3
BarfieId, Saving the Appearances, 73.
4 /
WA 58/1, p. 94 catalogues these references: "Hilarius ist
gut," TR 1, 106; "Augustinus et Hilarius lucidius scripsissent, alios
vero maximo cum iudicio esse legendos, " TR 4, 536; "Multa praeclara
de trinitate et iustificatione scripserunt, " TR 5, 154, 415; "Hilarius
verus luctator adversus haereticos scripserunt, " TR 2, 344. Again
p. 98: "/Lombardus7 Perlegit omnes scribentes, Hilarium" etc. TR 2,
517.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 205.
103
Hilary's "hearty, though not indiscriminate, acceptance of the method
/of Origen/ led to his general adoption in the West. " * On the other
hand, "his sense of the value of Scripture is heightened by his belief
in the sacredness of language. Names belong inseparably to the things
2
which they signify; words are themselves a revelation."
Hilary applied this to the problems posed by the Arians:
Thus the name which expresses His nature proves
the truth of our confession of the faith. For the name,
which indicates any single substance, points out also
any other substance of the same kind; and, in this
instance, there are not two substances but one sub¬
stance, of the one kind. For the Son of God is God;
this is the truth expressed in His name. The one name
does not embrace two Gods; for the one name God is
the name of one indivisible nature. For since the
Father is God and the Son is God, and that name which
is peculiar to the Divine nature is inherent in Each,
therefore the Two are One.^
Thus again: "Scripture makes no distinction, by difference of name,
between Their natures, but discriminates between Themselves. The
result of such a view is that Hilary basically opposes the use of any
technical terms in theology and prefers to employ those which have
their basis in Scripture. He is keen to perceive and explicate the
St. Hilary of Poitiers, Selected Works, Vol. IX, A Select
Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church,
trans. E. W. Watson et al. , ed. W. Sanday (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1899), p. lxi.
^Hilary, Selected Works , lxii.
^Hilary, De Trinitate vii.13.
^Hilary, De Trinitate iv. 29 .
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problem posed by human language and analogy:
We are well aware that neither the speech of men
nor the analogy of human nature can give us a full
insight into the things of God. The ineffable cannot
submit to the bounds and limits of definition; that
which is spiritual is distinct from every class or in¬
stance of bodily things. Yet, since our subject is
that of heavenly natures, we must employ ordinary
natures and ordinary speech as our means of express¬
ing what our mind apprehends; a means no doubt un¬
worthy of the majesty of God, but forced upon us by
feebleness of our intellect, which can use only our
own circumstances and our own words to convey to
others our perceptions and our conclusions. *
"God cannot be known except by devotion" but the heretics force men
to do otherwise.
The errors of heretics and blasphemers force us to
deal with unlawful matters, to scale perilous heights,
to speak unutterable words, to trespass on forbidden
ground. Faith ought in silence to fulfil the command¬
ments, worshipping the Father, reverencing with Him
the Son, abounding in the Holy Ghost, but we must
strain the poor resources of our language to express
thoughts too great for words. The errors of others
compels us to err in daring to embody in human terms
truths which ought to be hidden in the silent veneration
of the heart.
Hilary was a pioneer in the attempt to work through to a better
understanding of the function of human words and the human task of
understanding through words. His declension to the old allegorical
mode indicates the difficulty of making the break with that formidably
^Hilary De Trinitate iv. 2 .; cf. i. 19 .
^Hilary De Trinitate xi.42.
3
Hilary De Trinitate ii. 2.
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strong and appealing method. Indeed, even in our own century Hendrik
Kraemer can make this statement:
It seems that it is well-nigh superhuman to adopt and
practise obediently Biblical epistemology, because
it so rarely happens that scholastic epistemology is
radically dethroned, both with orthodox and liberal
theologians. 3
The two-fold difficulty of dealing with the nature of being and the
development of self-consciousness is succinctly stated by Friedrich
Gogarten:
According to Julius Stenzel's analysis of the metaphysics
of the Greeks, the meaning of "being" preceded the
division into subject and object. Being meant at one
and the same time both the objective reality that confronts
the consciousness and the reality that supports this
consciousness. . . .Thus man in the old era could not ask
questions about himself except as he assumed that he
was a being who received his being from the world. As
the New Testament writers say of those who live prior
to and without faith, he was "of" the world.3
The major thrust in Hilary away from the essentialist domination
is toward the underscoring of Biblical words as special, as unique
language, distinct from man and his language. In the context in
O
which he wrote "the words of God are realities, not mere words"
Luther specifically cited Hilary's works approvingly. Thus the words
^Hendrik Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1957), p. 344.
2
Friedrich Gogarten, The Reality of Faith: The Problem of
Subjectivism in Theology, trans. Carl Michalson, et. al. , (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1959), p. 33.
3Luther, Am. Ed., I, 21-22. V. also XXXII, 243-44.
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of Scripture, especially the names, the nouns, take on a non-
significative, self-contained importance. These conclusions are not
primarily affirmations on the nature of revelation as such, but are
analyses of the nature of language with the objective of aiding inter¬
pretation .
The work of Anselm of Canterbury several centuries later may
be seen as a development in a similar vein. Marcia L. Colish has
masterfully analyzed Anselm's epistemology in her book, The Mirror of
Language. ^ Professor Colish traces Anselm's grammatical approach
back to Lanfranc and sets it in contrast to the syllogistic proof. Those
who hold this type of view display "their confidence in the significative
power of the noun by assuming that definition in itself is somehow not
2
only explanatory but intellectually convincing.'"" This mode of procedure,
or "equipollent proof" eventuates in the statement: A=B=C=D. As Miss
Colish describes the Anselmic method, "The use of definition is
basic . . .in the sense of the quest for names of God that possess
rectitude. To find these names, Anselm moves from one definition to
3
another by equipollency. "
What is so very important in this summary analysis of Anselm's
^Marcia L. Colish, The Mirror of Language: A Study in the







methodology here is the presupposing of A. The conclusion E) is con¬
tingent on the rectitude of A. We can progress readily from this A of
nominal definition to Professor Torrance's comment that in Anselm "the
word of God is not in the likeness of the creature but the creature in
the likeness of God's Word. " * Expressed in a total theological view,
the foregoing concepts can be seen embodied in the Anselmic "Fides
quaerens intellectual. "
Abelard may well have begun with an unquestioned faith as did
2
Anselm and have proceeded to defend and understand that faith
through rational processes, but either his personal arrogance or his
critical stance aroused fears and opposition. He opposed the naive
ascription of equivalence to words and things, and pointed out the
arbitrary character of meanings given to words, as well as the logical
confusion of words and concepts in much argumentation. To avoid
this type of error he espoused a rigorous logical analysis of language
and grammar. The ultimate effect of this method was to question
seriously the dominant realism by the affirmation that universals are
*T. F. Torrance, "Scientific Hermeneutics according to St.
Thomas Aquinas, " Journal of Theological Studies, XIII (October, 1962),
278.
2
Smalley, Use of the Bible, 144; Gustav E. Weigel and Arthur
G. Madden, Religion and the Knowledge of God (Englewood Cliffs, N.
J.; Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 103.
^Meyrick H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (London: Oxford
University Press, 1946), p. 65.
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neither words nor things but sermones, concepts. ^ The door to
Nominalism thus set ajar was to be opened wide subsequently by
Ockham. We turn to Copleston for a judgment as to Abelard's responsi¬
bility in this wrestling with the problem of the universals:
If we wish, with John of Salisbury, to call Abelard a
"nominalist", we must recognize at the same time
that his "nominalism" is simply a denial of ultra-
realism and and assertion of the distinction between
the logical and real orders, without involving any
denial of the objective foundation of the universal
concept. The Abelardian doctrine is an adumbration,
in spite of some ambiguous language, of the developed
theory of "moderate realism".^
What insight have we gained from these sketches on the relation
of word and thing? Aside from the obvious implications for philosophy
and systematic theology, we conclude that Abelard manifests yet
another stage in the see-saw struggle to gain a viable mode of under¬
standing concrete man, his language and his religious experience.
This means that words are not viewed as pure form in the realist con¬
text, and that man begins to be seen as standing somehow subjectively
over against both words and things.
It is appropriate now to look at Thomas Aquinas from a new
perspective, inquiring into some of his theories of knowledge as they
relate ultimately to hermeneutics. Unfortunately, there have been so
•'■Carre, Realists and Nominalists, 60, 65, 106-07.
2 7
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), 2/l, p. 172.
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many and so varied interpreters of St. Thomas that any analysis is sub¬
ject to the accusation of being eclectic with a bias. J. A. Dorner
blandly stated that Thomas was a skeptical Nominalist, * Professor
Torrance sees him influenced by the Pseudo-Dionysius in a crucial
2
point. Augustine and Aristotle are seen as in continual interplay in
varying degree in the thought of St. Thomas. For our purposes here,
however, there is no absolute need to come up with the final judgment
as to the precise position of the great Scholastic. Rather we may note
the play of elements in the work of this complex thinker, and tacitly
accept Miss Colish's appraisal:
Despite the extensive amount of space he devotes to
topics related to this problem /of the role of signs in
the knowledge of God./, Thomas never compiles all the
relevant materials into one work, nor does he put forth
his theory with either economy or overtness.^
It appears clear enough that Thomas rejects Augustine's
illumination theory of knowledge and thereby places himself closer to
4
the Reformers. This done, he must resolve the remaining problem of
knowledge, by determining the roles of sense and intellection. Thomas
^J. A. Dorner, The Person of Christ, Div. 2, Vol. i: History
of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, trans. D.
W. Simon (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1862), pp. 371-72.
2




Torrance, Journal of Theological Studies, XIII, No. 3, 270-71.
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assigns specific, limited roles to each function, and thus points out
to us the growing awareness of the necessity of a truly scientific,
ultimately inductive, relation to things. Carre' summarizes, "Intellect
and sense are distinct and have different spheres. Understanding can¬
not know bodies, nor sense essences or forms."''' Torrance confirms
thus: "Intellective knowledge is dependent upon the sensitive as the
sensitive is upon the intellective. In this mutual dependence the
2
intellect is both passive and active."
Now this principle works out neatly enough when applied to
matters in the realm of nature, but we discover quickly that the
knowledge of God is sharply detached from such a psychological
scheme as that above. Rather, playing on the distinction between
God's "essence" and His "person" Thomas concludes, that there can
be no communication from God directly in word or speech, only in-
3
directly. Consistently, Thomas maintains that the Scripture, and
4
only the Scripture of all writings, has a double sense. As Professor
Torrance admirably summarizes, this means that:
''Carre, Realists and Nominalists, 85.
^Torrance, Tournal of Theological Studies, XIII, No. 3, 257.
C. 262.
3
Torrance, Journal of Theological Studies, XIII, No. 3, 273-74.
^Charles Donahue, "Patristic Exegesis: Summation," Critical
Approaches to Medieval Literature, ed. Dorothy Bethurum (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 80.
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Only metaphorically can we take the words of scripture
to be the word of God. Now this has a decided
advantage in directing attention to Christ himself as
the one word of God behind all the speech of holy
scripture, but the way in which Aquinas thinks of the
relation of scripture to that word leads into a highly
intellectualistic interpretation of it in which the mean¬
ing is inevitably schematized to the philosophical
thought-forms brought to its understanding. ^
Something of the deficiency of his approach stems from his failure to
2
apply the matter of the Incarnation to this problem.
From the work of St. Thomas and onward it is evident that two
ineluctable factors have been established in the processes of Western
theological inquiry: one, thinking man can not be regarded as a
neutral element in the knowing process, and the other, Christian man,
quite specifically the man of faith, faces a special problem as he
examines his own knowledge of God. We quote the words of Walter
Ong:
This gift from God, which is the gift called Christian
faith, comes into play in every Christian and sets the
mind to a task beyond itself. It thereby establishes
the mind of the believer in a lifelong state of real
tension. An acute awareness of the presence of this
tension brought Thomas to examine in terms of a detailed
study of human intellection the condition of man con¬
sequent upon Christian belief. ^
''"Torrance, Journal of Theological Studies, XIII, No. 3, 280-81.
V. also 266, 269.
2
Torrance, Journal of Theological Studies, XIII, No. 3, 280.
^Walter J. Ong, The Barbarian Within (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1962), pp. 109-10.
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Thomas'situation, as Professor Torrance explicitly states, is within
the well-known hermeneutical circle, * a circle drawn from God to man
and again to God.
Late Medieval Developments
The concluding section of this historical survey will deal
briefly with three figures: Nicholas of Lyra (ob. 1340), Gabriel Biel
(ob. 1495), and Jacques Lefevre d'Etaples, perhaps better known as
Faber Stapulensis (1455?-1536). The brevity of this report should not
be construed as giving minimal importance to these scholars. In fact,
the section on Lyra is painfully inadequate to summarize the wealth of
references particularly in Luther's works to this towering figure. It is,
true, nevertheless that these men have not engaged the broad attention
which has been accorded other exegetes earlier and later in the history
of hermeneutics. The problem with Biel is that he is marked at the
outset as a scholastic theologian, "the last of the scholastics, " and
little analysis has been made of his work from the perspective of
exegetical or hermeneutical study. The work of Heiko Oberman is of
tremendous importance in highlighting the key position of Biel in late-
2
medieval theology and Biblical interpretation. The situation with
•'•Torrance, "Scientific Hermeneutics..." JTS, October, 1962,
pp. 287-88.
o
We refer particularly to Oberman's, The Harvest of Medieval
Theology, previously cited.
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Faber is quite a different matter again. Here is a fascinating character
whose acknowledged relation to both the Wittenberg and Genevan
reformations has never become of general concern to the academic
searchers. A survey of the indices to secondary sources on the
Reformation will confirm this judgment.
Each of these men has representative importance in this presenta¬
tion. Without limiting our inquiry later, we may at the outset simplify
by citing Lyra as an example of the results of new contacts with and
new learning from Jewish scholarship; Biel gives us a picture of the
Occamist wrestling manfully with the problem of the relationship of
Scripture, tradition and Church, and Faber typifies the humanist exegete
with strong evangelical leanings.
The Franciscan Nicholas of Lyra is so highly esteemed as to be
denominated "the Jerome of the fourteenth century" by Farrar"'' and "the
2
best-equipped bliblical scholar in the Middle Ages. " His studies
had made him aware of Tychonius' seven rules, which he apparently
3
discovered through Isidore of Seville, not Augustine. A more dis¬
tinctive component of his background was his study of Rashi (Rabbi
Solomon ben Isaac, 1040-1105) from whom he derived a strong sense of
the priority of the literal sense of Scripture and the necessity of
'''Farrar, History, 274.
2
Reported in Oberman, Forerunners, 286.
3
Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 302, n. 35. Pedersen cites Lyra,
I fol. 3H and 4A, B, C and D.
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applying linguistic studies. The new interest in the study of the
Hebrew language and in conferring with Jewish rabbis on matters of
translation and interpretation, after some difficult exchanges, reaches
its zenith in the Reformation era.''" These Hebrew studies, however,
create an awareness of textual difficulties which are not to be
gainsaid. Lyra concludes:
Ulterius considerandum, quod sensus literalis. . . videtur
multum obfuscatus diebus modernis, partim scriptorum
vitio. . .partim imperitia aliquorum correctorum, qui in
pluribus locis fecerunt puncta ubi non debent fieri. . .
partim ex modo translationis nostrae (sc. Vulgata) quae
O
in multis locis aliter habet quam libri hebraici.
It is obvious that the work of the interpreter will incorporate critical
study of the text in its original language.
On the basis of the hebraic tradition through Rashi and the
Christian tradition through St. Thomas, Lyra argues for a literal in-
3
terpretation of the Scripture. A very promising progression in this
mode of dealing with texts is the expansion of the material beyond a
4
word or a few words to the dealing with a whole passage. In a most
significant judgment he concludes that doctrine is to be established
*E. C. Blackman, Biblical Interpretation (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1957), p. 71.
2
Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 304. n. 43. Pedersen cites Lyra
I, fol. 3 G.
3
Oberman, Forerunners, 286.
^Blackman, Biblical Interpretation, 115.
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only on the basis of literal interpretation: "cum ex solo sensu literali
et non ex mystico posset argumentum fieri ad probandum.
Any expectation of an unqualified literal-historical interpretation
in Lyra would be premature. Although his Postillae demonstrate more
of the ascendant literal interpretation, Lyra did also write the
Moralitates, and some systematic statements on exegesis which are
not only equivocal but definitely traditional in propounding the two
senses of Scripture. E. Thestrup Pedersen calls attention to this
statement:
Secundum igitur primam significationem quae est per
voces accipitur sensus litteralis seu historicus.
Secundum vero aliam significationem, quae est per
ipsa res accipitur sensus mysticus seu spiritualist
Ebeling concludes further:
Auch Lyra zB versteht eine Reihe von Pss litteraliter
Christologisch und will mit der historischen Deutung
anderer Pss (etwa auf David) nicht das Recht einer
ti-bertragenden Anwendung auf Christus bestreiten.
Eine prinzipielle Reduktion auf den sensus litteralis
historicus und Eliminierung jeder daruber hinaus
gehenden mystischen (prophetischen, allegorischen)
Deutung ist fur die mittelalterliche H. unvorstellbart
In view of this double system it is somewhat easier to account
for what appear to be discrepancies in the criticisms of Lyra. Oberman,
^Farrar, History, 276. No reference is given for the citation.
2
Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 300, n. 18. Pedersen cites Lyra I,
fol. 3E.
3
Ebeling, "Hermeneutik, " 250.
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for example, can say with approval that Lyra "programmatically opposed
current allegoristic interpretations of the Bible. " * But Grant observes
"even after the need for allegorization seemed gone, Nicholas of Lyra
2
set forth the spiritual as well as the literal sense in his commentaries."
Luther combines the uncertainty in himself in the often-quoted words,
3
"Lyram contemnebam, quamquam post viderem eum valere ad historiam."
Although Rupp's terminology is not precise, he supports the contention
of allegorization in the words "a literal interpretation of the Psalms
would leave many of them baffling indeed, so that even Lyra himself
4
made frequent use of tropology."
The impossibility of a clean break with the traditional mode of
interpretation is indicated further by Lyra's perpetuation in practice,
and his defence in principle of the famous Quadriga, or four-fold
method of interpretation. Lyra transmits the classic terminology:
Qui (sc. sensus mysticus seu spiritualis) est triplex
in generali: quia si res significatae per voces
referantur ad significandum ea, quae sunt in noua lege
credenda, sic accipitur sensus allegoricus. Si autem
referantur ad significandum ea quae per nos sunt agenda,
sic est sensus moralis vel tropologicus. Si autem
referantur ad significandum ea, quae sunt speranda in
beatitudine futura, sic est sensus anagogicus. . .Unde
^Oberman, Forerunners, 305, n. 6.
3Grant, Bible in the Church, 108.
3W. A. , T. R. 1, 44, no. 116; v. also 7, no. 18.
4
Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God: Luther Studies,
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), p. 133.
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versus: Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria;
Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia. ^
In his characteristic metaphorical style Luther accuses Aquinas and
?
Lyra of disseminating the Quadriga and so rending Christ's garments.
Even so, granted our dissatisfaction with the lack of thoroughness in
effecting a change in exegetical methods, and the retrenching from
forward positions, we must ponder and give credence to Farrar's judg¬
ment that "he did more than any other writer to break down the tyranny
of ecclesiastical tradition, and to overthrow the blind belief in the bad
3
method of many centuries. "
Lyra's deference to Mother Church seems to be another evidence
of the weakness of his convictions concerning his fresh insights on
Scriptural interpretation. E. Thestrup Pedersen notes how he submits
his teachings humbly /ydmygt/ to the correction of the Church:
Nihil intendo dicere assertiue seu determinatiue, nisi
quantum ad ea quae manifeste determinata sunt per
sacram scripturam vel ecclesiae auctoritatem. . .omnia
dicta et dicenda suppono correctioni sanctae matris
ecclesiae. ^
The exact signification of the "scripturam vel ecclesiae auctoritatem"
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 301, n. 24. Pedersen cites Lyra I,
fol. 3E. v. also Grant, Bible in the Church, 101.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 333.
^Farrar, History, 277.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 25. Pedersen cites Lyra, I, fol.
3H.
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and particularly the significance of the "vel" appears ambiguous at the
same time that it is singled out for study as a dominant motif in theology
in the late Middle Ages. The example of Gabriel Biel in our next
following section will elaborate on this issue. That Lyra's view of the
church is not properly interpreted in terms of some Protestant stereotype
of pre-Reformation interpretation is evidenced by the statement quoted
by Oberman: /Lyra says/
From this it is clear that the Church is not made up of
men with reference to their authority and ecclesiastical
or secular status. For many princes and popes and
others of lesser office have been found to be apostates
from the faith. ^
However we may appraise Lyra, his successors for the next two
centuries held him in high repute and perpetuated his influence. Harold
J. Grimm reports that there were at least six editions of the Postilla
2
during the period from 1471 to 1509 alone. The mind-set which would
3
not permit Lyra to make a full break with the scholastic chains so far
as the material was concerned undoubtedly operated also in the formal
so that he left behind him, consciously, as Augustine had done, a
system of interpretation.^ The appeal of a tidy system to the lesser
"''Oberman, Forerunners, 232. He is citing Biblia cum Postillis
Nicolai Lyrae (Basel: 1498-1508), Vol. IV.
^Harold J. Grimm, The Reformation Era: 1500-1650 (New York:
The Macmillan Co. , 1954), p. 53.




figures who followed him up until the time of the Reformation, ^ is quite
natural.
The later humanists do not disappoint our expectations in their
approval for Lyra. Reucnlin spoke of "the venerable father Nicolaus of
Lyra, the common expositor of the Bible, . . .approved as an irreproach-
2
able man by all faithful to Christ. " Although Erasmus does not seem
to approve all that Lyra has said, he defends his right to say what he
thinks, and attests further to the common acceptance of his works:
"Nicholas of Lyra, a man surely not ignorant but well-informed, who
dares to tutor Jerome and to tear apart many things hallowed by the
3
consent of so many centuries. " In the wake of the humanists, Luther
continues the insistence on the necessity of the knowledge of languages
in their philology and their grammar, but he is not content with such
literalistic and grammatical analyses alone, and criticizes Lyra and
other hebraists if and when they content themselves with a simply
4
grammatical exegesis.
More basic than Luther's criticism of the humanist-grammatical
exegesis in Lyra is the reformer's condemnation of his lingering
scholasticism. Thus, in his commentary on Romans 3: 5, after toying
■'■Farrar, History, 278.
2W. Schwarz, Principles and Problems of Biblical Translation:
Some Reformation Controversies and their Background (Cambridge:





with the typical scholastic terminology of the justice and righteousness
of God, and specifically Lyra's sense of sin contributing accidentally
to the glory of God, Luther counters with the bold resolution of the
problem in the text that it is to be resolved only by the interpretation
of those who are in the Spirit. * He decries Lyra's statement that a
knowledge of the opinion of philosophers concerning the nature of
matter is necessary in order to understand the account of the creation.
Lyra's highly formal introduction to his study of Romans is contrasted
by E. Thestrup Pedersen with Luther's launching "in medias res" in his
3
commentary. The element which seems to protect Lyra from Luther's
absolute rejection as a scholastic appears to be the solid ground of
exegesis which precedes the speculation and conclusions along
4
scholastic lines. It is too much to expect that Luther will overlook
Lyra's traditional understanding of gospel and law. To Lyra, the
5
gospel is a "lex seu doctrina." Although this presupposition enables
him to move on to the conclusion of an inspired total Scripture, in
which both Testaments are on an equal plane, the corrupting perspective
■'"Luther, Romans, 78.
^Luther, Lenker I, 42.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 325.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 66-67.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 136. Pedersen cites Lyra Pars V,
fol. 2A.
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of that total scripture as entirely pedagogical is far from the mark of
evangelical, Christocentric understanding of the revelation. ^
As we move to consider Gabriel Biel we are tempted again to
attempt to designate the origins or the causes of such a development
in thought as he manifests. The fifteenth century was a strange ad¬
mixture of hopes and despairs, of talk of the Golden Age and fears of
utter ruin. The questing, fearless and disrespectful minds of humanists
and Renaissance men had opened the flood-gates of criticism of the
Church and its hallowed teachings, not, admittedly, to the degree
which the next century would do this, but sufficient for widespread
alarms. Conciliarism had been a precipitate in the problem of the roles
of papacy and church, and there seems to have been a growing self-
consciousness on the part of the doctores which posed a problem over
against the more insitutionalized theologians of the hierarchy and the
monastery.
Against this background it is tempting to label Biel so staunch
a conservative that he is better denominated an obscurantist. We
might draw such an inference from the appraisal of Robert Stupperich:
/Kiel's/ theology had a mild, conciliatory tone, but
it did not succeed in pointing out new ways and goals.
Nothing about the current forms was upset; his intent
was simply to gain from them an intrinsic meaning and
to give them a deeper interpretation. Biel contented
himself with preserving the tradition, cultivating the
Pedersen, Skriftfortlker, 213-14. It is noteworthy that Lyra
incorporates a view of progressive revelation in the relation of the Old
and the New Testament.
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pious spirit, and striving after the original meaning
of ideas. *
An extremely negative interpretation, even of Stupperich's statement,
is belied by the seminal influence of Biel in his own time and to his
immediate contemporaries, and in current reexamination. Stupperich
does serve well to highlight two significant areas of concern with Biel,
that of tradition and of a search for the original, intrinsic meaning of
ideas. We may with just grounds attribute this latter to the mood of
the humanist quest.
As a first instance of the concern to analyze the intrinsic
meanings we note Biel in a sermon on predestination, following the late
medieval search for the proper interpretation of Augustine, dealing with
2
the caritas motif. In his analysis of the Quadriga, Biel goes beyond
a mere historical repristination to a new synthesis, incorporating the
element of the work of the "doctores" alluded to above, and some
emphasis on the historical. Here is Oberman's reporting, in brief, of
Biel's point of view:
Christ opens Scripture in four ways: (1) by his historical
acts, Christ interprets Scripture typologically--defined
by Biel as allegorical exegesis; (2) by his teaching,
he expounds Scripture for his disciples historically;
(3) by sending the Holy Spirit, he leads his disciples
to a further and deeper understanding of Scripture;
(4) finally Christ calls forth doctors to illuminate Holy





he himself had jione—but now also anagogically and
tropologically.
In view of the Augustinian caritas emphasis and the methodology
of the Quadriga, we anticipate a dependence on Scripture in Biel. If
we read indifferently, without reference to context and qualifications,
we might be led to think of Biel as a biblicist. Supporting such a con¬
clusion would be isolated statements like Oberman's: "The beginning
of faith is, therefore, assent to the veracity of the Christian faith,
2that is, assent to the Bible in its entirety. " There seems to be further
corroboration in Biel's strong statement on the inspiration of the
Scripture: "Scriptura autem canonica, utrumque videlicet testamentum,
3
Spiritu sancto dictante et inspirante scripta creditur. " However, in
view of other presuppositions in Biel, notably epistemological ones,
a Biblical theology is not really conceivable or possible. This is, in
reality, what is implied by the acceptance of the totality of Scripture.
The parts of Scripture can not be submitted to criticism, and one
passage cannot be used as the point of departure from which one may
4





Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 298, n. 14. Pedersen is citing
Friedrich Kropatscheck, Das Schriftprinzip der lutherischen Kirche,
I, p. 425, n. 1, without a primary source notation.
^Oberman, Harvest, 74.
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In view of this assertion, Biel can hardly employ Augustine's caritas
as the key to the Scripture, nor, for that matter, any other element of
the canonical record.
Another potentially misleading idea is Biel's apparent Sola
Scriptura principle. For example:
Per verbum quod procedit de ore dei intelligitur omnis
veritatis instructio, omnis consolatio, omnis exhortatio,
omnis devotio que ex auditione, lectione, meditatione
ac contemplatione divinorum eloquiorum procedit. . . .
Verbum eterni dei sacra scriptura que ab ore dei procedit
ipsius indicat voluntatem sine cuius agnitione nemo
recte vivere potest. In hac discimus quantum deo
appropinquamus et quantum a deo elongamur. . .que
credenda et que speranda et cetera nostre saluti
necessaria que omnia sola docet sacra scriptura. ^
We can not totally ignore here the strongly tropological character of
the application. Of immediate importance is the question, if the
Scripture is the inspired word of God unto salvation, and if the whole
of the Scripture meaning can not be derived from the parts of the
Scripture, how is man to know the truth and be assured of its authority?
The answer bluntly put would be, in Biel's system, to accept the
authority of the Church, to believe in the Tradition, in the broadest
sense (which clearly includes the canonical Scripture), and so to be
saved. In the manifest convergence of systematic and Biblical studies
in Biel we see that the result is the subordination of Scripture and
^Oberman, Harvest, 394, n. 96; citing Lect. 71G.
2
v. Oberman, Forerunners, 137.
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Biblical studies, essentially, to studies of the doctrine of the Church
and the doctrines of the Church. As Oberman indicates, Biel does not
represent a continuation of the hermeneutical problems of the relation
of inner and outer Scripture, or of res and siqna. The issue now is, as
we have said, that of Tradition, and it moves inexorably to pose the
question of written and unwritten truth. *
We are witnessing here a transition from the mildness and
ambiguity of Augustine's commovere to an explicit compellere and
2
approbare, such as Oberman ascribes to d'Ailly. And Biel concurs
with this mutation, setting the Church above the Scripture: "Hoc enim
modo ecclesia maioris est auctoritatis quam evangelium quia huius
ecclesie evangelista scriptor evangelii est pars: totum autem maioris
3
auctoritatis est sua parte." Saving truth is interpreted by Tradition,
and Tradition is seen as the history of biblical exposition:
Sed haec opinio non acceptatur quia obviat scripture
canonice sane intellecte et auctoritatibus
sanctorum. . .Veritas in evangelio continetur sane
secundum sanctorum expositionem intellecto.^
It is impossible to be mollified by a statement like Oberman's that




^Oberman, Harvest, 398, n. 107; citing Lect. 22D.
4
Oberman, Harvest, 398, n. 109; citing Lect. 37J.
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Biel, "but Church and Scripture support each other in such a way that
the Church has an ontological priority over Holy Scripture. " ^
An example of the dilemma that can be posed to a theologian by
such an emphasis on the Church is Biel's one-time denial that the
Church can remit sins to those in purgatory. On the discovery that the
Church had spoken in the matter, Biel resolved the matter by reversing
2himself. On the basis of such instances, Oberman concludes that
not only Biel, but the late medieval nominalists as such were not anti-
3
Catholic, but lined up with the Triaentine position.
The devastating logical inference from all of this exaltation of
the Church is for Biel that there exists an extra-Biblical tradition and
4
that this unwritten tradition has the same authority as the Scripture.
Such questions are ignored with typical humanist anti-





Oberman, Harvest, 398; Oberman, Forerunners, 58.
^In a marvellously acute and succinct statement, Henri Marrou
incorporates the various elements which marked humanism: "Humanism,
a movement by turns the ally and the foe of the Reformation, but itself
quite independent. . .by several of its fundamental tendencies. . .was
likely to recall attention to the work of the Fathers of the Church, and
among them to that of St. Augustine: its mistrust of scholasticism and
its 'barbarous jargon'. . .its love of antiquity, its return to the sources,
to the original texts, to the great books, behind all the rubbish-heap
of glosses and commentaries. ." Marrou, Augustine, 166.
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meant a concern for the Church, ^ but more centrally, a concern with
the Scriptures themselves, and for Faber, a special concern for the
writings of St. Paul. A listing of Faber's major works, in itself, in¬
dicates the Biblical tendency of his thought: The Psalterium Quincuolex,
five different versions of the Latin Psalms and a critical commentary,
1509; commentary on St. Paul's Epistles, 1512; commentary on the
Gospels, 1522; French translations of the New Testament and the
2 u
Psalms, based on the Vulgate, 1523-25. Bohmer concludes that not
Luther, but Faber, published the first commentary on Paul based on the
3
original text. This meant ignoring the medieval commentaries, and
not seeking so much to supplant the accepted glosses for the scholars
as to impart the message of the text even to the common people. &L
Given the correct, corrected, original text, the humanists
could yet disagree as to the mode of understanding it. The difference
between Erasmus and Faber is sharply stated by Gilmore:
Lefebre represented a unique combination of the classical
and the Christian elements. The philological tradition
-^Marrou mentions a seldom-cited work of Faber's, a group of
patristic texts published in 1498, a full decade before his work on the
Psalms, with the title "Life-giving theology," whose inscription,
Gibus solidus, indicated his prejudice. Marrou, Augustine, 166.
2
Grimm, Reformation Era, 66-67.
3
Heinrich Bohmer, Luther in Light of Recent Research, trans.
Carl F. Huth, Jr. (New York: The Christian Herald, 1916), p. 265.
^Grimm, Reformation Era, 67.
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as established by Valla and carried on by the great
work of Erasmus and others presumed that the exercise
of human reason could distinguish the truth in
scriptural texts and that by this means man could
rise from the knowledge of things human to things
divine. For Lefebre the exercise of reason was
accompanied and conditioned by a mystical illumina¬
tion of the spirit. *
This mystical component in Faber's interpretation may be trace¬
able to his study of the Christian mystics, Eckhart and Tauler; even
more significant was his intense religious experience, which in 1507
2
led him to consider a monastic career. Whether the relation is causal
or projective, the relation of that experience to certain subjective
elements in Faber's hermeneutic merits examination. An example of
that subjective element is thus stated by Oberman: "The unbeliever
cannot discover the real meaning because he approaches the text with¬
out the most necessary exegetical tool of all, that selfsame spirit which
3
created Scripture. " Because of his concern for piety, for the spiritual
health of the monks, "he wants to present an antidote against a literal,
A
' objective', unconcerned reading of Holy Scripture. A most vivid,
historically fresh note is struck with his emphasis on encounter in the
•'•Myron P. Gilmore, The World of Humanism: 1453-1517; (Series:
The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. William L. Langer, New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1952), p. 218.






Scripture, with the Scripture as acting upon the reader, rather than
Scripture quiescent under man's scrutiny. This emphasis is highly
reminiscent of an unforgettable personal, "tower" experience in his
own history. We find these evidences, mentioned in footnotes in
Oberman: "I want this edition to be of no other use to you, than that
you everywhere encounter the one and only benefactor. " * Again:
And so I came to believe that there is a twofold literal
sense. The one is the distorted sense of those who
have no open eyes and interpret divine things according
to the flesh and in human categories. /The footnote at
this point is: 'The Latin text reads here passibiliter. /
To read Scripture 'in human categories' means that the
reader of the false literal sense makes Scripture the
object (passive) of his reading, whereas the true sense
is found when Scripture is the subject and the reader
the object. The true reader of Scripture "does not act
but is acted upon"; his own human insights give way to
the influx of the Holy Spirit. ^
3
Thus, the right understanding of Scripture is both "gift" and "grace."
In the intensely personal, evangelical experience of Faber,
the "benefactor" is quite precisely Jesus Christ. He is the Word, the
Gospel:
For the Word of Christ is the Word of God, the Gospel
of peace, liberty, and joy, the Gospel of salvation,
redemption, and life. . .If this Word is called the
Gospel, the "good news, " it is because, for us, it is
the herald of all good things, and of the infinite
blessings which are prepared for us in heaven. How
'''Oberman, Forerunners, 307, n. 26. Cited from Faber's In¬
troduction to Commentary on the Psalms.
2
Oberman, Forerunners, 298-99 and the accompanying footnote,
305 , n. 8.
Oberman, Forerunners, 304.
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could those be Christians who do not love Christ and
His Word with perfect purity? *
With striking simplicity in another place Faber maintains: "If you be¬
lieve that Jesus Christ died for you, for the redemption of your sins,
2
this is enough."" In keeping with this premise, Faber concluded that
the monks for whom he was so concerned, languished and were not
adequately fed spiritually because emphasis on the literal sense
obscured the Christ, the "key to the understanding of David and about
whom David spoke, commissioned by the Holy Spirit." He remedies
this lack by pointing to Christ in almost all the Psalms.
How comes this high-handed rejection of the literal sense, so
strongly promulgated by Lyra, so typical of the humanist tradition in
which Faber was himself a conspicuous member? Is this reactionary
obscurantism, wilful capriciousness? Faber has a self-conscious
hermeneutic, and he defends what he consciously does in his inter¬
pretation by declaring that there is a difference between a carnal literal
sense and a spiritual literal sense. To ascribe this point of view to
some lurking Neo-Platonism may seem unduly suspicious, but Gilmore
*
James Bruce Ross and Mary Martin McLaughlin, eds. , The
Portable Renaissance Reader (New York: The Viking Press, 1953), pp.
84-85. Cited from Commentarii initiatorii in IV evanqeliis oraefatio
(Meaux, 1522); trans. M. M. M.
2
H. Daniel-Rops, The Protestant Reformation, trans. Audrey
Butler (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1961), p. 370.
Oberman, Forerunners, 299.
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has, along with other researchers, pointed out Faber's knowledge of
Platonism^ and Rupp has alleged that, with other humanists, Faber
"thought of the relation of text and meaning on the analogy of body-
2
soul." E. Thestrup Pedersen finds a neo-Platonic ontology in Faber's
3
interpretation of Psalms.
An absolute nexus is hardly provable, but the fact remains
4
that for Faber the literal sense is eo ipso the spiritual sense and that
it coincides with that spiritual sense: "Et videor mihi alium videre
sensum, qui scilicet est intentionis prophetae et spiritus sancti in eo
loquentis, et hunc literalem appello, sed qui cum spiritu coincidit."^
In distinction from the related double literal sense enunciated by Paul
of Burgos, Faber holds for this single literal sense, which may have a
two-fold appellation, either a prophetic literal sense or a New Testa¬
ment literal sense, thinking here in particular of the Psalms as the
g
prime object of application. Allegorizing is rejected, not only because
it is not treating with the literal, but because it does not consider the
^Gilmore, World of Humanism, 20 6.
^E. G. Rupp, "The Bible in the Age of the Reformation, " 75-7 6.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 122.
^Ebeling, "Hermeneutik, " 251.





intention of the divine Author of Scripture and the intention of the writer,
i.e., the Spirit-led prophet. ^
It is obvious that, in Faber's hermeneutic, we are touching on
points very sensitive to the Reformation problems of interpretation.
The very fact that we possess a copy of Faber's Quincuplex with
Luther's holograph glosses from his earliest lectures on Psalms, in¬
dicates that the early Luther did not despise his understandings. Al¬
though a scanning of the Luther glosses will indicate Luther's freedom
in criticism of Faber, the conclusions of Meissinger and Bainton are
properly taken that Luther followed Faber in his mode of understanding
the Psalms, and in his idea that the historical was the intention of the
writer. ^
In the exegetical movement of Faber and Luther we find another
revealing parallel. In both there is a progression from a major interest
in the Psalms to an interest in the Pauline epistles, particularly the
letter to the Romans. In both there is a development from problems of
exegesis, sources of helps and criticism of method to the substance of
the message. The primary issue as to the great Biblical question is the
3
nature of justification. Gilmore concludes that already in the 1512
^"Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 305-306. Oberman, Forerunners, 298.
O
Karl August Meissinger, Per katholische Luther (Munchen: Leo
Lehnen Verlag, 1952), 88-89; Roland H. Bainton, Studies on the
Reformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 7.
3
Oberman, Forerunners, 288; Meissinger, Per Katholische
Luther, 111.
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edition of his commentary on the letters of Paul Faber has set forth the
doctrine of justification by faith, anticipating the Reformers by several
years in so doing. * John Woolman Brush, in his monograph on Faber,
argues that the concept is not held in a fully Lutheran sense, since it
2
is rather informed by a mystic concept of love. In the context of a
Lutheran Law-Gospel polarity E. Thestrup Pedersen notes that Faber
improperly carries over the decalogue from the Old Testament to the
3
New. The simple fact that these two earnest seekers, under the
Word, are led to such similar, if not identical conclusions, is note¬
worthy.
To some French Protestants the similarity in theological
orientation of Luther and Faber has seemed sufficient to ascribe the
initiation of the Reformation in Europe not to 1517, as traditionally has
been done, but to 1512 through Faber. When Brush reports this he
hastens to negate this possibility by ascribing to Faber not so much a
4
new reforming as an old mystical tendency. Even so, already in 15 21
Erasmus made mention of the preaching of a certain Carmelite who
■'•Gilmore, World of Humanism, 217.
2
John Woolman Brush, "Lefevre d'Etaples: Three Phases of His
Life and Work, " Reformation Studies: Essavs in Honor of Roland H.




^Brush, "Lefevre d'Etaples, " 124.
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considered Faber one of the four Forerunners of the Antichrist. ^ With
similar bias, a twentieth century Roman Catholic historian, H. Daniel-
Rops assails the "wholly personal religion, in which the Church, as it
were, had no part" as "evangelical humanism" which constituted a
9
"real peril. " The fact that Faber renounced Luther and the developing
3
Reformation to die in communion with Rome does not remove the dis¬
trust of his method and his conclusions in interpreting Scripture and the
doctrines of the church for the pious Roman Catholic.
From their vantage point Protestants also must recognize that
the spiritual-edification mode of interpretation of Scripture was some¬
thing quite different from the attempts at a more literal, historical
interpretation as in Lyra, for example, and that the positing of a
spiritual meaning _in the letters as Faber conceived it did indeed have
4
the dangerous possibility of opening the way to sheer subjectivism.
Ultimately, then, we judge Faber, too, to have set forth important new
insights, without avoiding the old hazards.
■'•Oberman, Forerunners, 31. The reference is from a letter of
Erasmus, March 13, 1521, to Alexander Schweiss.
2
Daniel-Rops, The Protestant Reformation, 370.
3





Before we proceed to the major exposition of our thesis, we
must attempt to review and summarize this historical section. The
chronological statement must be transposed into a scheme with
sufficient inner logic to provide a form for analyzing the development
of the hermeneutic problem up to the Reformation, and to give a work¬
able structure to the description and analysis of the hermeneutics of
Luther and Melanchthon. Such a scheme should also clarify and
sharpen the central problems of this inquiry, and delimit the data sub¬
sequently to be adduced. The scheme is intended as a convenient
structure only, and is not to be construed as all-encompassing nor as
omnicompetent to contain the varied elements touched on in the history
or incorporated in the primary statement of this dissertation.
In view of our selected historical presentation and in view of
anticipated developments in the Reformation era, we shall set forth
three categories: the Scholastic, the Humanist, and the Mystical.
Under each category we must define the movements thus, again rather
arbitrarily, denominated, state the major affirmations relevant to this
inquiry, the assumptions on which such affirmations are based, and
the application to hermeneutical principles. Inasmuch as there is
evident a growth and development in the history of interpretation, our
three categories will not have been stressed with equal force throughout
that development. Conceding these limitations, let us now proceed
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to draw out such a summary and conclusions.
Under the Scholastics we subsumed what might well also be
called the ecclesiastical perspective. It is the dominant, almost uni¬
form pre-Reformation outlook in the Church of the West. The growing
respect for tradition has been undergirded by the systematizing of the
Scholastics as a recognizable theological group. In the Alexandrian
tradition, which devolved mainly on Origen, the stress continued
through certain emphases in Augustine, although he incorporated
elements foreign to this perspective as well. Gabriel Biel represented
in our sketch the figure typical of the group closest temporally to the
Reformation.
The Scholastics affirmed the primacy of canonical Scripture in
matters of doctrine, but accepted tradition which gave increasing
clarity to the teachings. In some quarters there was a willingness to
concede tradition parallel authority with the written Scripture. This
authoritative source, Scripture and tradition, was considered to be
capable of yielding propositional truths.
Those who under the guidance of the Holy Spirit set forth these
Scriptures were not necessarily, themselves, aware of the full implica¬
tion of their words as to their intrinsic historical meaning or their
prophetic significance. Likewise, the interpreters of the record might
operate in either of two levels, a lower, naive level of the simple
meanings, or a higher, esoteric level to be achieved by a spiritual or
intellectual elite.
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The assumptions of the Scholastics were colored by a tendency
to prefer abstractions. God is primarily Being, and Jesus Christ is to
be seen as the mirroring of Being in his being. The interest,
Christologically, is more centered on what Christ is than on what He
does. There is a preoccupation with the metaphysical problems, and a
quite specific judgment that philosophy is at the very least a necessary
handmaid to the theolgical enterprise. The ontological presuppositions
predispose to an acceptance of some form of Platonism. From this
assumption stems the view of man as body and soul, with soul of a
much higher nature than body, and the spiritual functions hierarchically
above the sense functions of the body. The telos of God's plan for
man, therefore, is necessarily a spiritual, future realization of the
Ideal. In such a perspective history is denigrated, whether as past,
present or future time, in favor of the exaltation of a trans-historical
fulfilment of divine purpose.
The hermeneutical implications or applications of such
affirmations and assumptions are clear enough. Once the concession
has been made metaphysically of a world which mirrors the Idea, there
can be no Sola Scriptura, not even a Scripture cum tradition, for the
world itself may reflect the heavenly. Note here the ease of accepting
also Aristotelian categories of analysis of empirical data toward
theological ends. The esoteric character of these understandings rules
out the propriety of reading and interpreting the Scripture by the masses
of the common believers. Only those duly gifted may penetrate such
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mysteries, and even here the developing concept of the nature of the
Church as shadowing forth the heavenly Church, the True Bride of
Christ, makes it imperative to acknowledge the prior right and
obligation of the Church to rule on interpretation. The justification is
typically circular, since the means of undergirding the juridical power
of prelates depends on the same presuppositions, i.e. , since the
church on earth is the reflection of the Church in Heaven, the authority
of the Church in Heaven is operative in the church on earth. As
stultifying as this came to be in late medieval times, the principle
was nevertheless generally entrenched that Scripture had been inter¬
preted by the commonly accepted Fathers of the Church, and that new
questions were to be resolved by the contemporary Fathers in the
person of Pope or Council, as their views were codified by the canonists.
Such a magnificent edifice of ecclesiastical authority demanded
one response from the individual man: humility. In great and small
affairs he was to subjugate himself to Mother Church, in whom was
Wisdom and Knowledge. And humility meant, further, unquestioning
obedience, not least of the mind. It is self-evident that under such
limitations, the study of Scripture would be secondary to systematic
studies of the given authority, and would have difficulty in making its
way independent of intrusions from the sovereign systematic discipline.
Our humanist sub-division in its full-blown form in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries is directly traceable to and dependent on the
Renaissance rediscovery of the classical emphasis on man, his high
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potentials in intellect and esthetic sensistivity and his central role in
the universe. From such an ancestry there derives a certain tendency
toward rationalism, at the very least a high expectation of the power
of intellection, and an optimistic confidence in the capacity of learning
to improve morals and human institutions. As we shall apply more
specifically later, humanists looked realistically at the world about
them.
Thus, the confidence in reason which is evident in scholasticism
is further developed in humanism, and the tendency to open a cleavage
between the individual thinker and the corporate body of the Church is
noteworthy. We have stylized the scholastics as churchmen, in the
sense of their hierarchical position, or their commitment to the
tradition. We see the humanists typically among the aoctores, the
scholars who have a commitment to learning as such, and sense the
pressures of the Church for conformity variously, sometimes as vexa¬
tious, at other times as intolerable. This development is a corollary
of the growing, and self-conscious, awareness of the universities as
powerful, independent faculties, creating new understandings rather
than simply perpetuating and transmitting the old. The sharp satire of
the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum is an evidence of the controversy
between doctors and the whole clergy, and the fearlessness of the
words, in spite of the anonymity of the authors, is testimony to the
depth of the underlying feelings.
We see the humanists accepting the history of man as real, and
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this world, therefore as real. Hebraic thinking in its Biblical sense
and the work of the Antiochenes is then in line with this perspective.
Certain elements in Augustine, which we may associate with his early
training in Latin rhetoric, are of the same stripe. Nicholas of Lyra
and Faber Stapulensis, as we have developed briefly above, are our
prime exemplars of the humanist outlook.
To the humanist scholar, the Scripture is a meaningful record,
a document to be studied gua record. This means that the writers of
the record assume larger dimensions. It is important to know who
wrote, and when and why. Thus also, the new sensitivity to
chronology operates, and anchronisms are no longer accepted naively.
The day of the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals is past, and the day of
seeking for the correct number of Isaiahs has dawned. To search out
such writings in their historical settings requires the specialists, the
doctores. These are men who have competences in language, litera¬
ture, history and archaeology. They have learned wherever there was
worthy material for study, from the pagan classics and the decretals,
from Jew, Greek, Latin, barbarian. Without being precisely aware of
the distinction, these men have followed the way toward "objective"
consideration of the facts, the detached research of the specialist-
scholar.
The theological assumptions of the Christian humanists strike
us as dangerously tending toward that crypto-universalism which
Wilburn ascribes to Erasmus and the desert-reaches of the later
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Enlightenment. ^ The dichotomy of rationalist scholar and obsequious
member of the contemporary Church, unfortunately, is a phenomenon
not entirely unknown even in our own day. It may not be provable that
the contacts with pagan learning corrupted good Christian men with
anthropomorphic concepts of deity, but the growing sense that if God
might not be as transcendent as the remote God of the scholastics, He
must at least be higher than the noblest men, operates to evoke
questions as to the kind of love God must display, the kind of tolerance,
the kind of punishments conformable to His goodness. Such an exemplar
of humanism as Erasmus, for example, could not conceive that his God
could accept or condone the kind of internecine strife which that
ruffian Luther was engendering in his protestations. Moderation was
the preferable modus vivendi.
Although a good part of the program of humanism was the
editing and publication of the classic works of philosophy, it seems
defensible to ascribe their insights and contributions rather to the
literary qualities and contents of the past than the metaphysical. The
exposure to the manifold wealth of the literature of the past could only
work to heighten sensitivities as to the various forms of literature and
their proper interpretation, chronicle as chronicle, poetry as metaphor,
legend and fable as instructive but not of necessity chronicle, and so
on. One of the sharp, incidental satires of the Epistolae breathes
"''Ralph G. Wilburn, Historical Shane, 43.
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scorn on the pseudo-learned who would interpret also the Poets in the
revered four-fold mode of the scholastics. *
That ancient sense of the function of drama as evocative of
proper emotions in the lives of the spectators may be seen in the belief
of the humanists in the pedagogical worth and effectiveness of the
Scripture. As we have suggested above, this optimistic view informs
their philosophies of education and their expectations of reform in the
Church. There is, therefore, hope for man, by the working of man, in
the sphere of man, i.e. , in this world, in the secular. The humanist
of this age is too close to his contemporary culture to be able to shed
completely his apocalyptic and eschatological hopes, but he is also
too learned to allow an unexamined other-worldliness to draw him away
from the new Golden Age which is dawning for man. The reduction in
the force of the old views of the end of history does conspire to revive
the ancient cyclical views of history, and with our historical hind¬
sight we might conjecture that a relativizing of history is involved when
the telos is minimized. When relativism in turn is given the rein, the
particularities of history become offensive, including the Incarnation
and the atoning work, but this outcome could hardly be perceived by
the humanists in the midst of the exciting new thought-world.
We have already intimated many of the extensions of humanistic
''"Francis Griffin Stokes, ed. , Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum:
The Latin Text with An English Rendering (New Haven: Yale University
Press , 1925), p . 73 .
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development into the realm of hermeneutical principle. The basic
viewpoint must result in a greater emphasis on method, on technique,
on the application of human, learned skills to the interpretation. The
letter of the Scripture is important, not atomistically, but as the
medium of human communication. The interpreter, whose understanding
and skills are the operative forces, is not conceived as subjectively-
involved in the exposition, rather, he is as we have pointed out,
"objective, " and may be Jew or Christian, or Arab. Since the Scripture
is conceived of as edifying, and all men are to be edified, the work of
the interpreter should be capable of being understood by all. The art
of letters should be given to the rude cow-herd, soAhie may be
illuminated by the Word of God. This prescription requires not only
translations into the vernacular, but simple interpretations to meet the
minds of the simple. This can be accomplished.
The mystic or spiritual strain is discernible throughout the
history of Biblical interpretation as a passim factor, lacking a corporate
or institutional character, nearly always an affair of the private
individual. It is considered compatible with the scholasticism of St.
Thomas or Bernard of Clairvaux, it exists in the extreme asceticism of
the monastic community and in the quiet, pious life of simple peasant
believers. It is characterized not only by individualism, but by in¬
wardness, so that its piety must always be reckoned as a matter of
deep, personal conviction, even though the forms of expression may be
the same as the forms others make external and nominal. In his use
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of the Bible, too, the mystic is able to transform the regnant methods
by his own urgent quest for the divine word, so that he might well use
allegory as well as literalism to his purpose. For this reason, in part,
we have not treated specifically of a mystic type of interpreter in our
historical overview. The writings of Eckhart and Tauler might be ex¬
amined from this perspective, but would yield little not touched on in
other types of interpretation.
It is in the sixteenth century that we see the greatest growth of
that aspect of the mystic life which concerns us. The encounter of the
Reformers with the so-called "left-wing" of the Reformation, or in
Luther's rather opprobrious term, the "Schwarmer, " posed fresh
hermeneutical questions which required confrontation. The fact that
these "spirituals" could adduce the evidence of the great mystics and
of the Brethren of the Common Life in their own day, makes the issues
even more inescapable.
It would be incorrect to say that the spirituals ignored or
disdained the Scripture; it would be equally incorrect to say that they
were concerned about the whole Scripture. That is to say that typically
they were nourished on those parts of Holy Writ which sustained and
enlarged their unique position. While it seems ironic, it must be asked
whether the books about the Scripture, intended to encourage the
spiritual life, did not in fact supplant the Scripture itself to many of
these pious ones. But the absolute principle was maintained, the
Scripture was the Word of God, given through godly men by the Holy
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Spirit of God. How this was accomplished was not a valid question in
their minds, nor was there questioning of the necessity of that same
Spirit to comprehend the record.
The assumptions underlying such a position, especially when
considered in the exaggerated terms we have employed, must be re¬
viewed. The distinction between spiritual and material, between the
spirit and the body, is always sharply etched. Thus the metaphysical
presupposition most congenial to the outlook, whether overt or covert,
is Neo-Platonic. God is Spirit, transcendent, ultimate, yet He is
Personal Spirit, opening the prospect of communion with Himself to the
receptive spirit of man. It is only the higher, spiritual nature in man
which can respond to this divine invitation, hence the inevitable
tendency toward ascetic withdrawal. It is this tendency, in turn, which
is anti-this-world, and anti-history. The eschatological hope leans
toward the apocalyptic type, interpreted as the destruction of the evil
material, the historical eon, and the emergence of the fulfilment in the
new life of the spirit, in full communion with God, untrammelled by
the material and fleshly.
We must concede that where the mystical did not turn aside to
sheer pantheistic absorption into the great Divine, it represented a
noble, personal religion of great integrity and strength. In spite of
what we have said above about the temptation to supplant Scripture with
commentary on Scripture, it must be recognized further that the
character of the Word as personal address is maintained here as nowhere
146
else in the tradition. And the saving Christ who is thus encountered,
although tending to be more spiritual than his birth, his hunger, and
his bloody death will really permit, saves this line also from the flat
rejection of history and the historical account.
As we conclude this schematic summary it must again be pointed
out how artificial and stylized, of necessity, this has been. No naked,
"pure" example of any one of the three emphases could conceivably be
found, for there is a constant, unconscious commingling. The question
our thesis poses is whether or not Luther and Melanchthon tend to
perpetuate any one of these given lines of approach, whether there is
some new combination of principles and methods, and, if some sub¬
jective element is discernible in relation to the old lines or to some
new synthesis.
Perhaps it is superfluous to add not as a nice, pious statement,
but as a conclusion based on the evidence, that the overwhelming con¬
viction grows through such a historical analysis that the Lord has not
allowed His Word to return to Him void, that He has not forgotten His
promise to be with His people to the end of the age. As D. E. Nineham
has effectively put it:
The human exposition of the revelation is always com¬
pounded not only of the revelation itself but also of
ideas and presuppositions already in the recipient's
mind quite apart from his acceptance of the revelation
he is seeking to expound. These ideas and pre¬
suppositions were sometimes such that when they
came together with the revelation the result was mutual
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illumination; but also. . .they were sometimes of such
a character as to obscure or distort the divine demand.
The dynamic character of the continuing struggle of the faithful
God to communicate with faithless men is indicated in words of L.
Hodgson, cited by Nineham:
"The real object of our study is not what the men whose
works we are reading were consciously aware of think¬
ing and saying; it is the truth which was struggling to
make itself known through mind conditioned by their
presuppositions."^
The perpetuation of the Christian Church in the world through the turmoil
of the centuries attests that God did make Himself heard and understood
by His own.
^D. E. Nineham, "The Lessons of the Past for the Present, "
The Church's Use of the Bible, ed. D. E. Nineham, 164.
2
Nineham, "The Lessons of the Past for the Present, " 164-65.
The quotation is from L. Hodgson, For Faith and Freedom, p. 114.
Italics are Nineham's.
CHAPTER III
THE HERMENEUTICS OF LUTHER: PROGRESS AND POLEMICS
Personal History
It is evident from the preceding chapter that the history of
hermeneutics has a wide context in the history of the church, both
institutional and personal. As we have seen in the instance of
Augustine personal religious development may be of much more than
private significance. In the same way, the Lutheran Reformation until
the death of Luther in 1546 closely paralleled the spiritual progress of
Martin Luther. This quite obviously does not mean that Luther caused
all that stir so he could break out of the monastic bonds and assume
the marital bonds. It does mean that Luther's discovery of the Gospel
and the meaning he saw in that Gospel is of the essence of Reformation
research.
Priest, Professor, Preacher
We must not overlook the importance of Luther's callings as
priest, professor and preacher. The responsibilities laid on him by
these demands, the expectations of his superiors, his parishioners and
his students, when combined with the new insights of the Gospel,




As a part of his preparation for the office of the priesthood
Luther studied Gabriel Biel's Canon of the Mass. We do not dare to
assume from this fact that he learned to know all of the hermeneutical
principles which we have ascribed to Biel earlier in this work. We do
assume that Luther, as a faithful son of the Church, and a devout
monk, accepted the authority of the Church over against the Scripture.
Beyond this, Biel's sense of the overwhelming presence of the Divine
Majesty and the awesome responsibility of the priest must have played
in to the well-known incident of Luther's difficulty in saying his first
Mass. Luther modified, but did not lose, that sense of the Holy God.
These studies of the Mass which were obviously more theological
than simple rubric-listings for the Mass renewed Luther's familiarity
with the great Nominalist theologian whom he had encountered earlier
when he was an undergraduate student at Erfurt. Biel would continue
to sharpen Luther's understanding when he continued as a theological
student and lecturer at the Universities of Erfurt and Wittenberg. The
general state of later medieval scholarship today, and the limitation of
this present research do not permit a detailed correlation of Biel's view¬
points and Luther's, but the recurring mention of Biel in the Luther
corpus indicates that his teaching had to be reckoned with. We add
only that Luther had a deep respect for Biel, but not for all those who
assumed they were proper disciples of the Nominalist.
Johann von Staupitz, Luther's superior, invoked the demands of
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monastic obedience in winning Luther over to his plans for the young
monk. Staupitz was convinced of Luther's aptitude for the academic
life and arranged that he pursue the course of studies toward the
Doctorate in Theology which would qualify him to succeed the Vicar-
General as Professor of Biblical Theology at the young university in
Wittenberg. Luther's reluctance may have been due to his sense that
the work posed too great a drain on his physical resources; perhaps the
rather formidable financial outlay seemed a bad gamble for a life that
Luther was convinced would be very short.
Study, especially Biblical exegesis, was most congenial to
Luther. He learned in his year of teaching Moral Philosophy at
Wittenberg (1508-1509) that he had little taste for Aristotle and
philosophy per se. But the prescribed work for the doctorate compre¬
hended indirectly as well as directly a solid Biblical base. The study
of Peter Lombard's Sentences, the systematic portion of the curriculum,
confronted him with a body of material both Biblical and patristic.
Staupitz's fine guiding hand must have encouraged Luther to follow his
own Augustinian leanings, and Luther responded by enthusiastic study
and notation of the great Bishop's Opuscula.
The exegetical studies introduced Luther to the standard materials:
the Glossa Ordinaria, the Glossa Interlinearis, the Postilla of Nicholas
of Lyra and the Annotationes of Paul of Burgos. As early as the summer
of 1509 Luther began teaching Biblical courses; he began both his study
of Hebrew and Greek before he received the Doctor's degree in October,
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1512, after five years of preparation.
With a solid, tenured position assured to him at the relatively
young academic age of twenty-eight, Luther might have droned quietly
on perfunctorily transmitting the accumulated wisdom of his teachers
and his accepted texts. Scholars continue to deduce precise relation¬
ships in words and thoughts by comparing Luther's exegetical notes
with the Glosses and Scholia and all the rest. However, such
verifiable relationships do not tell the whole story. Luther demonstrated
an irrepressible originality, freshness and critical acumen in his
earliest work as a teacher. The extant notes on Lombard's Sentences
and his early critical judgment that two works regarded as Augustine's
must be considered spurious on internal evidence confirm this general¬
ization. As he developed his mastery of the theological inheritance of
his day he continually reshaped the traditional vocabulary and
structure by redefining terms and by incorporating them in the total
context of his theology.
It is important to note that Luther was cast in a dual role at
Wittenberg, that he became court preacher by virtue of his professor¬
ship. The point is not that he would, in a sense, have to preach his
way out of his own spiritual problems. That would be a sorry indictment
of Staupitz and the Elector, and a sad commentary on the shape of
preaching at any moment in history. But Luther was not privileged to
sit in a solitary cell and fret over his ultimate salvation alone. The
congregation before him waited for the Word of God. They were his
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burden. In his sense of his vocation to preach the gospel to these
people he would continually be led farther down the road to reformation.
We conclude that Luther's preparation for these three callings,
and his carrying out of the prescribed duties of the same contributed to
his Biblical understanding. He received substantial information and
subjective challenge in each of them. We judge further that the
Turmerlebnis to which we now turn was decisive in effecting a major
change in his theological and hermeneutical outlook.
Discovery of the Gospel
For Luther, the distinctive element in that "moment before God"
which has been termed the Turmerlebnis, was his discovery of the
gospel. The dating of this moment is vital to the precise understanding
of Luther's early exegetical works, but in the context of our inquiry
we must accept simply the established fact which so substantially
altered Luther's theology and his hermeneutics. *
The discovery was given at the conjunction point of two quests
of the monk-professor. On the one hand he sought assured grace for a
passionately uneasy conscience, on the other hand he struggled for
■'■Donald C. Ziemke, a young American Luther scholar, gives a
concise review of the development of Luther's early exeg^is, and the
question of the date and significance of the Turmerlebnis, in his small
volume, Love for the Neighbor in Luther's Theology (Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1963), especially Ch. 2, "Luther's Early
Biblical Lectures," pp. 14-42.
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clarity in the interpretation of vexing Biblical themes. Over thirty
years later, in 1545, Luther recalled the transformation in these vivid
words:
I raged in this way with a fierce and disturbed conscience,
and yet I knocked importunately at Paul in this place,
thirsting most ardently to know what St. Paul meant.
At last, God being merciful, as I meditated day and
night on the connection of the words, namely, 'the Justice
of God is revealed in it, as it is written, "the Just shall
live by Faith, " ' there I began to understand the Justice
of God as that by which the just lives by the gift of God,
namely by faith, and this sentence, 'the Justice of God is
revealed in the Gospel, ' to be that passive justice, with
which the merciful God justifies us, by faith, as it is
written, 'the just lives by Faith.'
This straightway made me feel as though reborn, and
as though I had entered through open gates into paradise
itself. From then on, the whole face of scripture appeared
different. I ran through the scriptures then, as memory
served, and found the same analogy in other words, as
the Work of God (opus) that which God works in us,
Power of God (virtus Dei) with which he makes us strong,
wisdom of God (sapientia Dei) with which he makes us
wise, fortitude of God, salvation of God, glory of God. ^
Can such a testimonial be admitted as significant in the career
of a great theologian? A time-honored Roman Catholic criticism makes
it out as an inadvertent admission that the professor had not done his
homework, that he had not learned from his predecessors that there
was already a consensus of interpretation in the Church on this matter
of righteousness, incorporating ideas of grace, of faith, of the un¬
merited character of the working. What these criticisms overlook is
*The whole passage is from W. A. 54, 179-187. The trans¬
lation above is found in Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 122.
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Luther's counter-critique that the context of these terms was infused
grace and a gradual healing or becoming righteous. Those who treasure
the "conversion" aspect of this realization must deal with their private
specter of a theologian who has too much of sentiment and too little of
understanding to share. Without discrediting other components in a
truly unique human experience we find merit in the gently rueful, but
profoundly suggestive statement of Professor Rupp that "it is perhaps
the way in which in His inscrutable wisdom He addresses His
theological professors!""'' What experienced student does not know the
rare, uninvited moment when the "pieces have fallen together, " when
the essential error and its potential resolution have arrived with
blinding insight? Luther's memory recalls sharply the operative words
in their new shape--that "the just live" now, immediately, here, that
God "justifies us" sinners, actively, totally, graciously in Christ.
These words open Paradise, not the dreary vistas of earthly becoming
or of purgatory.
Coram Deo: Luther and Paul
Because Luther's spiritual problems were so central in his
personal and professional development, it is imperative that we make
clear what their nature was. A number of contemporary students have
Gordon Rupp, Luther's Progress to the Diet of Worms (New
York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 39.
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judged Luther psychotic and his experiences have been designated by
all the current psychological jargon. Among these psychoanalysts of
the Weimarer Ausgabe are the psychologist Erik H. Erikson, * the play-
o
wright John Osborne, and the literary critic and man-of-all work Norman
3
O. Brown. Psychoanalytic conclusions can hardly be validly drawn
over four hundred years after the death of the patient, nor can they be
adduced from materials intended not primarily for a personal viewpoint
but for theological, hortatory and educational purposes. These alleged
analyses, like the bitterly vitriolic denominational allegations which
preceded them, overlook a very essential point. That point is the
positive application Luther made throughout the entire remainder of his
life of the profound insights he gained as a young monk.
Luther gave the most objective, sober and studious attention to
the implications of his shattering discovery of the meaning of the
Gospel. The central conviction, that he had been and continued to be
encountered by the Living God in the Scripture remained with him
throughout all contrary suggestions that it might well even have been
the devil who had urged him on the course of the religious life. Like
■'•Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis
and History (London: Faber and Faber, 1958).
^John Osborne, Luther: A Play (New York: Signet Books, 1963).
3
Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical
Meaning of History (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University
Press, 1959).
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many a fanatic, Luther may have been zealously defending sheer
illusion, but the effectiveness of his insight in opening new vistas of
understanding reduces such a possibility also to absurdity.
By subsuming the central material of his provocative Luther
study, "The Righteousness of God" under the heading, Coram Deo,
Professor Rupp rightly stresses the conviction which emerged and
established itself for Luther, that man stands before a God who is not
to be enmeshed in the web of man's thoughts, but is free, active,
dynamic. As we shall see, this had perhaps the most revolutionary in¬
fluence on Reformation theology and on its hermeneutics. Let us con¬
sider some of the more general aspects of this change first.
Since Coram Deo every man stands condemned as sinner,
sinner man must expect the Word to condemn and terrorize him. "The
only effect of the law, when correctly understood, is to make us guilty
and to condemn us to everlasting hell under the wrath of God. " ^ Only
thus does the needful gift of the Holy Spirit come to him: "The Holy
Spirit is given to none except to those who are in sorrow and fear; in
2
them it produces good fruit. " This view of the force of God's Law
appears to be a generalizing force. What it does, however, is to
eliminate the atomizing of law by viewing God as the Righteous One
standing over against man, rather than as the judge of individual laws,
'''Luther, LenkerXII, 431. Sermon on John 3:1-15 .
2
Luther, Lenker XII, 281. Sermon on John 14:23-31.
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bound to his own legal code. So far as salvation is concerned the
problem, by virtue of the confrontation, is removed from the arena of
the acquisition of legal merits by good works to the problem of becom¬
ing righteous. As Erich Seeberg has said, "Was Luther erfahren hat,
war die Unmoglichkeit des Gesetzes. Die Auffassung des Gesetzes
verbindet ihn mit Paulus und trennt ihn zugleich von ihm. " ^
Thus the great apostle makes his impressive entrance and takes
the center of the stage as Luther's prime mentor and spiritual example.
All the essential Luther themes are Pauline: the experience of con¬
frontation, the rightousness of God, the condemnation, the new
righteousness by faith. Note how Ragnar Bring incorporates them all
in this pregnant paragraph:
We might say that St. Paul's experience on the road
to Damascus gave him the key to the Scriptures. He had
followed the Rabbinical tradition and had learned a
great deal from it. But he discovered that at this most
decisive point of all it was wrong and therefore did not
represent the true tradition. For the Rabbis did not under¬
stand God's righteousness (Rom. 10.2). But this did not
mean that St. Paul wanted to propagate a new doctrine
of his own concerning righteousness. Rather did he
think that he had been given the true understanding of
the Scriptures, i.e., of the Old Testament, . . .According
to him, the Old Testament did not teach that righteousness
was of the Law, but of faith.
. . .The Law. . .was given in order to judge and condemn
them.2
■'•Erich Seeberg, Luthers Theologie in Ihren Grundzugen
(II Aufl. , Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1950), p. 16.
?
Ragnar Bring, "Preaching the Law, " Scottish journal of
Theology, Vol. XIII (March, 1960), 2.
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Theological and Hermeneutical Insights
If our assumption is correct that Luther followed Paul in ex¬
perience and in thinking, we may expect a broad range of new insights
to flow from this beginning. What, then, do we find in Luther develop¬
ing out of his great moment?
Luther understood the Turmeriebnis basically as his apprehension
of the unmerited grace of God in Christ, effected by the contingent
activity of God, and communicated through a living Word from God.
This summary implies a Christocentric emphasis, a doctrine of a Viva
Vox Scripture and a concept of God that is dynamic rather than static.
Christocentric Emphasis
A random sampling of citations indicates clearly the force of the
Christocentric emphasis. The flat designation, Christ, comprehends
the whole issue: "Tolle Christum e scripturis, quid amplius in illis
invenies? " * "Man kan sonst nicht predigen quam de Iesu Christo et
2fide. Das ist generalis scopus. " The whole Scripture is for the
knowledge of Christ: "Omnia scripturae verba tendunt, ut Christus
3
cognoscatur. More specifically, the reference is to the cross:
%. A. 18, 606.
2W. A. 36, 180.
^W. A. 14, 197. Cf. Luther, Lenker X, 150.
159
"Crux enim Christi ubique in Scripturis occurrit. " * Tota scriptura
2
nihil docet nisi Crucem." "Ego non intelligo usquam in Scripturis
•5
nisi Christum crucifixum. Luther cited Paul's words in I Corinthians
2 and commented "Sihe, ist das der hohe Apostel, der so treffliche
erleuchtung gehabt, und weis nichts herrlichers und k&stlichers
zurhumen wider die falschen Apostel noch hohers zu predigen denn den
armen gecreuzigten Gott?"4
The purpose of the cross is the salvation of man: "Eo tendit
tota scriptura, ut doceat: quicunque crediderit salvabitur. "^ And again,
"Video scripturam in omnibus et per omnia consonare et consentire sic,
ut de tantae rei veritate /redemption/ et certitudine nihil dubitari
fl
possit. If a man knows this article of the faith he may ignore some
of the vexing problems of interpretation. Thus, Luther judged in the
matter of a harmonizing of the synoptic gospels:
These are problems and will remain problems. I shall
not venture to settle them. Nor are they essential. It
is only that there are so many sharp and shrewd people
who are fond of bringing up all sorts of subtle questions
and demanding definite and precise answers. But if we
1W. A. 36, 3.
2W. A. 9, 560.
3W. A. 4, 153.
4W. A. 28, 136.
5W. A. 9, 383.
SW. A. 40/3, 652.
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understand Scripture properly and have the genuine
articles of our faith--that Jesus Christ, God's Son,
suffered and died for us--then our inability to answer all
such questions will be of little consequence. The
evangelists do not all observe the same chronological
order. The one may place an event at an earlier, the
other at a later time. *
Christ and His work are the material of the Scripture; Christ in
His person is the interpreter of the Scripture. Luther emphasized this
in a variety of ways and with a variety of purposes, frequently polemical.
Therefore it behooves us to learn to identify the Bride¬
groom's voice. If someone should come without Christ,
against Christ, or under the name of Christ, tell him:
"The name of the Bridegroom and of the bride dare not
be blasphemed and dishonored. Christ says so and so.
And whoever follows the voice of the Bridegroom will
not alter or change this message. " In the home it
would be intolerable if the wife were to act contrary to
the husband's commands. . .The church has no right
either to hear Christ the Bridegroom speak or command,
and then to change His orders. . .Therefore we must be
on the alert against the devil, who assails us either
with doctrine that runs counter to Christ, as the tyrants
do, or with doctrine that is devoid of Christ, as the
canon laws do. And others will come with the Scriptures
and give themselves the semblance of the Lord Christ;
this, of course, is also against Christ.2
3
Since Christ alone teaches these things one must sit at His feet as
Mary did and as Luther had learned to do:
Hoc est 1. , quod mus gesondert sein, qui vult loqui
et audire, discere oportet einsam sey cum Christo.
Sic mihi factum. Meam doctrinam et praedicationem
''"Luther, Am. Ed., XXII, 218.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XXII, 446.
"^Luther, LenkerXII, 331.
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non potui assequi in omnibus libris, in Aristotele, apud
Scholasticos, Thomam, Scotum, donee wurde abgesondert
a turba et ipsum solum audivi. Cum hoc facerem et
ilium tantum audirem und setzt mich mit Maria ad pedes,
turn didici, quid Christus et doctus fidem. Das ist uns
von noten, quia nos Christiani habemus ein scheren und
ebenteuerlichen glauben.
Even the secrets of the Scripture are opened by Him:
Haec diligenter inculcanda et credenda sunt, cum
"aperitur scriptura," alias enim nemo cogitet
unquam, quod possit intrare in penetralia et secreta
scripturae excluso illo Bracnio Domini, incarnato
Deo. 2
These principles may be applied in the controversies of the day as with
Carlstadt: "It will be hard for Carlstadt to give up his views, but
3
Christ will force him to do so if he does not yield of his own accord. "
As over against the Jews, it is having Jesus Christ that gives Christians
understanding also of the Old Testament:
Wir Christen haben den synn und verstand der Biblia,
weil wir das Newe Testament, das ist Jhesum Christum
haben, welcher im alten Testament verheissen und
hernach komen, mit sicn das liecht und verstand der
schrifft bracht hat, wie er spricht Joh. 5.^
The foregoing statements leave room for debate as to whether
we should speak of Christocentric or Christological concern. A rigid
lW. A. 34, II, 148, 6-13.
2W. A. 40, III, 702, 23.
3
Luther, Correspondence, II, 102. No. 533 Luther to Spalatin
(Wittenberg), March 13, 1522.
W. A. 54, 29.
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interpretation one way or the other would involve both possibility and
hazard. If we do not demand a sharp either-or we find almost un¬
limited possibilities for combination and exploitation of the emphases.
We shall look briefly at some evidence in the work of Ebeling and other
Luther scholars.
'Ebeling speaks of Christ as the content which gives under¬
standing:
Christus ist nicht nur der Inhalt der Schrift, sondern
auch der sich allein selbst erschliessende, allein
selbst das Verstehen gebende Inhalt der Schrift.
Dieser Zusammenhang ist fur Luther wichtiger als der
Hinweis auf die "Konformitat der Affekte" als
subjektive Voraussetzung der Exegese, eine in
Bereich der Mystik durchaus traditionelle Forderung. *
Ebeling notes further on the christological side: "Aber die eigentliche
Rolle der christologischen Formel in der Evangelienauslegung ist nicht
ihre Begrundung durch einzelne Schriftstellen, sondern ihr Dienst als
M 2kritischer Kanon fur die Auslegung. " He goes on to point up Luther's
concern with the distinction of the two natures in the one person.
Given the theological presuppositions of incarnation, sacrament, faith
and confession, Ebeling can proceed to summarize Luther's gospel
interpretation in four different ways /Weise/: historical, sacramental,
exampkg/exemplariscH7, and spiritual.
John M. Headley stresses Christ as the scope of Scripture for
^Ebeling, Evang. Ev. , 283. Cf. Luther, Lenker X, 149.
^Ebeling, Evang. Ev. , 243.
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Luther, and the Christocentric interpretation which was the pattern,
and applies this principle to Luther's use of allegory, the tropological
(derived from a spiritual-literal sense), and a typological method de¬
rived from this scope. * According to A. Skevington Wood, "Luther's
Christocentric approach to Scripture supplies the clue to the paradox
involved in his insistence on the primacy of the literal sense whilst
2
conceding that there is a further, inner, spiritual meaning. "
The lack of uniform and simple conclusions in the judgments
quoted above indicates that we must add other elements to the Christie
if we are to state the meaning of the evangelical insight into Scripture
and the unique subjective element in the Lutheran reformers.
The Living Word Addresses Man
Once we accept the premise that Luther viewed the proper
Christian faith as relating to the gracious activity of God in Christ
we open the way to viewing the Scripture not as a prescription for
what man must do, nor a simple record of what God has once done.
The Scripture becomes the living Word, the continuing act of God.
Man is addressed in the Word.
It would be easy at this point to fall prey to the temptation to
^Headley, Luther's View, 21, 22, 140.
2
A. Skevington Wood, Luther's Principles of Biblical Interpreta¬
tion (London: The Tvndale Press, 1960), p. 34.
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modernize Luther and anachronistically to employ the concepts and
vocabulary of twentieth century theologies strongly influenced by the
development of existentialist categories. There should be no doubt
that there are strong family relationships between Luther and Christian
existentialist understandings, which we shall have occasion to exploit
in the course of this study. However, respect for the realities of
history demands caution in dealing with what was only vaguely
adumbrated in the sixteenth century. How, then, can we clarify the
concept of "living Word" in terms proper to the Reformation era?
Although he was a twentieth century man, Dietrich Bonhoeffer
stated the polarities with typical acuity:
What is the real evil in this question? It is not that
it is asked at all. It is that the false answer is con¬
tained within it, that within it is attacked the basic
attitude of the creature towards the Creator. Man is
expected to be judge of God's word instead of simply
hearing and doing it. This is accomplished as follows.
On the basis of an idea, a principle, some previously
gained knowledge about God, man is now to judge
God's concrete Word. When man proceeds against the
concrete Word of God with the weapon of a principle,
with an idea of God, he is in the right from the first,
he becomes God's master, he has left the path of
obedience, he has withdrawn from God's addressing
him. In other words, in this question the possibility
is played off against the reality and the possibility
undermines the reality. However, in man's relation¬
ship to God there are no possibilities, there is only
reality. There is no "... .allow me. . . , ' there is only
command and obedience.
'''Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Inter¬
pretation of Genesis 1-3 (London: SCM Press, 1959), p. 68.
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Thus the living Word of God is seen as inviting and demanding not a
critical judgment, but a listening response.
In a scholarly study which betrays a near-obsession with his
theme H. Gstergaard-Nielsen has scrutinized the problem of the living
word in Luther. Here, for example, he comments on the personal
character of the relationship to the Law:
Nur wenn man das Gottesverhaltnis als ein person^liches
Verhaltnis auffasst, gilt, dass die gottlichen Befehle
wirkliches Imperative sind, die als solche nur sagen,
was geschehen soil, und nicht, was mit Notwendigkeit
geschehen muss; denn nur in der personalen Beziehung
gilt, dass der Mensch sein Dasein--nicht in der
Ubereinstimmung mit einer Norm hat, sondern in einer
Gemeinschaft, in der Glaube und Liebe walten.
O
In a similar vein elsewhere Gstergaard-Nielsen declares that the law
is made an idol if the God-relation is objectivized. Adolf Sperl also
brings the elements under consideration together in a perceptive
statement:
Dieses verdammende Wort Gottes angesichts dessen
"nur noch Sterben blieb, " konnte nur durch Gott selbst
uberwunden werden. . .Nur durch Gott selbst, durch
sein Wort konnte bestatigt werden, dass das
Verdammungswort nicht Gottes letztes Wort ist. . . Darum
hat er mit solch ausserster Kraft um das Verstandnis
der Schrift und den in diesem Zusammenhang zentralen
Begriffes der "iustitia dei" gerungen. Und deswegen
*H. $stergaard-Nielsen, Scriptura Sacra et Viva Vox: Eine
Lutherstudie (Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957), pp. 86-87.
^stergaard-Nielsen, Scriptura Sacra, 98.
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konnte nur ein neues Verstandnis der Bibel die
Befreiung bringen. *
All this is to say that the Scripture is not in the power of man
to manipulate or control in any way. Luther himself made this ex¬
pressly clear: "Hoc est dicere, quod Scriptura non est in potestate
nostra, nec in facultate ingenii nostri, sed humiliari et orare oportet,
2
ut inclinet ad nos ilium. "
Man's Response to the Address of God
Headley underscores the intimate relationship of Luther's
spiritual experience to his theology of the Word. These are his
comments:
By his exegesis Luther expressed the relation be¬
tween Christ and the mediating Word and the continuing
presence of Christ through the Word. Yet this exegetical
method was inextricably related to and a result of his
spiritual pilgrimage and the discovery of a gracious God. . . .
the religious can never be divorced from the theological
in Luther. ..^
Two distinctions must be drawn between late medieval religiosity
*
and the type of spiritual experience and response we have noted in
Luther. The medieval fear of hell, which Luther shared before the
Turmerlebnis, was a more generalized terror inspired by the totality
■'■Adolf Sperl, Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation
(Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959), pp. 56-57.
2W. A. 3, 516.
Headley, Luther's View, 25.
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of the threats of the church and popular piety. * Over against that fear
we must set the quite specific, holy awe fostered by the personal,
direct Word of God which Luther heard in the Scripture. The second
distinction is seen in the word of grace which Luther heard from the
same God. The paradoxical character of that word Luther found most
aptly in I Sam. 2:6 "The Lord kills and brings to life." Let us note
further the incidence of these concepts:
Pastors and listeners are soon parted, but it is
impossible to separate the Word of God from your
conscience, which heard the Word. These will make
your heart, yes, the world, too big for you to escape
on that Day, you will stand condemned, for the Word
will condemn you. .
Quia omnis homo wenn er recht an Gott denckt, so
erschrickt er, quoniam sentit peccata et non kans
la ssen, si audit deum nominari u. , quia scit deum
feind esse peccatis.
Denn das gewissen ist da, das fiilet und weis, das
Gott den sundern feind ist und verdammen wil und
Gottes zorn nicht entgehen noch entfliehen kan,
darumb mus es zittern, beben und zagen, erblassen
und erkalten als fur einem blitz oder donnerschlag.
Darumb mus Christus dagegen mit gewalt zufaren und
solche susse, freundliche, trcistliche wort ins hertz
propffen, das er die schweren, bittern und greulichen
gedancken hinweg neme und den Vater auffs aller
^■cf. George Gordon Coulton, Five Centuries of Religion
(Cambridge: University Press, 1936), III, pp. 9ff.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XXII, 40.
%. A. 28, 120.
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lieblichste eindbilde, wie ein hertz wundschen
sollte. 1
This new fear does not debilitate, rather: "if one would begin to become
wise, one must fear God. One must truly regard it as God's Word,
2
then everything can be learned easily. " The corollary to the action
of God is that man is held by the force of the Word: "I am a captive,
and cannot free myself. The text is too powerfully present, and will
not allow itself to be torn from its meaning by mere verbiage. "
If what we have said about the Word of God is true, then we
must go on to assign a new and loftier role to the preacher or teacher.
The word of the preacher is God's Word, but not in such a way that he
shall boast of his importance as preacher. The moral for the congrega¬
tion is to honor the preached and taught Word as God's Word, but not
to glorify the man who brings the message.
But you now have the Word of God in church, in books,
in your home; and this is God's Word as surely as if
God Himself were speaking to you.^
Would to God that we could gradually train our hearts
to believe that the preacher's words are God's word
and that the man addressing us is a scholar and a
king.5
1W. A. 28, 121.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XIII, 385.
3
Luther, Am. Ed. XL, 68.
^Luther, Am. Ed. XXII, 527.
5Luther, Am. Ed. XXII, 5 26.
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Therefore do not regard the person, but give ear to
what is said. Pay no attention to the speaker. See
whether it is God who is speaking and acting through
this person. If it is God who is speaking, then sub¬
mit to Him. When burgher or peasant hears a pastor,
he must say: "I do indeed hear and recognize the voice
of the pastor. But the words which he utters are not
his. No, he would be incapable of them. It is the
sublime majesty of God that is speaking through him. "
Likewise, when a lowly pastor comforts me, then I
must be discerning enough to say: "It is not you who
is speaking to me. The voice is yours indeed but it
is really God who is speaking through you. "
Now, all this emphasis on the Word of God spoken through men
might seem to encourage the preacher and expositor to be arrogant. The
opposite is the case. As the theme of humility has been observed
specifically or by implication in a number of the interpreters studied in
the preceding historical sketches, so also Luther refers constantly to
it. He makes some very penetrating caveats that give a distinctive
flavor also to this old wine as it is put in the new wineskin. The
following excerpt is a "standard" example:
And certainly it is much to be marvelled, that such ex¬
cellent men as Peter, Barnabas, and other /sic7, should
so suddenly and so lightly fall, especially in that thing
which they knew to be well done, and had also before
taught unto others. It is a perilous thing therefore (as
Dr. Staupitius often admonished us), to trust to our own
strength, be we never as holy, never so well learned,
and although we think ourselves never so sure of that we
know; for in that whereof we think ourselves most sure,
we may err and fall, and bring ourselves and others into
great danger. Let us therefore diligently, and with all
humility, exercise ourselves in the study of the holy
1Luther, Am. Ed. XXII, 508.
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Scriptures, and let us heartily pray that we never lose
the truth of the Gospel. *
Over against the strong tradition of humility as a virtue to be
practised by the aspiring Christian Luther protests that self-conscious
humility is really a type of work-righteousness.
Die demut ist szo zart unnd szo kostlich, das sie nit
leyden kan yhr eygen ansehen, szondern das bild ist
allein dem gottlichen gesicht behalten, . . .den wer do
kund sehen sein demut der kund sich selb urteyllen
zur selickeit und were gottes gericht schon auss. 2
Humility is a hidden thing always, but presumptuousness is evident,
and Luther is disturbed by some of his students:
What do we have to be so puffed up and proud about?
We have many students here who are so full of
knowledge after they have been in Wittenberg half a
year that they suppose that they are more learned than
I am.... That is what pride does. ^
In view of Luther's assurance of the truth of his own views as
he defended them at Worms and elsewhere, his statements on humility
may seem mere formal, meaningless protestations. The frequency of
occurrence of statements like the following, however, gives evidence
of his sincerity:
Martin Luther, A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the
Galatians, Prepared by Philip S. Watson (London: James Clarke & Co. ,
1953), p. 121. /Galatians/
2W. A. 7, 536.
^Luther, Am. Ed., XII, 189.
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Not that I find I have grasped anything of a Wisdom
so high, so broad and so profound beyond a few
meager rudiments and fragments; and I am ashamed
that my uninspired comments on so great an Apostle
and chosen instrument of God should be published. ^
The continuing interplay of pride and humility is employed
polemically beyond Luther's self-judgment and his quizzical attitude
toward self-assured students. Pedersen introduces this perspective:
The literal-carnal exegesis is that position over
against the Scripture which does not infer the con¬
sequence of the faith relationship to the Word as the
mediator of the divine truth. In the Dictata the
protagonists of the fleshly literalism (those who are
caught up in the old essence of the letter) are not the
theologians of the church, but the Jews and heretics,
together with all the proud, arrogant men (proprietarii
opiniones /W. A.77 4, 317, 27) who will not humbly
listen to and hear God's speaking, but seek only
support for their own ideas and idols in the Scripture.
Their relationship to the scripture is basically false,
because they seek to be masters of it, rather than
humbly to listen to it self-critically. That is the begin¬
ning and essence of heresy: a positing of self-righteous¬
ness, and that means with respect to the study of
scripture, that one distorts the testimony according to
one's own bias. The supremacy of the word over the "I"
of the individual must always be asserted, the word is
sacrosanct, the individual must lister^, inquire, submit
himself, continually be corrected;. . .
Pedersen supports his arguments by reference to the Gloss on Ps. 118
(119), 2: "Beati qui scrutantur testimonia eius, non qui torquent ea
3
ad suum sensum. " The comparison of the offending interpreters to the
'''Luther, Galatians, 16.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 415.
V A. 4, 281.
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Jews who reject Christ calls forth the general condemnation of wrong
interpretation as killing, crucifying Christ afresh. *
There is then no native affinity which enables a man to under-
stand the Word through some kind of "point of connection, " no
developed intellectual or spiritual/moral affinity which gives insight.
Understanding is continually, completely dependent on the gift of
grace in the Holy Spirit. "Scire ergo filium dei esse incarnatum pro
salute nostra et extra eum omnes esse in peccatis, hec est eruditio
ista, intellectus iste: quod nemo nisi per spiritum sanctum cognovit."
Living Word and the Life to Come
The theological and practical implications of all this Luther
summarizes thus:
God converses with us, governs us, provides for us;
and Christ hovers over us -- but invisibly. And even
though there were clouds above us impervious as iron
or steel, obstructing our view of heaven, this would
not matter. Still we hear God speaking to us from
heaven; we call and cry to Him, and He answers us.
Heaven is open, as St. Stephen saw it open (Acts 7:55);
and we hear God when He addresses us in Baptism, in
Holy Communion, in confession, and in His Word as it
proceeds from the mouth of the men who proclaim His
message to the people.4
1W. A. 4, 318.
^cf. Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 425.
3W. A. 3, 172.
4Luther, Am. Ed. XXII, 201.
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Emil Brunner draws a continuing, ultimately eschatological
inference from some words of Luther spoken in this mode:
"Whenever God speaks or with whomsoever He speaks,
whether in wrath or in grace, the one addressed is im¬
mortal. The Person of God who there speaks and His
Word show us that we are creatures with whom God wishes
to speak for all eternity and in immortal fashion" (I Cor.
15:31) . In this formula of Luther is expressed a genuinely
Biblical Christo-centric faith in immortality. Not in the
way we are made but in God's creative summons have we
our eternal life, which has not ceased to bear witness to
itself, even in our sinful mortal mode of existence. Our
eternal life is rooted in the "thou" of God who addresses
us, not in the "I" which we speak to ourselves (I Cor.
15:55 ff.).
We submit yet another appraisal, from Thomas F. Torrance,
because it contributes to several themes which we must study later.
A closer study of the context of the following quotation will indicate
the broad ramifications of the theme of the Living Word in Luther.
Because this Word is none other than Christ Himself
who was crucified and resurrected for us, this is the
Word which slays and makes alive, and operates law
and Gospel, by crucifixion and resurrection. ^
One Man against the Many
Conceivably, Luther might have enunciated all of the foregoing
"'"Emil Brunner, Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1954), p. 107.
2
Thomas F. Torrance, Kingdom and Church: A Study in the Theology
of the Reformation (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1956), pp. 40-41.
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ideas in a most commonplace, unprovocative style without causing any
untoward opposition or polemicizing. After all, he himself consistently
drew selectively upon the exegetical works of his predecessors, there¬
by acknowledging some evangelical value in their works. We may
well use Oberman's delightful turn of speech concerning subjective
orthodoxy, the will to conform to and continue the tradition of the
Church, combined with objective heresy, the actual contradiction of
that teaching. ^ These terms describe the works of those earlier
Biblical scholars who had indeed said something of the gospel by
means of their allegorizing, but entertained a heretical, indeed an
anti-Christian potential in their methodology.
Luther did not provoke, protest, polemicize because of personal
hostility, neurosis or subjective fanaticism. Neither was it sheer
independence of mind which led him to "disregard them /the commentators/
2
all and put them away. " Rather, it was conformity with Luther's
theology, in which we find "the expectation that what is needed for
salvation can be arrived at from the correct understanding of the word
of Scripture. " The search for this understanding, like the expectation of
3
the word of salvation "is unparalleled in the surrounding milieu. "
^"Oberman, Harvest, 427.
2
Luther, Erlangen Ed. 22, pp. 54-5. Quoted by Wood, Luther's
Principles of Biblical Interpretation, 19.
^Ebeling, Theology Today, XXI, No. 1, 37.
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Intimations of Independence
However we may adjudge and describe Luther's hermeneuticsj
then, and there are innumerable varieties of such analysis, we recognize
uniqueness which is only a part of his total unique activity in the
"surrounding historical milieu." For Luther set a pattern for radical
change in exegesis in at least three vital areas. First, he abandoned
the accepted mode of Biblical-systematic elucidation of the Scripture,
such as could be found in Lombard's Sentences or Thomas' Summae.
This is a factor quite generally overlooked in the analysis of the
hermerrtical revolution at the Reformation. Luther's systematic works,
while heavily supported by Scripture, were not a replacement for the
explicitly exegetical studies as the primary work of the theologian.
A second feature of the new approach was the abandonment of the time-
honored system of glosses and scholia in favor of something more like
running commentary with major words and phrases illumined not atomist-
ically, but out of the total context of Scripture. This change, also, has
been given but little mention. The area of change which has called
forth the most critical analysis, and criticism, is Luther's rejection of
the Quadriga, or four-fold method of interpretation.
In each of the three divisions above Luther's change reflects
some subjective involvement. In the first area, where he engaged with
the scholastic theologians and the great doctors of the church, the
personal relationship which he saw established between God and man by
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Christ is not properly developed theologically by dialectic. To use the
modern idiom, dialectic involved an I—It relation rather than an I-Thou.
Sixteenth century terminology speaks rather of the role of reason here,
but the intent is the same. For a whole complex of reasons, the mind
of man can not understand God as He is. Man is weak, sinful, proud,
etc. In other words, he is subjective by nature, and this natural sub¬
jectivity deludes him, even as it perverts his entire understanding.
We must be careful lest we construe this perspective as anti-
rationalist as some critics of Luther maintain. Reason has its place
for the man who is already a Christian, for the "fool in Christ. " The
danger lies in the misuse of reason and presumptuous pride in the
capacity of reason. Some of Luther's early theses will illustrate major
aspects of his perspective:
/From the Disputation against Scholastic Theology, 1517/
35. It is not true that an invincible ignorance excuses
one completely (all scholastics notwithstanding);
36. For ignorance of God and oneself and good works is
by nature always invincible.
43. It is an error to say that no man can become a theologian
without Aristotle. This is in opposition to common opinion.
44. Indeed, no one can become a theologian unless he be¬
comes one without Aristotle.
45. To state that a theologian who is not a logician is a
monstrous heretic—this is a monstrous and heretical
statement. This in opposition to common opinion.
46. In vain does one fashion a logic of faith, a substitution
brought about without regard for limit and measure. This in
opposition to the new dialecticians.
/From the Heidelberg Disputation, 151&7
20. He who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle
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without danger to his soul must first become thoroughly
foolish in Christ.
Instead, then, of these corrupt cogitations, let men hear the Word of
2
God in faith. Thus they will avoid error and heresy.
Inasmuch as the glosses and scholiae comprised the select
wisdom of the church they represented traditional material for representa¬
tion and set the traditional form for classroom communication. Luther's
break at this point might appear to be one more evidence of his in¬
transigent privatism which could ignore the totality of the Christian
community.
Luther and the Church
We must make clear at this point that the subjective element we
expect to delineate more precisely in this thesis is not a subjectivity
of individualism, of privatism, the right to private judgment or the like.
Throughout his life Luther was haunted by the jeering question, "Are
you alone right? Do you alone have the truth? " This was the judgment
of his opponents at Worms: "What audacity to arrogate to himself alone
a knowledge of the Scriptures against all the doctors of the Church and
1Luther, Am. Ed. XXXI, 11, 12, 41.
^Luther, Lenker, I, 240; XII, 191, 430. Luther, Am. Ed. XII,
49; 282 ff; XXII, 283; Prenter, Spiritus Creator, 196-7.
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to be wise above all others!"^ The reformer's defence was that such a
situation was not unprecedented in the church.
And this is a wonderful matter, that God preserved
the Church, being yet but young, and the Gospel it¬
self, by one only person. Paul alone standeth to the
truth; for he had lost Barnabas his companion, and Peter
was against him. So sometimes one man is able to do
more in a council than the whole council besides .
Which things the Papists themselves do witness. And
for example they allege Paphnutius, who withstood the
whole council of Nicaea (which was the best of all that
were after the council of the Apostles at Jerusalem), and
prevailed against it. 2
Luther had no intention of dissociating himself from the historic church
and its community. Without assuming that our analysis is complete
we may nevertheless set forth some evidences which will clarify this
preliminary statement on Luther's relation to the church. Pelikan
supports our contention in a notable statement in relation to Luther's
view on the Sacrament:
In Luther's exegesis of "participation in the body
of Christ" these two belonged together, the individual
and the church. Whatever was significant for the one
was significant for the other as well, for the only true
individuality was in the church. Hence his exegesis
included both meanings of "participation": that the
Lord's Supper made individuals more personally aware
of the meaning of Christ, and that it brought them to¬
gether more closely in the church. Thus in the Lord's
Supper the Holy Spirit strengthened and nourished the
corporateness of Christian faith and life. Many
Mackinnon, James, Luther and the Reformation, 4 Vols.
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925) II, p. 301. Cf. C. R. I.,
225.
^Luther, Galatians, 120. V. also W. A. 32, 340.
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Reformation scholars have failed to realize that the
church was perhaps more prominent in Luther's exegesis
than it had been in any exegete since Augustine. ^
As a believer who has found his one-ness in the many-ness of
the church, the reformer expresses a deep protective affection for the
membership.
Seeing then that the Church is so soft and so tender a
thing, and is so soon overthrown, men must watch
carefully against these fantastical spirits; who, when
they have heard a few sermons or read a few leaves in
the Holy Scriptures, by and by they make themselves
masters and controllers of all learners and teachers,
9
contrary to the authority of all men.
As Luther understood Augustine at this point the universal
church throughout the world had the right and responsibility of judging
and recognizing true and false dogmas (jus judicandi et cocmoscendi) .
The problem was that the officials of the church had presumptuously
3seized this as their peculiar right. Even so, with a kind of poetic
justice, the ambitious ecclesiastics were frustrated in the matter of
the essentials of the faith and left to express their powers in lesser
matters, judgments of canon law, for example.
Saepe me moverunt Gregorii et aliorum autoritas. Papa
non rexit ecclesiam, sed Gregorius, Hieronymus,
Augustinus, Ambrosius. Papa ist allein bliben in
'''Luther, Am. Ed., Companion Volume, Introduction to the




^v. Headley, Luther's View, 84-85.
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controversiis iudicialibus. ^
The autoritas of the doctors was not beyond question or reproach, for
even they could write bose ding. ^ Power, wisdom, holiness and piety
were no safeguards in themselves against false teachings. This is
not a personal judgment of Luther's, but an application of the principle
that the Scripture was perspicuous and that it judged all other
4
authorities, including the fathers.
Therefore neither am I to be believed, nor the church,
nor the Fathers, nor the Apostles, no, nor an angel
from heaven, if we teach any thing against the Word
of God; but let the Word of the Lord abide for ever:
for else this argument of the false apostles had
mightily prevailed against Paul's doctrine. . .For no
man saith willingly that the Church erreth, and yet
it is necessary to say that it erreth, if it teach any
thing besides or against God's Word. . . .Therefore
neither is the Church, nor Peter, nor the Apostles,
nor angels from heaven, to be heard, unless they
bring and teach the pure Word of God. ^
This generous criticism and general disavowal of the authority
of the fathers, the ecclesiastical leaders and the great doctors of the
church does not leave the interpreter isolated and without aid. He
depends on the better guide, the Holy Spirit Himself:
XW. A. , TR 1, 8.
V. A. , TR, 1, 45.
^W. A. 47, 256.
^Headley, Luther's View, 83-84.
^Luther, Galatians, 78. v. also W. A. 20, 744-45.
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Wherefore let us, casting away all such pernicious
and absurd follies, enter upon a new road of inter¬
pretation, caring naught for having disregarded the
footsteps of those who have gone before us. For we
have the Holy Spirit as our guide, not setting before
us in Moses a heap of absurd allegories, but teaching
us through him the mightiest truths and the mightiest
things which took place between God the- Creator and
man the sinner, and Satan the author of sin. ^
Churchly Allegory
The development of the allegorical method which occupied so
prominent a role in the history of hermeneutics (v. supra passim) was
trenchantly set forth in the mnemonic lines "Littera gesta docet, quid
credas allegoria, moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia. " This
four-fold method of interpretation was normative for late medieval
O
Scriptural exposition. This means that in the same way as the con¬
tent of the faith had been established in the traditional teachings, so
the method had been established through which the faith-content was
verified and elaborated. The interrelation of content and method is so
close that Ebeling can affirm:
Diese Stabilitat der H. /Hermeneutik/zeigt nicht nur,
dass die wesentlichen Probleme der Theologie des MA,
gerade auch die methodologischer Art, an anderer
Stelle lagen (obschon die traditionelle H. dafur die
Luther, Lenker I, 286.
^It is significant that the contemporary Catholic theologian Chenu
uses the term "axiom" for the Merkvers. M. D. Chenu, Is Theology a
Science? trans. A. H. N. Green-Armytage (London: Burns and Oates,
1959), p. 86.
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grundlegende Vorbedingung war), sondern vor allem,
dass die h.e Konzeption Ausdruck einer kirchlichen
Grundentscheidung ist, mit der die Kontinuitat der
kath. Kirche in Zusammenhang steht.*
The predilection for a distinction between the literal and
spiritual interpretations which is the essence of the Quadriga betrays
a basic metaphysical understanding in the Roman church which was not
o
at all congenial to the new theology of Luther. On this basis alone
we would expect Luther to perceive the incongruity of such a method
for him. From another, and less frequently considered point, the
Quadriga, especially in its allegorical development, was vulnerable
to Luther's criticism. The Achilles heel at which we direct our attack
is the subjectivity of this mode of interpretation.
On the preliminary level of criticism, we know that allegory
gave opportunity for flights of the most unbridled fancy, that some
extreme instances of this type of exegesis were nothing more than
prideful displays of technical virtuosity. We know that the most
absurd arguments were supported by the "spiritual" interpretation of
Scripture. Without some restraint laid on the expositor, captiousness
and whimsy could easily fit the literal verba to a Procustean bed of
ideas.
At yet another level, the critique pertains to the Roman Catholic
^"Ebeling, "Hermeneutik, " 249.
^Ebeling, Theology Today, XXI, No. 1, 42. Cf. Gogarten, The
Reality of Faith, 18 .
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church, rather than individual working within it. Thus, in a telling
statement, Prof. T. F. Torrance has written, "the element of objectivity
in the tradition is subordinated to a massive subjectivity in the mind
of the Church." C. S. Lewis'aphorism is also apropos: "The truth
2
is not that allegory is Catholic, but that Catholicism is allegorical."
When the church, in the defensible attempt to establish pura doctrina,
fixed the meanings of all the symbols within the schemes of allegory,
she vitiated the dynamic of the revelation. Citing Lewis again, "Into
3
an allegory man can put only what he already knows. " Erik Erikson
makes a similar judgment:
Having attributed a real existence to an idea, the mind
wants to see this idea alive, and can only effect this
by personifying it. In this way allegory is born. It is
not the same thing as symbolism. Symbolism expresses
a mysterious connection between two ideas, allegory
gives a visible form to the conception of such a connection.
Symbolism is a very profound function of the mind, allegory
is a superficial one. It aids symbolic thought to express
itself, but endangers it at the same time by substituting a
figure for a living idea. The force of the symbol is easily
lost in the allegory. ^
^"T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCM
Press, 1965), p. 68.
2
C. S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval
Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 322.
3
C. S. Lewis, Letters, ed. W. H. Lewis (London: Bles, 1966),
p. 271.
4
Erikson, Young Man Luther, 182. cf. "Fix the meaning of a
symbol, and you have fallen into the commonplace of allegory. " Horace
Gregory, D. H. Lawrence, Pilgrim of the Apocalypse (New York: Grove
Press, 1933), p. 105.
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These strictures do not apply with the same force to typology.
The difference is in the reference to history: allegory does not take it
into account, typology rests on a historical fulfilment. *
The Scholastic theologians, with their penchant for ordering
logically what existed in the tradition, displayed the kind of allegoriz¬
ing Catholicism simplistically described above. Although Chenu gives
Thomas Aquinas high marks for rejecting symbolism in his scientific
theology because of the threat posed by Hugo of St. Victor to make of
allegorizing the ultimate and supreme task of the theologian, this
contemporary Catholic returns rather lamely to defend the virtues of
2
allegory. Ebeling takes pains to set Thomas within the allegorists,
but concedes more sobriety and restraint to his efforts as he points
out the primary role which Thomas accorded to the literal and historical
and his emphasis on finding clear evidences elsewhere in Scripture to
3
support the allegorized insights. More generously, Miss Smalley
suggests that both Albert and Thomas may have been too advanced for
4
their contemporaries, a concession which does not change the
historical profile significantly.
^G. W. H. Lampe, "The Reasonableness of Typology, " Essays
on Typology (London: SCM Press, 1957), p. 31.
^Chenu, Is Theology a Science? 85-87.
^Ebeling, Ev. Evang. , 128-136.
4
Smalley, Study of the Bible, 275.
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Luther and Allegory-
Consistent with this tradition as he had been taught it, Luther,
on his own admission, began as an allegorizing exegete. His state¬
ment has become almost trite by repetition:
Da ich ein Monch war, war ich ein Meister auf geistliche
Deutung, allegorisirte es Alles; darnach aber, da ich
durch die Epistel zum Romern ein wenig zum Erkenntniss
Christi kam, sahe ich, dass mit Allegorien und geistlichen
Deutungen nichts nicht war; nicht was Christus bedeutet,
sondern wer und was er ist. ^
The evolution from this allegorizing monk to the reformer who
would say "Origen, Jerome and all the other allegorists are alike in-
2
volved in the greatest folly" is an epic which has been given master¬
ful scrutiny by Ebeling in Evangelische Evanqelienauslequnq, by
Pedersen in Luther som Skriftfortolker and by Prenter in his whole
analysis of the spiritual break-through of the reformer. The sketch
which we present here is not intended as a summary of those findings,
but as a simple statement of some of the elements involved in the
transition and what they imply for our study.
It is evident that Luther was not only aware of the Quadriga
3but careful in his use of the terminology. In his early lectures on the
%. A. TR 1, 335.
2
Luther, Lenker I, 154.
3
. .a very beautiful allegory, or rather by an anagoge. . . "
Am. Ed. I, 87, on Gen. 2:7.
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Epistle to the Hebrews it is evident that he accepted the conclusion
that the spiritual understanding was available not for all, but for
advanced students. ^ Some continuation of this view, but with a
significant modification in its essence is Luther's contention that
allegory might be profitable for believers, but ineffective against un¬
believers .
Quia Galatae fideles erant, allegoricis doctrinis
audiri potuerunt. . .Infidelibus vero allegoricis nihil
potest probari. . .aut certe quod Apostolus Galatis ut
infirmioribus paterna solicitudine et volens rem
similitudine et volens rem similitudinibus et allegoriis
deliniat, ut verbum eorum captui attemperet. 2
3
Elsewhere again Luther denies to allegory any "value for giving proof"
such as can come from the historical account. In deference to that
priority of the historical Luther came to the point where he admitted
allegory only where the text itself allowed it.
Ego quidem ab eo tempore, quo cepi historicam
sententiam amplecti, semper abhorrui ab Allegoriis
nec sum iis usus, nisi vel ipse textus eas ostenderet,
vel interpretationes ex novo Testamento possent
sumi. ^
''"Luther: Early Theological Works, ed. and trans. James
Atkinson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), p. 117.
2W. A. 2, 550.
^Luther, Am. Ed. I, 233.
^W. A. 42, 173. Lectures on Genesis, 1535-37.
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The strong Christocentric emphasis in the maturing Luther^
draw the four lines of the Quadriga together so that the content of the
Scripture is still proclaimed in the same scope, but is focussed in
Christ. The emphasis on the Incarnation and Redemption emphasizes
the historical as over against the un- or anti-historical allegory, the
emphasis on faith militates against the materialistic metaphysic, and
the emphasis on the dialogical or personal confrontation rather than the
dialectical rational element further emasculates the allegorical inter-
pretation.^
Luther buttresses his rejection of the Quadriga by appeal to the
Fathers, and significantly evidences thereby that he does definitely
relate himself to the Church, the Church of the Apostles and the Ancient
Fathers:
Verum quicquid sit de illis sensibus, certum est necque
apostolos necque antiquos doctores observare, qui
tropologiam, allegoriam, misticum seu misteria et
spiritualem sensum prorsus indiscrete accipiunt,
anagoges vero nec verbo meminerunt.3
Does Luther's depreciation and avoidance of allegorical inter¬
pretation complete the hermeneutic revolution? Is it now sufficient to
contend for the historical/literal interpretation for the clear, pure
■'■Roland H. Bainton, Warren A. Quanbeck, E. Gordon Rupp,
Luther Today (Decorah, Iowa: Luther College Press, 1957), pp. 74ff.
9
V. Ebeling, Ev. Evanq. , 201, and Ebeling, Theology Today,
XXI, No. 1, 37.
3W. A. , 57, 96.
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understanding of the Word? No, the resolution is not, unfortunately,
that simple. Man may yet obscure the holy truth by his literalism or
by some other offence to the historical sense, he may lay claim to
spiritual insights which also impose foreign presuppositions on the
Word and corrupt it. ^ These problems, as they were actually posed to
Luther in his later career, must also be confronted and incorporated
in our analysis.
The substance of the preceding section has been gleaned from
a broad cross-section of Luther's works, supported by a variety of
secondary references. Is it a fair statement, consistent with the
working principles of Luther when confronted with a specific text or a
specific theological issue? We submit the evidence gathered from
three major theological and exegetical confrontations to corroborate the
analyses above.
Clarification Through Strife I
Latomus and Scholasticism
In May, 1521, Luther received a copy of the work by Latomus
(Jacobus Masson) of the University of Louvain. Latomus, spurred by
Luther's answer in March, 1520, to the 1519 condemnation of Luther's
works by the Louvain professors, returned to a defence of the Louvain
position. Luther was at the Wartburg in hiding, but decided to make
"''Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 413.
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his reply to Latomus at once, even though he lacked an adequate library
for checking his sources in the works of the fathers. These circum¬
stances, however, give added force to the document. Luther necessarily
wrote out of his central, personal convictions, unable as he was to
make a tidy research project out of the response. The year represents
a crucial one, not too far removed in time from Luther's evangelical
discovery, just after the Diet at Worms, at a time when he was en¬
grossed not only in apologetic and polemic writing but was occupied
with his great translation of the New Testament.
The University of Louvain was a stronghold of scholastic
theology. The action of condemning Luther's works and burning his
books indicates further their sense of commitment to the honor of the
papacy. The themes which Latomus dealt with were central to the
Reformation proclamation, and the issues were joined on the interpreta¬
tion of the Scriptures involved in those themes. Luther returns again
and again to the theme of man's total corruption by sin, the grace of
God in Christ, and the continuing mercy of God to the sinner who is
and remains simul justus et peccator. *
The Turmerlebnis is a real presence in the tract as evidenced
by the recurrence of terms like "righteousness of God, "justified by
iThis introductory material is drawn largely from the Intro¬




faith, " "he who believes in Christ has a merciful God. " Luther main¬
tains "I have to some extent tested these spiritual matters in
O
experience" which seems at least an oblique reference to the Tower.
3
Certainly, all is of grace, Christ and his atoning cross are everywhere.
4
To help us understand the Word "there is one teacher, even Christ."
God is a God who is to be feared and obeyed before all men. 3
g
He kills and makes alive. The Word of this God resists man so he can-
7
not force it to his way of thinking. At the close of the argument Luther
urges his colleagues to take over some of this kind of response so he
may fulfil a pastoral role which is clearly on his conscience, "to help
poor ordinary people . " For when "God's Word is taught. . . God ... is
g
then present. " Clearly, then, claims which we make whether as to
our interpretations or our own righteousness have the awesome
Q
character of being "before God." The disputing is not about "an
1
Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 227.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 258.
3Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 155, 208.
4Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 217.
5Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 146.
6Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 148.
7Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 181.
8Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 147.
9Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 182.
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ordinary man" but about "the fearful and eternal Majesty. "
Typically, the court of last resort is the Pauline word." The
abundance of citations, not the least important being those from the
letter to the Romans, gives evidence of this lifelong trait of Luther's.
In response to the accusation that he is immodest in attacking
the theologians of Louvain, Luther defends himself ably and cites
3
Biblical instances of men who were bold to defend God's truth. Over
against this defence he sets his accusation of the men of Louvain who
are proud^ and the sophists likewise.3
Luther marvels at theological method which assumes a point of
connection, a similarity such that "the Eternal Life should be compared
0
to a momentary one!" Rhetorically, he challenges the sophists to
compare their scholarly competence in the Sentences with their inadequate
7
teaching of the Word of God. He wearies of Latomus' method of
argument and laments how "other interpretations were added to those
interpretations, so that now there is no limit to the increase of glosses
1Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 240.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 155.
3Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 142-43.
4Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 150.
5Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 160.
6Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 260.
7Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 259.
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on glosses and, in the confusion of words, we are led into the utmost
confusion. " *
As to the historic Church, again, the Feathers did err, they were
2often human, erring, inconsistent, and asleep. Luther will not give
unqualified approval of any of the fathers, but urges attention to them
3
"especially Augustine! " Neatly put: "Behold, this is my faith just
because it is the catholic faith. /italics mine^/
More technically, there are figures of speech, metaphors, in
the Scripture, which must not be interpreted literally.^ Judging the
words by the Spirit, men may still come to understand the ancient word
g
of the Scripture, if they do not look only at the surface. But Latomus
is guilty of arbitrariness in interpretation simply because he must refute
7Luther. "When Latomus is the teacher everyone is free to allegorize
0
and play with Scripture as he pleases. " There are those who interpret
Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 236-37.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 151.
3Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 216.
4Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 213.
5Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 168.
6Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 177.
7Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 166.
8Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 179.
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figures of speech at "choice" or "whim."''' The Louvain "theologizers". ..
O
"distort and condemn" Scripture. And "sophistic envy is so blind that
it cannot even grasp ordinary common sense nor the rudiments of a
3
schoolboy's learning." Although he is accused of being ungrateful
and insulting to St. Thomas, Luther maintains that he is not ignorant of
the great theologian, yet remains convinced "that scholastic theology
is nothing else than ignorance of the truth and a stumbling block in
comparison with Scripture.
If Luther were a heretic he would not be moved by Latomus'
kind of figurative interpretation.3 Augustine was right, "Figurative
language proves nothing." Time after time Luther harks back to the
simple, clear, lucid literal text. What is the meaning "in this present
7verse?" There is a sharp emphasis on the Incarnation, the humanity
of Christ. Note the trenchant injunction near the end of the piece:
He who wishes to discuss sin and grace, law and
gospel, Christ and man, in a Christian way,
necessarily discourses for the most part on nothing
1Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 195.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 187.
3Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 185.
4Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 257-58.
SLuther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 166.
6Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 167.
7Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 188.
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else than God and man in Christ; and in doing this one
must pay the most careful attention to predicating both
natures, with all their properties, of the whole Person,
and yet take heed not to attribute to this what belongs
exclusively to God or exclusively to man. For it is
one thing to speak of the incarnate God, or of man
raised up to God, and another to talk simply of God or
of man.
Clarification Through Strife II
Erasmus and Humanism
If allegory and the spiritual interpretation represented by that
system have now been properly criticized and discarded, the obvious
simple remainder in exegetical options is the historical-literal inter¬
pretation. Both Reformation historians and students of the history of
interpretation point to the emergence of historical understanding of the
Scripture as one of the primary achievements of the Reformation, one
which has borne fruit in the more recent and highly developed historical
2
study of the Bible. Inasmuch as the historical-literal sense had
never been entirely excluded from consideration, even by the allegorists
who must use this sense as a base for their spiritual constructions,
Luther's views must be seen as an evolution from, and an adaptation
and modification of previous attitudes. Before we attempt to delimit
these changes more specifically, it is necessary to refresh some
1Luther, Am. Ed. XXXII, 257.
2
Luther, Romans, pp. xxix ff.; Grant, Bible in the Church,
109 ff.
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background material and sharpen some of the issues.
The central presuppositions, and therefore also the central
problems of the relations of historical and spiritual interpretation set
forth above in the problems related to allegory, were metaphysical.
Given the basic premises of idealist philosophy, the exegete assumed
a primal world of ideas which were understood by their reflected images
in the physical world and the world of human history. Under Nominalist
influences, as well as under the forces of a renewed Aristotelianism,
the idealist view came under severe questioning. Subtly, and very
often quite unconsciously, men accepted a view of the world and
history as real in themselves. How, then, can the words used by men
within this sphere of reality convey meanings of a heavenly sphere
which is by definition, of a quite different order? The school of
Antioch, by its emphasis on the historical interpretation had, as we
have observed above, encountered the hazard and accusation of
heretical statements. Quite remarkably, Athanasius came out of the
school of Alexandria, but so effectively expressed the resolution of
the Christological problems in the homoousion and kindred statements
as to be acceptable to both East and West after long struggles. It is
not so incredible, then, that a man like Augustine should also stand
in a mediating position and should still be acceptable in much of his
writing to the sixteenth century reforming spirit.
These questions of history, of reality and of human language
were examined most closely in their technical connotations by the
196
movement generally designated as Humanism. By the sixteenth century
humanistic thought had developed and matured. Although it was
basically a cultural phenomenon it was not to be avoided by the
ecclesiastical world. Both the old church and the new-born Reformation
group must reckon with it.
Professor H. Richard Niebuhr may have been correct in his
judgment that "Roman Catholicism has always been inclined toward a
Christian or "otherwordly humanism, but this did not protect the
church of the sixteenth century from sharp criticism by humanists,
even the moderate ones. The humanists had been impressed by
classical antiquity and had drawn from those sources a new respect for
human values in and of themselves. The supreme challenge of this
quest is stated by Emil Brunner: "It is as though man in history were
seeking humanitas and true humanism without ever being able to find
2
them." A deep intuition informed many of the sixteenth century
humanists that humanitas was to be found in the One true Man, but the
correlation with Him was not uniformly or successfully made.
The strong rationalistic trend of the humanists led to a clash
with scholasticism. Erasmus and others of his intimate circle were
convinced that scholastic logic was despicable. They alleged that this
^H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America (New York:
Harper & Bros., 1937), pp. 20-21.
Brunner, Eternal Hope, 86.
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logic was detached from the reality of life, hence of the human. As a
result of this primary error education became meaningless. Humanism
thus became the champion of a new educational program stressing con¬
tent above method. ^ The movement accepted an optimistic view of
man, including the idea that he was fundamentally good and capable of
improvement by education. Thus, as Gilmore says, "Learning,
2whether sacred or profane, would increase piety. "
The philologist Budaeus testified to the vital role of Erasmus in
realizing these objectives of humanism:
Was anyone born under such inauspicious Graces that
the dull and obscure discipline (scholasticism) does
not revolt him, since sacred literature, too, cleansed
by Erasmus' diligence, has regained its ancient purity
and brightness? But it is still much greater that he
should have effected by the same labour the emergence
of sacred truth itself out of that Cimmerian darkness,
even though divinity is not yet quite free from the dirt,
of the sophist school. If that should occur one day,
it will be owing to the beginnings made in our times. ^
This judgment certainly implies also that Erasmus will provide
valuable data for our concern for hermeneutics, and ultimately with the
subjective element. Erasmus' notorious subjectivity of tremulous fear
has been commented on at length by biographers and critics. We may
deal with this matter briefly since it is patent personal weakness, and
*Ong, The Barbarian Within, 156.
^Gilmore, World of Humanism, 206-07.
3
J. Huizinga, Erasmus, ed. Edward W. Bok (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1925), p. 169.
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since the more subtle elements of the subjective are more apropos for
our consideration. Luther chided Erasmus for desiring to conduct
theological debate in a mood of compromise "in order to ensure that no
occasion for public disorder arises. " For many years before he wrote
against Luther, Erasmus had been vociferously disowning any connection
with the vitriolic German reformer, and even with his own uncle, John
Reuchlin. Thus he wrote to Albert of Brandenburg October 19, 1519:
When Luther's books were published, they grasped them
as if they were a handle and used them to link the cause
of language and learning, that of Reuchlin and of Luther,
and indeed my own, together in the same bundle, pre¬
senting their case poorly as well as distinguishing badly
between the objects of their attack. For what has literary
study to do with a matter of faith? And how am I involved
in the cause of Reuchlin and Luther? But by this trick
they have mixed these things together so that they "ia^
burden all friends of learning with a common reproach.
Margaret Mann Phillips reports on the conversations between
John Colet and Erasmus and states that they discussed the "psychological
3
interpretation of the Bible. " Here the normative character of humanitas
is evident along with a negation of the abstractions of sophistic logic.
The excitement and sense of achievement which Erasmus experienced in
this mode of inquiry stemmed not from the novelty, but from the deep
•'■Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer
andO. R. Johnston (London: James Clarke & Co., Ltd., 1957), p. 90.
2
John C. Olin, ed. , Christian Humanism and the Reformation:
Desiderius Erasmus (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 143.
Margaret Mann Phillips, Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance
(New York: The Macmillan Co. , 1950), p. 44.
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conviction and assurance that knowledge could lead to faith. This
principle of erudition has been labelled as the prime characteristic of
Erasmus' theory of interpretation by John William Aldridge, who goes on
to call this a "theologically poor, but historically beneficial
position."* However, Erasmus added what appears to be a destructive
qualifying element in this project of education to faith. Even though
his own editions of the Scripture were intended to enable the ploughboy
to read and understand the holy word, he let it be known in his argu¬
ment with Luther that he felt a public, rational discussion of some of
2
the exalted truths of God would be harmful to the simple.
We have warrant for attributing Erasmus' reaction against pure
rationalism to his early experiences with the Brethren of the Common
3
Life. Education and culture did not equip one to get beneath the sur¬
face of the Scriptural word. Piety is the essential key to open the
mind. In this warm admonition from the Paraclesis Erasmus stated
this point with evangelical zeal:
The journey is simple, and it is ready for anyone.
Only bring a pious and open mind, possessed above
all with a pure and simple faith. Only be docile, and
*John William Aldridge, The Hermeneutic of Erasmus (Richmond,
Virginia: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 58.
2




you have advanced far in this philosophy. It itself
supplies inspiration as a teacher which communicates
itself to no one more gladly than to minds that are
without guile. ^
Professor Torrance concludes that the interplay of psychological
and moral functions together with Erasmus' penchant for matters of
language, are the reason for his predilection for "the primacy of second
2
intentions and the pursuit of oblique meaning." Thus, too, Erasmus
lost direct contact with the Word. Ultimately:
Erasmus could never bring himself to be greatly con¬
cerned for doctrinal questions, nor indeed for their
natural or direct signification. All that really mattered
is that they should supposit for inward moral
experience.J
It is vital to our subequent argument to allege against Erasmus
that he betrayed in this complex relation to Scripture a basically
historicist view. The validity of this accusation gains strength from
Aulen's analysis of one of the major defects in historicism:
Of greater importance from the religious point of view,
the fundamental defect of historicism lies in the fact
that, like the idealistic theory of immanence, the
character of revelation as being a revelation of God is
obscured. It directs the attention of faith to a human
life of the highest moral and religious quality and to
high and pure human thoughts about God and his kingdom.
But that which is essential for faith does not have
reference to human thoughts, however high and noble,
nor to the life of any human personality, however
-^Olin, Christian Humanism, 96.
2
Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 83.
3
Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 83.
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completely "religious." . . . It does not confuse humanity
even at its best with the divine. Faith is related to
nothing but God Alone. When it speaks of revelation it
has reference only and entirely to God's revelation, to
God's way down to mankind from above; to this and nothing
else. ^
It is not only that Erasmus would draw from the static scripture
a power to transform man into a better man ethically, it is even more
that his relativizing of his own situation indicates that he finds in the
data of his experience no ordering center. He was intensely aware of
2the ambiguity of all that is. Since he was not of a mind to draw an
3inference of unity from the varied particulars he withheld judgment and
withdrew to the safer realm of language. Where, in his writings, do we
find any eschatological hope or true vision of the outworking of God's
purposes among men?
Ironically, we perceive in that work which was originally pro¬
duced in the most offhand way, and which Erasmus looked on with
some degree of unhappiness, a most perceptive analysis of the vanity
of trusting in man's best accomplishments. As Huizinga says: "Moriae
Encoomium alone was to be immortal . . . .For only when humour
4









We may well argue further that the way in which Erasmus re¬
solved the problem of the relation of words and things depended on a
historicist position. That is to say that he saw words given established
meanings by human cultures. Through philological inquiry and through
broad readings in the general literature of any given language-group, a
rational, simple perspicuous meaning could be determined for words.
Erasmus did not probe the ontological questions raised by this view.
As he brought forth the clear and simple meaning of the Scripture to be
applied to the ethical situation of man he argued in literalistic fashion
that if a command were given to man by God then the possibility of
man's obedience of that command was implied. With genial optimism
Erasmus expected that the leaders of the church would amend their ways
once their errors were pointed out and that lay Christians both high and
low would become worthy soldiers of Christ through the spread of
Scriptures and the renewal of teaching. Likewise he accepted at face
value the Biblical statements about the justice of God. According to
the human linguistic mode these statements had an absolute character
that was severely tested by accounts such as that of the hardening of
Pharaoh's heart.
In order to reconcile such opposing statements in Scf\i]pture and
to defend his rationalistic view of the freedom of man's will Erasmus
was not above employing the old stratagem of allegorizing. ^ His forte,
^"Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 304-05.
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however, continued to be his stubborn appeal to the literal meaning of
words as he interpreted them. In the popular misunderstanding and con¬
fusion of the early years of the Reformation it is to be expected that the
methods of Luther and Erasmus should have been viewed as not only
related, but well-nigh identical. The bitter controversy which erupted
between the two men in 1524 and 15 25 indicates that the contrary is
true, that Luther sensed no kinship with Erasmus on hermeneutics at the
deeper levels of the problem. In the light of subsequent developments
it was a most unfortunate decision which Erasmus made, belatedly and
reluctantly, to challenge Luther on the subject of the freedom of the
will and in the domain of Biblical interpretation. In response Luther
produced a classic statement in The Bondage of the Will, significant
from its contribution to systematic theology, but more intriguing and
less shop-worn as a source of hermeneutical insights.
Although Erasmus' Diatribe was the immediate cause of Luther's
forceful response in The Bondage of the Will, Luther's views were not
an ad hoc development to meet the challenge of the humanist. Heinz
Blumm states in his article "Luther's View of Man in his First Published
Work":
Relentlessly he drives home the point that the comparative
humanism of the world in which he lives is the principal
foe that needs to be battled. The extreme theocentricity
of Pauline theology is to be enthroned again. . . .He is
convinced that a Christian, far transcending the bounds of
mere Moral Man, is, or should be, concerned with in¬
comparably deeper issues beyond the question of conspicuous
misdemeanor. As a matter of fact, what Luther suggests in
his first publication is that a Christian qua Christian is
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troubled by matters quite different from those of easily
recognizable moral conduct. *
Clearly, Luther thus early had set himself in anti-humanist and anti-
moralizing stance.
Luther's response to the new philological aids to exegesis
which Erasmus developed was a selective acceptance. We can readily
determine the point in Luther's lectures on the letter to the Romans
where he began to employ the textual helps of Erasmus, but Luther
remained free to reject technical conclusions on the literal meaning of
the text and he was not at all impressed by the theology, expressed or
2
latent, of the philologist.
By 1525 the strained relations between the two reform leaders
had been intensified by their own reactions and suspicions, and by the
urgings of their partisans. Whether Luther displayed an unseemly
wrath against what he considered the crass perversion of Scriptural
truth in the Diatribe, whether Luther wrote in careless subjectivity or
not must be determined by scrutiny of the text with a special view to
such problems. In the realm of the subjective elements which we have
set for study here, we find some other data, very enlightening and
typical.
•'•Heinz Bluhm, "Luther's View of Man in his First Published
Work, " Harvard Theological Review, XLI (April, 1948), 105-06.
2
cf. Aldridge, Hermeneutic, 125.
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Luther recognizes his reluctance to admit that he could have been
in the wrong, but also points out with devastating insight how men
delude themselves about this defensiveness:
For I know well enough by experience how reluctant
we all are to admit defeat. As Quintilian says, there
is none who would not rather appear to know than to
learn. And this remains true, despite the proverbial re¬
frain which all around us keep mouthing (more because
it is in popular use, or rather misuse, than because it
expresses their heart): 'I want to learn; I am ready to be
taught and to follow the better when I am told it; I am
man, and prone to err.'
Further, Luther indicates that he has held the same view as Erasmus
in the matters under discussion, that he has been deeply troubled by
them, and "would have continued so, and would be under their influence
to-day, had not constraint of conscience and evidence of facts forced
2
me on to a different road. " The phenomenon indicated by the words
"forced me" was evidenced in universal experience, including that of
Augustine and Bernard, so that
men are different when occupied with words and dis¬
putations from what they are when occupied with
experience and practice. In the former case, their
speech does not accord with what they previously
felt; in the latter, their feelings do not accord with
what they previously said.







himself against so great a host of saints and scholars as Erasmus re¬
cruits"'" Luther dares "to claim that I have understanding, and that you
have not--though I freely grant, as I must, that you have eloquence
O
and I have not." Admittedly that judgment, "the enlightening of the
Holy Ghost, the special gift of God" which "belongs to faith, and is
needful for every Christian, even for a layman" is an individual matter,
3
which "benefits none but him who has it. " In response to the re¬
curring accusation that the Wittenberg reformation has guiltily stirred
up needless strife Luther refers to the tumults precipitated by apostolic
preaching^ and exonerates himself from a charge of self-deception in
this matter and in respect to his own sense of the Tightness of his view
by allusion to his vocation, unhappy as the results of that work may be
for the world's peace. The Word of God "demands to be asserted with
invincible and unshakeable zeal""' and the Professor of Bible is called
to this onerous and despised task.
Emboldened by such deep personal confidence, Luther ventures
to assail Erasmus on faulty applications of his own principles. He










Yet the Diatribe still errs and goes wrong in that it
neglects the purpose of the simile, which should be
our main concern, and catches contentiously at the
words of it instead. 'Knowledge of meaning must be
sought from the reasons for speaking, ' says Hilary; it
is not afforded by the terminology alone. So it is here:
the force of a simile depends upon its purpose. Why
then does the Diatribe ignore the point for the sake of
which Paul uses this simile, and catch at what he says
without reference to the intent of the simile?
Moreover, the precise meanings of words as the philologist has assumed
them must be corrected by a prior knowledge of the things to which the
words refer. Thus "Words must be regarded (as the formula runs) in
2the light of the subject-matter and of the speaker's intention. "
Ignorance of the things to which words refer has been the occasion of
much error in theology.
Moreover, it is a mere logical fancy that there is in
man a middle term, willing as such; nor can those who
assert it prove it. The notion sprang from ignorance
of things and preoccupation with words. As though
things always corresponded in fact to the verbal
analysis of them. (The Sophists make endless errors
over this .) ^
These strictures do not militate against the clarity of Scripture
for Luther.
I have noticed that all heresies and errors in handling
the Scriptures have come, not from the simplicity of







not regarding the simplicity of the words, and from
hankering after figures and implications that come out of
men's own heads. ^
In the positive application of that principle Luther has "shattered the
figures and glosses of men, and taken the words of God in their simple
sense."^
In an open criticism of the style of Erasmus, Luther contends
that teachers should be bound by this same directive.
We should speak according to a definite rule, in sober
and proper terms; for what is wanted in teaching is
simplicity and logical correctness, not the high-flown
figures of a rhetorical persuasive.
The hazard of such cavalier treatment of words is indicated by this
comment and parody:
As I said above, we shall end by overturning all usage
of words and language and saying: 'All men are no man,
and all things are nothing' -- referring one term to the
thing as it is in itself, and the other to something
extraneous that might come upon it or happen to it I ^
Such clear, strong, simple words are not the private province of the
learned, as if only they could confront such reality. "These ex¬
pressions do not make Scripture, nor do they need adapting to the
various capacities of the hearers—unless, of course, one likes








creating difficulties where none exist. " ^
According to Martin Greschat, one of the significant results of
the controversy on perspicuity between these two champions was a re¬
finement of Luther's definition of terms. Greschat concludes:
Von hier aus unterscheidet Luther zwischen einer
ausseren und einer inneren Klarheit der Schrift: die
letzere wird allein durch das Wirken des HI. Geistes
vermittelt, die erstere dagegen durch die Verkundigung
von jenem grundlegenden Heil in Christus. . . Im Wort
geschieht die Bewegung Gottes in Christus auf den
Sunder zu. Das aus sere Wort ist demnach nicht nur in
keiner Weise selbst thematisch, sondern von ihm kann
angemessen uberhaupt nur in seiner Umfassung vom
Wirken des geistes geredet werden. 2
Such a development is further indication of Luther's concern for
content as distinguished from Erasmus' concern for method. 2 The real
target of Luther's criticism, then, is what the Diatribe says, rather
than the method of reaching conclusions. "Reason" is at work here but
not even a consistent Reason, since the judgments are not "according
to equity. " "If a God who crowns the undeserving pleases you, you
4
ought not to be displeased when He damns the undeserving!" Acting
•'■Luther, Bondage, 108.
^Martin Greschat, Melanchthon neben Luther (Witten: Luther-
Verlag, 1965), pp. 89-90.
3
Aldridge, Hermeneutic, 128. Aldridge here draws a corollary
between the position of Erasmus and that of contemporary "new
hermeneutics. " In his judgment, Luther in his time and Barth in ours





demand that God should act according to man's idea of
right, and do what seems proper to themselves--or else
that He should cease to be God! 'The secrets of His
majesty,' they say, 'shall not profit him; let him render
a reason why He is God, or why He wills and does that
which has no appearance of justice in it. *
The problem of the justice of God so construed, and the problem of the
ethical potential of man seen by reason have this outcome, "reason
2thinks that man is mocked by an impossible commandment. " By such
logic we are diverted from the revelation of God Himself.
But how, given the disagreements among Christian men, given
the apparent contradictions, can a simple revelation of God be found
in the Scripture? Luther answers unequivocally that it is in Christ.
For what solemn truth can the Scriptures still be con¬
cealing, now that the seals are broken, the stone rolled
away from the door of the tomb, and that greatest of all
mysteries brought to light—that Christ, God's Son, be¬
came man, that God is Three in One, that Christ
suffered for us, and will reign for ever? And are not
these things known, and sung in our streets? Take Christ
from the Scriptures--and what more will you find in them?
You see, then, that entire content of the Scriptures has
now been brought to light, even though some passages
which contain unknown words remain obscure. ^
It is essential that we observe the emphasis on the Incarnate God who






the Incarnation, but His statements have instead the vigor of the second
article of the Apostles Creed:
Here, God Incarnate says: 'I would, and thou wouldst
not.' God Incarnate, I repeat, was sent for this purpose,
to will, say, do suffer, and offer to all men, all that
is necessary for salvation; albeit He offends many who,
being abandoned or hardened by God's secret will of
Majesty, do not receive Him thus willing, speaking,
doing and offering.
The possibility of man's acting is not inherent in man, but is directly
related to God's acting:
For if I am ignorant of the nature, extent and limits of
what I can and must do with reference to God, I shall
be equally ignorant and uncertain of the nature, extent
and limits of what God can and will do in me—though
God, in fact, works all in all (cf. I Cor. 12.6). Now,
if I am ignorant of God's works and power, I am ignorant
of God himself; and if I do not know God, I cannot
worship, praise, give thanks or serve Him, for I do not
know how much I should attribute to myself and how much
to Him.
In the final pages of The Bondage of the Will where Luther urges
his opponent to stick to what he knows, the language is much more
moderate than are the implications. Erasmus' own words are turned
against him. "You say that 'you have wandered far from the mark, if
you are ignorant of Chirst. ' I think that you yourself see how the
3






see" we hear the pained admiss'ion of the pastor that some men fail to
recognize the saving acts of God in Christ. Put in yet another way,
Erasmus failed to see that "revelation implies salvation."''' In this
context, as Aulen puts it, "The first and foremost question is: What
2
is the nature of the hidden God? "
By his frequent references to the matter of the hidden God in
The Bondage of the Will Luther indicates how keenly he was aware of
this question, and his treatment comprises some of his most distinctive
and seminal contribution both to the problem of the freedom of the will
and to the problem of interpretation. As later Luther research indicates,
there are few topics in Luther's theology which display his virtuosity
to such advantage as does the Deus absconditus--Deus revelatus
formulation. Unfortunately, this depth of insight inevitably also pro¬
duces a myriad of interpretations and qualifications.
There is no equivocation in Luther's statements about man's
proper fear before the Deus nudus. "God in His own nature and majesty
is to be left alone; in this regard, we have nothing to do with Him, nor
3does He wish us to deal with Him. " Such judgments lead John Baillie
■'•Harold B. Kuhn, "The Problem of Human Self-transcendence in
the Dialectical Theology, " Harvard Theological Review, XL (January,







A speculative knowledge of God as He is in His naked
majesty would not and could not save, but would rather
terrify and destroy. A saving knowledge, a knowledge
that meets our situation as regards conscience and jus¬
tification and reconciliation, must be veiled knowledge.
There God appears not in His naked majesty but in His
humiliation. *
Yet it is precisely in this humiliation that so many find the
stumbling block. As Wingren says, "Just because God accomplished
his purpose in suffering and downfall he is fathomless. If he sat
II o
majestically on high he would be easy to understand. With
characteristic boldness, Luther states that it was different for the
godly. "So the godly mind is not shocked to hear that God is in death
or in hell; though either is more frightful and foul than a hole or a
3
sewer." A great Luther scholar like Heinrich Bornkamm seems to
flaunt the extremes of the conclusions that may be drawn from such a
statement when he characterizes Luther's views thus:
Der Glaube fragt in den unsichtbaren Hintergrund des
geschichtlichen Raumes hinein: Wo ist Gott in diesem
wirren Geschehen?
Ueberall—antwortet Luther. Er wohnt nicht etwa
nur in den lichten und edlen Kraften, sondern er gibt
auch den wilden und damonischen ihr Leben. Auch der
"'"John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York: Charles
Scribner" s Sons, 1959), p. 191.
9
Gustaf Wingren, The Living Word (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg




Teufel, das Bose in der Welt empfangen ihr Leben aus
Gottes Allmacht. *
In a less provoking way Luther suggests some of the practical
questions even Christian men might raise.
As to why some are touched by the law and others not, so
that some receive and others scorn the offer of grace,
that is another question, which Ezekiel does not here dis¬
cuss. He speaks of the published offer of God's mercy,
not of the dreadful hidden will of God. ^
How things that are bad for us are good in the sight of
God is known only to God and to those who see with
O
God's eyes, that is, who have the Spirit.
To label these apparent contradictions "paradoxes"^ does not remove
the offensiveness. Better to admit that
it is the highest absurdity by far--foolishness to the
Gentiles and a stumbling-block to the Jews, as Paul
says (cf. I Cor. 1.23)—that God should be a man, a
virgin's son, crucified, sitting at the Father's right
hand I^
The proper answer to this difficult situation is the response of
faith. "We must show some measure of deference to His Divine
g
wisdom by believing Him just when to us He seems unjust. " "Faith's
^Heinrich Bornkamm, Gott und die Geschichte nach Luther








object is things not seen. That there may be room for faith, therefore,
all that is believed must be hidden."''' The deplorable ambiguities of
the definitions of "faith" result here in varied views among Luther
scholars. John Dillenberger reports Karl Heim's understanding of the
experience of Luther in faith as giving him "a new intuition of the
2
problem" while Emanuel Hirsch construes faith as the "state in which
3
all things are unified." Since our own commentary requires some
further analysis of faith we defer comment until a later section of this
treatise.
Although we may not subsume adoration under faith, this
response belongs to the proper attitude of man to the Majesty.
So this is the time and place to adore, not your
'Corycian caverns', but the true Majesty in its awful,
wondrous, oncomprehensible judgments, and to say:
Thy will be done, as in heaven, so in earth. (Luke
11.2). We are nowhere more recklessly irreverent than
when we trespass upon and argue about these inscrut¬
able mysteries of judgments.^
Luther stresses that such a view of the Scriptures does not seek for the
how of the divine truths, which we do not need to know.^ Thus,
"'"Luther, Bondage, 101. v. also Wingren, The Living Word, 206.
2
John Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1953), p. 41.
3
Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, 51.
^Luther, Bondage, 216. cf. also 208, 99.
^Luther, Bondage, 73.
216
"content with the words of God" * the believer waits for the ultimate full
revelation of God, waits in hope of the light of glory:
But the light of glory insists otherwise, and will one day
reveal God, to whom alone belongs a judgment whose
justice is incomprehensible, as a God Whose justice is
most righteous and evident—provided only that in the mean¬
while we believe it, as we are encouraged to do by the
example of the light of grace explaining what was a
puzzle of the same order to the light of nature.
If such language as Luther employs above seems the height of
Christian pious hopes from the perspective of the theologian, these
words must appear as the worst obscurantism to the logician or the
epistemologist. Would it not be both advisable and proper to devise
a rationale incorporating the oppositions which Luther rather fancied
using?
All that is believed must be hidden. Yet it is not hidden
more deeply than under a contrary appearance of sight,
sense and experience. Thus, when God quickens, He
does so by killing; when He justifies, He does so by
pronouncing guilty; when He carries up to heaven, He
does so by bringing down to hell. . . .Thus God conceals
His eternal mercy and lo/ing kindness beneath eternal
wrath, His righteousness beneath unrighteousness.
Dillenberger has examined the way in which Erich Seeberg attempted
to make the principle of opposites programmatic in Luther's theology,
4






Dillenberqer, God Hidden and Revealed, 51-52.
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this emphasis back to Tauler and the via negativa. ^ Yet Seeberg him¬
self concluded that the deus absconditus and deus revelatus "are one in
2
thought and nature." Again, Karl Holl "defines hiddenness as a path
3
at the end of which lies revelation. "
Some scholars have attempted to find an esthetic path by which
to arrive at the revelation through hiddenness. What we have reviewed
earlier on the relations of words and things hardly enlightens our
present problem, but Marcia Colish, in her analysis of the epistemology
of Augustine makes these significant statements:
As figures of speech go, aenigmata are admittedly
difficult to grasp. But their very obscurity may also
enable them to function as accurate signs. For
Augustine, verbal signs, whether literal or figurative,
represent truly, if partially, really existing things. . . .
Metaphorical signification is far better suited to ex¬
press realities that are themselves intrinsically
obscure and difficult to understand. An aenigma, like
any other figure of speech, is designed to communicate
information. ^
This understanding through enigma as metaphor can be related to the
conclusion of Denis de Rougemont on the work of the artist who
"incarnates a reality": "It happens that the expression veils what is
^"Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, 46-47.
2
Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, 52.
3
Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, 57.
4
Colish, Language, 79. v. also the following page for more
comment on Augustine's appraisal of his use of paradoxes.
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expressed, while manifesting it at the same time to our senses."^
Professor Nathan A. Scott, Jr. , emerges from his inquiry into the problem
of Mystery with a quite mystical assessment:
The province of Mystery. . .is. . .the realm in which I
come to know the essential hiddenness of reality before
any finite exploration, and yet it is also a realm which
is suffused with a sense of encountering the things and
persons in my environment in the dimension of presence. ^
But both these types of analysis, the one of express scrutiny of the
Luther materials and the other of the general esthetic-literary probing
into the problem of hiddenness, miss the mark. It was not Luther's
intention by this clever device to resolve an issue which for him re¬
mained a matter of the Word of God, and of faith, not feelings or
thoughts. This excerpt from his commentary on the story of the
Canaanite woman recorded in Matthew 15 is a succinct summary:
This was written to comfort and teach us all to know
how deeply God hides his grace for us and how we
should cling, not to cur feelings or thoughts about Him,
but strictly to His Word. . . .For this reason our heart
must turn aside from such feelings and with firm faith
in God's Word seize and cling to the Yes deep and
hidden beneath and beyond the No, just as this woman,
and give God His due when He judges us. Then we have
won Him and caught Him in His own words. ^
The merits of Luther's insights here are affirmed by Paul Tillich's
Denis de Rougemont, The Christian Opportunity, trans. Donald
Lehmkuhl (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1963), pp. 88-89.
9
Nathan A. Scott, Jr. , The Broken Center (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966), p. 173.
n/V. A. 17/2, 203. Quoted in Harrisville, His Hidden Grace, 81.
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statements that Christ as the "New Being" is the "only paradox and the
source of all paradoxical statements in Christianity. " Further, "The
'offense' given by the paradoxical character of the Christian message
is not against the laws of understandable speech but against man's
ordinary interpretation of his predicament."''' Arthur C. Cochrane con¬
cludes that Karl Barth maintains "God is hidden to us because fellow¬
ship between God and man rests upon His grace. . . .God's hiddenness
2
signifies God's jusgment upon human perceptions and conceptions."
Dillenberger ascribes similar views to Paul Althaus in his studies of
3
hiddenness in Luther, especially the hiddenness in revelation.
By his attention to the problem of suffering, Paul Althaus
develops a final underscoring in this present sequence of reviews of
hiddenness, and provides a transition to our next major section. This
is Dillenberger's summary paragraph on Althaus:
The believer also recognizes God's hiddenness but he
recognizes God hidden in suffering. He sees God's
revelation behind his judgment, his "yes" hidden in
his "no. " Faith dares in the "strange work of God" to
see God's own true work hidden.^
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963), II, p. 92. For a somehat contrasting, but Christ-
including, Roman Catholic statement, v. Trophime Mouiren, The
Creation (London: Burns & Oates, 1962), p. 82.
o
Arthur C. Cochrane, The Existentialists and God (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 127-29.
3
Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, 58-59.
^Dillenberger, God Hidden and Revealed, 58.
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Clarification Through Strife III
The Schwarmer
There was no unanimity on such an understanding of the function
of experience as Luther set forth, and the group variously designated
"spirituals" or "Schwarmer" were insistent on a more direct derivation
of religious conclusions from the special position which they asserted.
As allegorization derived its force from the foregone conclusions of an
ontology based on idealism, and Erasmus1 brand of humanism espoused
an interpretation supported by the clarity of human linguistic and
philological knowledge, the Spirituals constructed their interpretive
citadel on the ground-works of the direct working of the Holy Spirit
upon them.
The very religious character of this opposing position made the
dialogue an extremely difficult one on both sides. Carre reports on
Melanchthon's diffidence in the early period of the confrontation:
Melanchthon was at first impressed by their knowledge of
the Scriptures, their claim to direct inspiration by the
Spirit, and their pretension to foretell the future by
means of visions. He f eared to condemn them lest he
might extinguish the Spirit and was greatly perturbed
over their arguments against infant baptism,
especially as they appealed to Luther's teaching in
support of their claims. *
The emphases of the sectarians on vital personal religion, on the
function of faith, on the necessary operation of the Holy Spirit, coupled
1 >*
Carre, Realists and Nominalists, 75.
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with their subsequent unfortunate history of persecution and martyrdom,
made them an opponent not so much formidable as elusive. Once the
differences were brought into the open the controversy raged bitterly,
very likely because of the strong personalities on both sides engaged
in the debates, and because of mutual intransigence, but aided and
abetted because of the mutual frustrations of communication. Although
not all the Spirituals were unlearned, there were many who had only the
rudest of intellectual equipment, and the special character of the
position seemed to cancel out viciously the earlier theological train¬
ing of the learned, so that common premises for conversation were
increasingly difficult to establish.
Whether or not the genealogical lines were known or recognized
by the Spirituals, they did have genetic roots in preceding major
movements of thought in the West. One of these ancestors must be
nominalism, not only because of its latent strength all through the
sixteenth century as a viable option, * but because of its character of
reaction to scholasticism with all that this involved. In labelling
universals "fictiones," the nominalists questioned the possibility of
a knowledge of things in themselves. There was a resulting disjunction
in the relation of words and things so that, as Dorner says, "words, as
"'"On this point v. Professor Torrance's summary, Theology
in Reconstruction, 179.
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the signs of thoughts, are in reality mere signs of signs. " * The re¬
action to this theological skepticism as we observe it in a man like
Ockham became either a taking refuge in the arbitrary authority of the
church or in emphasizing the alternative of an unreasoning faith or
fideism. Religious minds turned toward the practical and devotional
aspects of the Christian faith, as witness the Brotherhood of the
Common Life at Deventer, and the great mystical writers such as
2
Eckhart, Suso, and Ruysbroeck. The ultimate hazards of such a
/
position are indicated by Etienne Borne in a catalog of theological
monsters which includes "the nominalists of the fourteenth century,
enemies of reason, who introduced fideism into theology and put out
3
the eyes of faith, reducing it to a blind certitude. "
As to a humanism in the spirituals' views, mention of Deventer
in the preceding paragraph may remind us of the experiences of
Erasmus with the Brethren in his early life, so that we might expect
some line of descent through him. The nexus lies rather in something
of their own type of rationalism, in a strong ethical emphasis, and a
confidence in man's unique capacities more particularly in his religious
responsiveness. As tenuous as this argument of a connection may be,
^"Dorner, The Person of Christ, Div. 2, Vol. 1, 375.
2 >
Carre, Realists and Nominalists, 122.
3 '
Etienne Borne, Modern Atheism, trans. , S. J. Tester (London:
Burns & Oates, 1961), p. 88.
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we do nevertheless find an allegation of it in the term quoted by H. A.
Enno van Gelder from J. Lindeboom, "spiritualistic humanism. "
The strongest antecedent of the spirituals is mysticism.
Typically individualistic, this reactionary style of outlook, disgusted
with the aridities of so much of scholastic thought, like nominalism
sought to establish a purer religious base. Gilmore summarizes the
principal marks thus:
This tradition emphasized the reliance on immediate
divine guidance, the role of inspiration and the im¬
portance of the sanctified individual, whose extra¬
ordinary piety made manifest the operation of grace. ^
Fugitive strains of mysticism attached themselves to diverse movements
and individuals. The eminent philologist, John Reuchlin was attracted
3
to the esoteric matter and principles of the Jewish Cabbala. J. A.
Dorner ascribes this kind of quest to a sense of spiritual need:
The mind of the Western nations, dissatisfied with what
it possessed, turned its eyes in all directions, inquir¬
ing whence it could again draw the spiritual certainty
and joy which it had now lost.^
^H. A. Enno van Gelder, The Two Reformations in the 16th
Century (The Hague: Martinus Mijhoff, 1964), p. 252. The citation is
traced to J. Lindeboom, Een Franc-tireur der Reformatie, Sebastiaan
Frantk (1952): 15.
2
Gilmore, World of Humanism, 204.
3
Schwarz, Biblical Translation, 80-84. V. also Lewis W. Spitz,
The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 77.
^Dorner, The Person of Christ, Div. 2, Vol. 1, 377.
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Perhaps too much stress has been laid on the role of mysticism
in shaping the religious views of Martin Luther. He knew and loved the
great mystical writings of the age, particularly the German Theology,
which he rated so highly. His spiritual father, Staupitz, attempted to
aid Luther in his religious torments by the comforts which he himself
found in a practical mysticism, where "the experience of sweetness"
was a "sign of election; mysticism. . .the basis of certitude of salva¬
tion. Not only did Luther fail to find Staupitz's kind of calm assur¬
ance in mysticism, anything of those emphases was radically modified
before entering his personal world of piety.
The Schwarmer or "fanatics" with whom Luther engaged in so
much and such bitter controversies in the 15 20's bore the varied im¬
press of these late medieval movements. This diversity is inevitable
inasmuch as the constitution of the group is so fluid and covers so
wide a range. Carlstadt, the former colleague of Luther, moved into
this orbit, and to attendant criticism and ignominy. Zwingli came to
be reckoned in this number long before the Marburg Colloquy. The real
extremists, men like Muntzer, Storch and Zwilling seem more remote
because the engagement with them was more generalized and less of a
9
direct pamphleteering confrontation.
■'"Oberman, Forerunners, 140. V. also Roland H. Bainton, Here
I Stand (New York: Pierce and Smith, 1950), pp. 42-44.
2Luther, Am. Ed. XXXVII, 18, n. 14.
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With such a wide spectrum of personalities, generalizations
tend to be sadly overdrawn. The terms used by Copleston, however,
with reference to the mystics, do transfer rather adequately to the
Schwarmer. The key terms are "extension of the idea of experience"
and "speculative rationalization of religious experience."''' This con¬
cept is the basic principle alleged by Rupert E. Davies concerning
Zwingli's justification of his Biblical interpretation. Davies writes:
Zwingli replied that faith cannot be formed from the
words of the Bible, but that the latter are to be under¬
stood under the guidance of faith and must yield to
faith. . . .Thus the principle has emerged that faith is
the true interpreter of Scripture. ^
But this extension of subjectivity progresses yet further to take a place
prior to the Word. This is the critique of Regin Pren' ter in Spiritus
V
Creator, that the Schwarmer, according to Luther, turn the order of
3
outer and inner upside down. Prenter footnotes support for his con¬
clusion from Luther:
Das sie nicht zuvor aurchs eusserlich wort zum geyst
sondern zuvor aus dem geyst auff das eusserlich wort
komen. . . .Sie selbs sind besser und hoher denn die
Aposteln und wollens on eusserlich wort und on mittel
ynnwendig ym geist lernen, wilchs doch den Aposteln
nicht ist gegeber^ sondern dem eynigen son Ihesu
Christo alleyne.
^Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. 3, Pt. I, 194-95.
9
Rupert E. Davies, The Problem of Authority in the Continental
Reformers (London: The Epworth Press, 19 46), pp. 80-81.
9
Prenter, Spiritus, 254-55.
"^Luther, W. A. 18, 185.
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Gordon Rupp concurs in this judgment also and specifically apropos of
Zwingli, of whom he says
Though he did not deny the importance for faith of the
outward word of preaching, he so stressed the spiritual
character of communion with God, so detested the
thought that the Spirit could make use of outward and
physical media, that the sacraments for him became in¬
deed signs and pledges. *
The extreme development was to make the experience independent
of words or things. "The Schwarmer make the thing, that is, the
spiritual experience of faith, independent, and divorce it from outer
words" says E. Thestrup Pedersen. The head-on clash of ideas
precipitated by this point of view is set forth by Rupp, first citing
Muntzer's independent spiritual assertion:
The heart must be the footstool of God so that man can be
sure that God has certainly chosen him for His possession.
But before a man can be assured of this blessedness, there
come such water floods and such roarings of the same that
a man loses all desire to live. . .a man must not flee these
billows but masterfully ride them like a skilled navigator. . .
and thus his heart will be taken hold of by the true spirit
of Christ, the possessor of the soul.^
Then Luther in effectual response:
But when you ask these people how one comes by this lofty
Spirit, they don't point to the outward gospel, but up into
cloud cuckoo land, and they say, "Ah, yes, you must ex¬
perience what is called 'Waiting, ' like me, and then you
''"Rupp, Luther Today, 158.
^Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 425.
^Rupp, Luther Today, 142.
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will get it. Then a heavenly voice will come to you, and
suddenly (just like that!) God will be talking with you. 1
What emerges so significantly in these polemics is Luther's
sense that faith, in this kind of sinful world, must always be mediated
2
by the Word. In a trenchant aphorism recorded in the Table Talk,
Luther pointed to the implications of the cavalier treatment of the Word
by some of the Swiss reformers: "Definiunt verbum non secundum
3
dicentem Deum, sed secundum recipientem hominem." The undesir¬
able anthropocentrism was countered by a due regard for the Word of
the "dicentem Deum" of Luther:
Alss gross der ist der do spricht, sso gross mussen
wyr auch seyn wort achten. Es ist eyn wortt, das er
ynn sich selb spricht una ynn yhm bleibt, nymer von
yhm gesundert wirt. ^
Unmoved by such arguments "dieser geyst will nicht gleuben, was
Gotts wort sagt, sondern was er sihet und fillet.
This exaggeration and distortion of the subjective was most un¬
fortunate because it created reactions against a proper and needful
development in theological perspective. As Professor Torrance points
3Rupp, Luther Today, 142.
3Rupp, Luther Today, 160. Cf. W. A. 32, 339; 514. Luther,
Am. Ed. XL, 55.
3Luther, W. A., T. R. 3, 670, #3868.
4W. A. 10/1, 186.
SW. A. 18, 206. Cf. W. A. 36, 45, W. A. 37, 632.
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out the "transition from medieval to modern thought" involved a "transi¬
tion from a dialectical to a dialogical mode of thinking, and from think¬
ing of the relations of ideas to thinking to personal objectivity or
transcendence."^ Instead of developing the sense of the human sub¬
ject over against God as subject, the fanatics' "apocalyptic visions,
2
mystical illumination" were combined with the fact that they "mis¬
interpreted the Word spoken to them as the words of piety which they
3
spoke to themselves. " Thus they frightened many of the reformers into
a reaction in which even the proper work of the Holy Spirit through the
Word was not recognized. Let us grant the validity of Rupp's assertion,
"Only in the theology of Calvin, as in the theology of Luther, were the
twin concepts Word and Spirit reconciled in their providential harmony.
We must still reconcile this theoretical existence of a viable Reforma¬
tion pneumatology with the strange phenomenon that Prenter's Spiritus
Creator of 1946 began with the premise that Luther's doctrine of the
Holy Spirit had "the most infrequently"^ been dealt with as an
independent problem.
^Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 97.
2
Luther, Galatians, 7.
^Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 128.
4
Rupp, Luther Today, 108.
^Prenter, Spiritus, 9.
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In view of the oppositions of the letter to the spirit in the debate
with the Schwarmer on the interpretation of the rightly spiritual, it is
important to clarify one key concept in Augustine, who had said so
much to this point during his theological career. The question is,
what of Augustine and "illumination? " Is there any similarity between
his sometimes ambiguous development of this epistemological principle
and the "extension of experience" of the Schwarmer? The answer is a
thorough-going "No!" To say that the soul becomes aware of God
through "certain ideas, forms, or reasons, of things which are immut¬
able and constant. . . is not the same as saying that the soul gains a
direct knowledge of God, " writes Gordon Leff in his analysis. *
Augustine's exegesis stressed the priesthood and the Sacraments through
2
which the Spirit was present and active mediately, not immediately.
A rather lengthy quotation from the Confessions will point to the involved
process of Augustine's theory with its distinct emphasis on a functioning
of the body and the senses within their ascribed limitations, to the
completion of the illumination or vision:
And thus by degrees I was led upward from bodies to the
soul which perceives them by means of the bodily senses,
and from there on to the soul's inward faculty, to which
the bodily senses report outward things--and this belongs
even to the capacities of the beasts—and thence on up to
the reasoning power, to whose judgment is referred the
experience received from the bodily sense. And when this
^Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham
(London: The Merlin Press, 1959), p. 40.
2
Am. Ed. Companion Vol. , 158.
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power of reason within me also found that it was change¬
able, it raised itself up to its own intellectual principle,
and withdrew its thoughts from experience, abstracting
itself from the contradictory throng of fantasms in order to
seek for that light in which it was bathed. Then, without
any doubting, it cried out that the unchangeable was better
than the changeable. From this it follows that the mind
somehow knew the unchangeable, for, unless it had known
it in some fashion, it could have had no sure ground for
preferring it to the changeable. And thus with the flash of
a trembling glance, it arrived at that which is. And I saw
thy invisibility understood by means of the things that are
made.*
We are not concerned here to extricate Augustine from the
lacunae of his incomplete and highly metaphorical statements but rather
we must reenforce the charge, even more specifically enunciated, that
the Schwarmer were basically much more non-historical than Augustine.
We dare to say they were anti-historical. Not even the recurrent
emphasis on experience can absolve them of this responsibility, for
the experiences in which they gloried were non-historical. They were
apart from the human ministry, apart from the preached Word, isolated
from the physical elements in the Sacraments, immediate, not mediated,
therefore spiritual and not really involved in history.
This matter of experience set within history becomes a central
one in our analysis of the Schwarmer. In the preceding section of this
chapter we treated of Erasmus and his problem of accepting the strange
will of God, now we treat of the fanatics who have difficulty with the
strange works of God. As Erasmus attempted to avoid his problem by
'Augustine, Confessions vii. 17.
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insisting that God must work in a way conforming to man's observation
of history, that is, in a historicist fashion, our fanatics now seek to
avoid the problems posed by the Words and works of God in history by
a denial of history, an escape from its apparently ineluctable quality.
The matter does not only concern speculative problems, such as those
concerning the Sacraments, but the practical problems of the individual
lives of men.
The hardships encountered by the Schwarmer, ultimately to be
rejected by Catholics, Erasmians and other Protestants as well,
afforded ample opportunity for them to experience suffering and even
martyrdom for their cause. A truly historical view of faith must be able
to accept realistically the totality of life and to find a meaning within
the rigorous confines of lived life. The harshest test is adversity in
the form of physical trials and spiritual testings. For the Christian
man, the man of faith, a meaningful meeting of the adverse factors in
this life ought be met not with some Stoic tolerance, but with a response
related to faith.
The touchstone for our comparison of the Schwarmer and Luther
in their approach to the contingent ills of life is quite properly sub¬
sumed under Luther's special word, Anfechtung, applied so often by
him in his writings. Roland Bainton defines it:
The word he used was Anfechtung, for which there
is no English equivalent. It may be a trial sent by
God to test man, or an assault by the Devil to
destroy man. It is all the doubt, turmoil, pang,
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tremor, panic, despair, desolation, and desperation
which invade the spirit of man. *
Professor Rupp has appraised the difference between Muntzer and
Luther at this point:
He contrasts his own true view of faith with the pre¬
fabricated, "phony" faith of Wittenberg. At first sight
what he has to say seems to resemble Luther's own
"theology of the Cross" and his doctrine of Anfechtung.
For Muntzer, too, stresses the need for the Christian
to suffer temptation and tribulation. Perhaps Muntzer's
most characteristic text is the word from the Psalms:
"All thy waves and thy billows have gone over me. "
But while Muntzer stresses the immediacy of this ex¬
perience of tribulation, faith seems to come as an after¬
thought, rather than through the very experience itself
of Anfechtunq ; and though he stresses experience. . .he
takes refuge in obscurity when he comes to define how and
O
whence this faith comes.
In contrast to this tentativeness and ambiguity is the virtual pro¬
grammatic use of Anfechtung in Luther. The relation to other emphases
which we have described above is obvious: the element of hiddenness,
3
in that the life-giving act of God is hidden under the killing, and the
understanding comes through contrarieties. The nature, purpose and
profit of the experience is indicated in statements like this:
^Bainton, Here I Stand, 31. Cf. Rupp, The Righteousness of
God, 105, 235 ff.
^Rupp, Luther Today, 141.
^Cf. Luther's connection of the killing of the believer, his
descent into hell, and his resurrection together with Christ. W. A. 3,
431-32. Wilhelm Pauck notes in his editing of Luther, Lectures on
Romans, p. 42 how frequently Luther referred to I Sam. 2:6, "He kills
and makes alive. "
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Ibi adest promissio crucis. Qui vere adorant, habent
crucem vel tentationem a Satana, quia Satan non potest
hanc adorationem ferre. Et libet: Christum venisse,
sed: vicit Christus pro nobis. Ubi inveneritis locos,
dicta de iustificatione, hos diligenter observate, quia
Satan ut leo rugiens est inimicus huius articuli. . . .In
omnibus peccatis et tentationibus nititur, ut auferat hunc
articulum. ^
The threat of subjectivism in this concept was warded off by
Luther in two ways. The first was the emphasis upon the activity of
God in all this. As Rupp puts it: man is here the "subject of an
initiative and action from God who employs the whole of man's existence
2
as a means of bringing men to awareness of their need and peril. "
The second limitation stems from this first, and says "you must not
lay the cross and sorrow upon yourself." With such safeguards
Luther could apply this insight very directly to the whole of the life of
faith and to the work of interpreting:
Without it /Anfechtun£7 no man can rightly understand
the Holy Scriptures or know what the fear and love of
God is all about. In fact, without Anfechtung one does
not really know what the spiritual life is. ^
An outgrowth of this view on trials and sufferings was Luther's
doctrine of Vocation. A host of abuses of the principle of a regular call
Hv. A. 20, 746. Cf. Luther, Galatians, 18.
2
Rupp, The Righteousness of God, 106.
3
Luther, Lenker XII, 77.
SaT. A. , T. R. 4, #4777. Quoted in Reformation Studies:
Essays in Honor of Roland H. Bainton, ed. Franklin H. Littell (Richmond,
Va.: John Knox Press, 1962), p. 46.
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of the Holy Spirit through the Church gave Luther occasion to ponder the
implications of the calling. Carlstadt flagrantly violated all regular
structures for determining his role in the Reformation. The Zwickau
prophets' activities called forth a letter from Luther to Melanchthon,
written at the Wartburg January 3, 1522, urging Melanchthon to prove
the spirits, to see "whether they can prove their calling. " * The
Christians of Muhlhausen received this admonition from Luther in regard
to Muntzer:
The Holy Spirit doesn't "talk big" before doing any¬
thing: He really does things before talking about
them. . .when Muntzer says God and His spirit have
sent him like an apostle, let him prove it with signs
and wonders. I have never preached, nor do I wish
to preach where I have not been asked or called through
men to preach. ^
Gustaf Wingren has stated acutely the distinguishing marks of
Luther's own sense of calling:
Man's vocation is involved in this hiddenness of the
Christian life; in man's vocation the true "mortifica¬
tion" is to be carried through by God's will. There is
none of the saintliness prized by man in the work of
vocation.
As to his own situation, Luther was both positive and vocal:
But perhaps you will say to me, "why do you, by your
books, teach throughout the world, when you are only a
preacher in Wittenberg? " I answer, I have never wanted
^Enders, iii. 27 2.
^Rupp, Luther Today, 140.
3
Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation, trans. Carl C. Rasmussen
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), p. 248.
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to do it and do not want to do it now. I was forced and
driven into this position in the first place, when I had
to become Doctor of Holy Scripture against my will.
Then, as a Doctor in a general free university, I began
at the command of pope and emperor, to do what a doctor
is sworn to do, expounding the Scriptures for all the
world and teaching everybody. . . .1 cannot keep silent or
cease to teach, though I would like to do so and am weary
and unhappy because of the great and unendurable in¬
gratitude of the people. And even if I were not a Doctor,
I am, nevertheless, a regularly called preacher and may
teach my own people with my writings. . . .For I have
never pushed myself in or desired or asked that anyone
should read these writings, but have acted just like other
pious pastors and preachers. . . .They do not run and sneak
like these worthless, uncalled knaves into the offices of
others without the knowledge and consent of the pastors;
but they have a definite office and position by which they
are driven and compelled. *
This contrasting of the Schwarmer and Luther has ranged over a
number of key topics. The conclusions drawn above may seem simply
broad generalizations stemming from a cursory look at Luther's general
stance. Admittedly, the usual exegesis of the basic anti-fanatic texts
develops into a study of sacramental viewpoints and express inter¬
pretations of texts. To establish the validity of the foregoing analyses,
let us look at the evidence of one short document from the exchanges.
Luther's tract "That These Words of Christ, 'This is My Body, '
etc. Still Stand Firm Against the Fanatics," appeared early in 1527.
The numerous references to Zwingli and Oecolampadius seem to dis¬
qualify the piece as evidence of the Schwarmer controversy proper.
However, Luther evidently had in mind a large number of opponents
1Luther, Am. Ed. XIII, 66.
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when he wrote, and the two more moderate reformers are included as
sharing some of the fanatical views, even if they do not represent the
most extreme instances. We are informed by the editor that more than
two dozen writings had appeared between late 1524 and early 1527
opposing Luther's views on the Sacrament, and that Luther alluded to
eleven of these in our document, and knew of at least three more. 3
Critical and contemptuous, Luther alludes to the claims of a
special gift of the Spirit: "They think, when they dream something up,
2
it is forthwith the Holy Spirit. " Luther pillories the arrogant in¬
dividualism of Oecolampadius, who he asserts has claimed, "I,
3
Oecolampadius, say that the Scriptures are contradictory." The latent
rationalism of their arguments is countered throughout, and bluntly
labelled: "In the new interpretation of these spirits it means: 'Faith
must believe no more and no farther than one's eyes and fingers point
4
out to him and the reason can measure. " "However, if we should
judge the articles of our faith and the Scriptures according to our reason
and our eyes, as Oecolampadius does here, then indeed every point in
the Scriptures is in opposition to the other. " "Because your
1Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 5.
2Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 45.
3Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 51.
4Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 47.
5Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 49.
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reasoning is this: Whatever appears to you useless and unnecessary is
not true, just as Oecolampadius, like a know-it-all, says. .
Luther's emphasis on the central significance of the Scripture
text goes on and on like a set response in the antiphon. But the
fanatics "wish that men forthwith would praise them saying, 'Pure
2
spirit, pure spirit you are; pure truth, pure truth you teach!"'
One side must be of the devil, and God's enemy. There
is no middle ground. Now let every Christian see
whether this is a minor matter, as they say, or whether
God's Word is to be trifled with. Here you have the
fanatics and their spirit. I have often said, no ungodly
man can have a high regard for God's Word. These
fanatics demonstrate forthrightly that they regard the
words and works of Christ as nothing but human prattle,
like the opinions of academic hairsplitters, which ought
fairly to yield to love and unity. But a faithful Christian
knows clearly that God's Word concerns God's glory, the
Spirit, Christ, grace, everlasting life, death, sin and
all things. 3
So their appeal is, "You must love us along with the Scriptures; you
must believe us. We are certain of it without Scripture, and more cer-
4
tain than if the Scriptures said it. "
The striking emphasis on the Incarnation and especially the
problems posed to faith by the very historic humanity of Jesus Christ
indicate how Luther attempted to inject a more positive historical view
XLuther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 127
2
Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 22.
3
Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 26.
^Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 46.
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in the controversy. Although at times he could be agonizingly scholastic
in his analysis, Luther tended more to the simple assertions of the
historic faith, that the Lord Himself had come down from heaven and
taken on human flesh. The meanings here are not self-evident: "I can
say of God: Of what use is it that he is man? Why must one believe
such a difficult thing? "
How can it be true at one and the same time that God
is entirely present, personally and essentially, in
Christ on earth in his mother's womb, yes, in the crib,
in the temple, in the wilderness, in cities, in houses,
in the garden, in the field, on the cross, in the grave,
etc. , yet nonetheless also in heaven in the Father's
bosom? " ^
Because of the Scripture, faith can accept so incomprehensible a truth:
"O how very few there are even among the most learned who have ever
pondered this article concerning Christ so profoundly, or have ever be¬
lieved it so utterly incomprehensible that God should be man and man
should be God! But there stands the Scripture, and faith holds it to be
3
certain truth. " The impossibility of holding to the dictum "the flesh
is of no avail" in its anti-historical implication is castigated by
Luther:
Now you see what a mighty swarm of fanatics the saying
can stir up: "Flesh is of no avail. " It makes heaven and
earth too narrow for Christ's body and hounds him straight
out of heaven and out of the Spirit, though the fanatics
^Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 53.
^Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 61.
^Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 69.
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had spirited him thither as to a mighty fortress secured
with genuine iron walls, to keep him well protected from
dishonorable handling by knaves at the altar. *
In addition to the historical evidences of the Incarnation, Luther
points out the involvement of God as creator and provider:
Therefore, indeed, he himself must be present in every
single creature in its innermost and outermost being, on
all sides, through and through, below and above, before
and behind, so that nothing can be more truly present and
within all creatures than God himself with his power. . . .
He must make everything, both the parts and the whole.
Surely, then, his hand which makes all this must be
9
present; that cannot be lacking.
Again, it is the Word which binds God to be present, not alone in the
generalized sense, but for you:
I said above that the right hand of God is everywhere,
but at the same time nowhere and uncircumscribed,
above and apart from all creatures. There is a difference
between his being present and your touching. . . .It is one
thing if God is present, and another if he is present for
you. He is there for you when he adds his Word and binds
himself, saying, "Here you are to find me. " Now when
you have the Word, you can grasp and have him with cer¬
tainty and say, "Here I have thee, according to thy Word."
Just as I say of the right hand of God: although this is
everywhere, as we may not deny, still because it is
also nowhere, as has been said, you can actually grasp
it nowhere, unless for your benefit it binds itself to you
and summons you to a definite place. This God's right
hand does, however, when it enters into the humanity
of Christ and dwells there. There you surely find it,
otherwise you will run back and forth throughout all
creation, groping here and groping there yet never finding,
1Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 84.
2Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 58.
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even though it is actually there; for it is not there for
you.
The name-calling, accusations and recriminations generously
dashed throughout Luther's writings against the Schwarmer have been
the grounds for many judgments that Luther revelled here in the opportunity
to be his gross, coarse German peasant self. Admittedly the language
is harsh, and even in maintaining that he did not enjoy the task Luther
employs terms both coarse and ungracious, but if we accept his asser¬
tions at face value he did not enlist for the chore, he was drafted and
forced to make the defence. Thus, prefaced with an appeal to God Him¬
self, Luther writes: "God knows, I write about such difficult matters
with great reluctance, for it is destined to reach such dogs and pigs.
But what am I to do about it? The fanatics must bear the responsibility
2
for pushing me to it. "
We draw to a close here this section on these three major areas
of controversy illustrative of the hermentical options considered by
Luther. The realm of polemics tends to be an inadequate representa¬
tion of theological points of view. A controversial figure raises an
issue not too germane to the problem, but his objections must be
countered. Public support or condemnation develop along highly
passionate partisan lines which distract from the central concerns.
1Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 68-69.
2Luther, Am. Ed., XXXVII, 68.
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Thus we have portrayed Luther's positions here in the main from a
negating point of view, although we have attempted to suggest as well
certain unique positive stresses which emerged through each representa¬
tive polemic. Our central thesis, however, remains to be developed as
a positive, distinctive and invigorating factor in the Wittenberg
hermeneutic. Before we make these constructive statements we must
look briefly at the relation of Melanchthon to the polemical confronta¬
tions .
CHAPTER IV
THE HERMENEUTICS OF MELANCHTHON
PROGRESS AND POLEMICS
Personal History
We must begin with some brief sketching of the relevant per¬
sonal characteristics of Philip Melanchthon. As the very title of
Clyde Manschreck's excellent biography indicates, Master Philip
was indeed "Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer.""'' This brilliant,
scholarly man, who was to be the responsible and highly regarded
colleague of Martin Luther and his rel uctant heir to the leadership of
the Wittenberg reformation, was by all his instincts shy and withdrawn.
We must not judge him as timid, but we see no pugnaciousness in him.
He could be dogged, but he did not desire to precipitate controversy.
He was confident of his proper abilities, but not forward to speak of
himself, his experiences, or his inner life. The limited number of
biographies of Melanchthon have a far different tone than do the myriad
of Luther biographies. Even Melanchthon's partisans tend to be more
restrained, and his enemies have hardly developed the vitriolic angers
"''Clyde Leonard Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer
(New York: Abingdon Press , 1958).
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of Luther's opponents. We must recognize from the outset that our
search for clues to any subjectivity or legitimate subjective element in
the work of the Preceptor will be more limited in scope than the Luther
segment of this study. We find typically in the Melanchthon corpus
the evidence of the reserved person, who writes with scholarly pre¬
cision. It would be easy, but we contend erroneous, to assume that
here was an austere, detached, non-subjective, totally objective
theologian at work.
Our first point of difficulty and reward is in the establishment
of the personal religious development of the man. We have less in¬
dication of any great spiritual crisis here than we do even in the case
of John Calvin. There is absolutely nothing in his religious develop¬
ment which approximates the storm and stress of Luther's monastic
years or his Turmerlebnis. * The rather bland assumption seems to be
that Melanchthon accepted his religious convictions largely at second¬
hand from Luther, after the two began to collaborate at the University
of Wittenberg. This is a demeaning judgment, and hardly qualifies
Melanchthon for the role he played, or the immense confidence Luther
placed in him.
Melanchthon's home offered him the solid, but undramatic
advantage of piety. The deaths of his father and grandfather, separated
*Peter F. Barton, "Die exegetische Arbeit des jungen
Melanchthon 1518/19 bis 1528/29," Archiv fur Reformations-
geschichte, LIV, (Heft 1, 1963), 57.
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by a very short time during Philip's childhood, seem to have been dis¬
turbing to him, but not traumatic. There was no family influence like
that of the ebullient and dominating, very-much-alive Hans Luther on
the sensitive Martin. Perhaps because of this, no Erik Erikson has
attempted to plumb Master Philip's Freudian depths. Nevertheless,
there was a man there of passion, if not of passions, of strength, if
not of raw power, of genuine warmth without the affability of Luther. It
is a tribute to the stature of the younger man that he could perceive the
contrasting qualities in his leader, appreciate their potential, but not
indulge himself in undue envy or self-deprecation.
We have often heard the dramatic tradition of Luther's discovery
of the Bible, chained to its lectern. Manschreck's account of young
Melanchthon and his Bible is less dramatic, but highly revealing of
the serious concerns of this classics scholar long before his contact
with Wittenberg and Luther. While Melanchthon was studying at
Tubingen his great-uncle John Reuchlin came often to visit him. This
happened:
A gift from Reuchlin at this time was cherished by
Melanchthon the rest of his life—a Latin Bible. During
church services when the priest was discoursing, or
piously relating a fable about some saint or telling how
the wooden soles of the Dominicans' sandals came from
the tree of knowledge, Melanchthon would be reading
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Scripture. More than once he was reprimanded for reading
his Bible in church ! 1
So much stress has been laid on the humanist forces brought to
bear in the shaping of Melanchthon's thinking that there is little
awareness of his receptivity to other strains of later medieval culture.
Thus, Melanchthon had studied the pre-Lutheran reformer John Wessel,
before he met Luther. Of those writings, critical of the papal,
institutional church and eager for a restoration of the pristine apostolic
church, Melanchthon's judgment was that they were very good, and in
2
that judgment Luther later was to concur heartily. Again, there is no
general recognition of any influence of the mystics on Master Philip.
Robert Stupperich comments that "on the way which he traveled, he
did not come into contact with this world of spiritualization and in-
3
wardness." Yet, in his funeral oration for Luther, Melanchthon made
this astounding appraisal of mysticism by incorporating two of its
luminaries among the great successors of the apostles:
After the apostles comes a long line, inferior, indeed,
but distinguished by the divine attestations: Polycarp,
Irenaeus, Gregory of Neocaesarea, Basil, Augustine,







Melanchthon, "Funeral Oration over Luther, " The Protestant
Reformation, ed. Lewis W. Spitz (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 70.
246
Personal Piety
We may gather documentation to describe quite specifically the
healthy personal piety of Melanchthon. It was Christocentric: "This
province of debate was first undertaken for no other reason than that
it might be made known openly what a great difference there is between
the old theology, that of Christ, and the new Aristotelian doctrine.
In near-mystical terms he describes the relationship:
For the Spirit loves his moments of repose in which he
penetrates our hearts and takes possession of us in a
manner most eager, not for glory, but for ascertaining the
truth. That spouse, beloved of Christ, does not stand
forth in the doorway, but leads her spouse into the house
of her mother. Neither do any rays of celestial wisdom
shine forth through us unless beforehand we have been
purified by the cross and are "dead to the basic elements
of the world. " ^
Again, and very, very piously put: "I shall show just what we who have
3
been washed in the blood of Christ actually owe to Paul. " In a
similar vein: "To know Christ consists not only in possessing a know¬
ledge of his mighty acts but in embracing his grace with a thankful
mind."
In the baccalaureate theses which Melanchthon defended in
'''Philip Melanchthon, Selected Writings, ed. Elmer Ellsworth








September, 1519, we observe very Luther-an notes in such statements
as these:
6. The law, therefore, causes us even to hate God.
9. Therefore the gracious act of Christ is righteousness.
12. The intellect can give assent to no given proposition
without reason or experience. *
Melanchthon was called on to resolve the difficulty of the relatedness
of mind or reason and faith. His reflections on this problem are a
major theme throughout his works. In the sad hour following Luther's
death he could appraise the contribution of that great figure to this
recurring problem, and attest his own acceptance:
He also showed what the true worship of God is: and
/"he/ recalled the church from /the/ heathenish
superstition which imagined that God is worshipped,
even though the mind, agitated by some academic
doubt, turns away from God. He bade us worship in
faith and with a good conscience, and led us to the one
Mediator, the Son of God.
In this case, Melanchthon made a quite personal statement as to what
his commitment to Christ had involved for him:
In my case, to be sure, after I surrendered my mind to
him to be shaped, I know full well what he has done.
And would that all would prefer to try this out for them¬
selves rather than put confidence merely in my words. . . .
For Christian doctrine alone is efficacious for inciting
and inspiring our hearts, a thing which the apostles
confessed when they called the philosophy of Christ the
'''Melanchthon, Writings, 17.
2
Spitz, The Protestant Reformation, 71.
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word of eternal life; Christ alone is the life and the
truth and the light and the way. *
Shortly before he died, the man who had given up so much of
earthly comforts and rewards to stay with the evangelical cause in
Wittenberg wrote these simple words of hope, stating why he was not
afraid to die:
You will be redeemed from sin,
And set free from cares and from the fury of theologians.
You come to the light, you will look upon God and his Son,
You will understand the wonderful mysteries
Which you could not comprehend in this life:
Why we were so made, and not otherwise,
And in what the union of the two natures in Christ consists.
With Melanchthon, as with Luther, personal religious experience
was extended into the entirety of his Biblical exegesis and his theology.
Peter Fraenkel points out how Melanchthon insisted that the creation
3
was not to be seen in itself, but must be seen "pro me. " The
4
Scripture was to be read for its message of justification. Melanchthon
reproduced Luther's sense of the living word, from God Himself:
Porro necessaria causa est, cur officii mentionem
faciat, ut ecclesia sciat doctrinae Pauli credendum





Peter Fraenkel, "Revelation and Tradition, " Studia Theologica,
XIII (No. 2, 1959), 130. Fraenkel's primary sources are W. A. 5, 25,
and C. R. 13, 7Iff.
4C. R. 1, 638.
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allegat auctoritatem Dei: "Locutus est dominus Deus
cunctos sermones hos etc."3
Professor Fraenkel has made a weighty point of the way in which
Melanchthon stressed this dynamic element in his exposition:
What is true of "ministerium" is largely true of "doctrina. "
This term, too, has as it were a tendency to become a
verbal noun. . . .Even where doctrina means doctrinal sub¬
ject matter, Melanchthon frequently couples it with verbs,
verbal nouns or other nouns to show the subject matter
"at work. "3
When we combine this stylistic subtlety with the open mention of the
Word as the act of God we are strongly impressed with the close re¬
lationship of the views of our two reformers. To highlight this
awareness Fraenkel set this thesis for the monograph from which we
have quoted:
It will be our contention here that for Melanchthon the
propositional form of the Gospel is the manifestation of
those very things that modern historians have not been
able to find there: the Gospel's more than rational,
active character, its mediation of grace and power of
conversion, the self-revelation and saving presence of
God.3
If we are willing to accept Ernst Bizer" s conclusion that Melanchthon
had arrived at a Lutheran understanding of the promise of the gospel
1Melanchthon, S. A., V, 57, cf. IV23, 196, 337.
2
Fraenkel, Studia Theologica, XIII, No. 2, 116-17.
^Fraenkel, Studia Theologica, XIII, No. 2, 100.
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toward the end of the Matthew Commentary"'' we must recognize the
commentary on Romans, the first Loci Communes and the subsequent
works of Melanchthon to be outgrowths of this evangelical understand¬
ing.
Clarification Through Strife I
As we have noted, historians have been unduly vague as to the
personal element in Melanchthon's religious outlook. However, they
have compensated by a quite precise judgment that Melanchthon was
an over-zealous traditionalist, concerned over preserving the traditions
of the fathers, and equally concerned that the Reformation theology be
perpetuated in sharply etched form. In his book, Testimonia Patrum,
Peter Fraenkel has given a more positive cast and a more critical
9
stance to Melanchthon's use of the fathers. In our present venture
we are especially impressed with the unique role which Augustine
played in Melanchthon's theological studies. Master Philip had taste
preferences different from Luther's in his selections from the wealth of
the Augustine corpus, and he may in some cases have been unwisely
impressed by certain elements in that earlier theology. Henning
■'"Ernst Bizer, Theologie der Verheissunq, (Neukirchen-Vluyn:
Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1964), p. 287.
2
Peter Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum, The Function of the
Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon (Geneve:
Gregory Lounz, 1961).
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Lindstrom is convinced that some of the dubious psychological con¬
clusions drawn by Melanchthon "did not happen without the influence of
Augustine. " *
From our studies we are convinced that the typically negative
critique of Franz Hildebrandt is improperly drawn: "A man of
Melanchthon's calibre, just because he has no speculative talent and
no genius of originality, must show himself particularly anxious about
2
the 'recte tradere'. " On the contrary we say that Melanchthon chose
not the tradition as such, but the faithfulness to the gospel as the
criterion:
Haec persuasio occupavit etiam magnam partem ecclesiae,
postquam evangelium non est pure traditum. Porro plena
impietatis sunt doctrina, cultus et invocatio apud dubi-
tatores istos. Ac profecto quantum habeat mali ilia
dubitationis doctrina, peritae et piae mentes iudicare
possunt. 3
Melanchthon accepted the controversial and unpopular consequences
of this insight, as recorded in the Annales Vitae:
Ioanni Hesso scribit et reprobat transsubstantiationem,
distinguit inter theologiam biblicam et scholasticam,
defendit suam docendi rationem ad adversariis notatam,
et contendit, scripturam sacram solam condere articulos
fidei, earn Conciliis esse superiorem, neque contra earn
audiendam esse Pontificem Romanum, neque audiendam
"'"Henning Lindstrom, Skapelse och Fralsning i Melanchthons
Teologi (Stockholm, Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bok Forlag,
1944), p. 161.
2
Franz Hildebrandt, Melanchthon, Alien or Ally (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1946), pp. 10-11.
3
Melanchthon, S. A., V, 36.
252
traditionem ecclesiasticam. *
The onus for the corruption of doctrine falls directly on the
scholastics, who distort to absurdity:
Ergo omnino repudianda est interpretatio scholasticorum,
quia detrahit iustificationem fidei et transfert in dilectionem
et iustificationem reddit incertam, quia addit fidei
conditionem nostrae dilectionis. Et vide, quam sit
absurda interpretatio! ^
Philosophy deceives, and corrupts evangelical doctrine:
Et admiscuerunt doctrinae Christianae philosophiam, qui
rationi tribuerunt vim efficiendae in nobis fidei erga
Deum sine Spiritu Sancto. Et quidam scripsit fundamenta
doctrinae Christianae Platonicam philosophiam esse. Sic
pro certis affirmare, immo quae prorsus sunt extra iudicium
rationis aut philosophiae posita, ea est inanis deceptio.
Et sicut in lege praeceptum est, ne quis dissimile semen
serat in eodem agro, cavendum est, ne commisceantur
evangelii doctrina et philosophia; sed evangelium est
doctrina vitae spiritualis et iustificationis coram Deo.^
Against such a philosophical-intellectual knowledge Melanchthon
argues for the function of faith. The apostle Paul, he contends
rightly accomodates the statement of faith, and witnesses
that he understands by faith not only a historical know¬
ledge, but a trust by which we firmly believe that our sins
are forgiven for Christ's sake. Nor, indeed, can anyone
who does not thus understand the word "faith" follow the
reasoning of Paul. . .Right now this darkness is to our
adversaries a special impediment to their accepting the
doctrine of faith, because they do not rightly understand
the word "faith. "^
^C. R. 1, cl. Annales Vitae Mel.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 99.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 241.
^Melanchthon, Writings, 166, cf. Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 381.
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The cherished method of allegorizing then fell under Melanchthon's
rigorous criticism. The method is both profitless and improper to the
simple understanding of Scripture:
De scholasticis non est, ut multis agam, quibus divinae
literae, quidvis sunt potius quam simplices, immo nescio
quern Proteum fingunt, dum eas in allegoricos, tropologicos,
anagogicos, literales, grammaticales, historicos sensus
transformant et transfundunt in nescio quas lacunas.
In reference to these, it was not the duty of an ordinary
man to trifle about the four senses in almost every individual
syllable. Nor has it shamed bold men to play games in so
serious a matter and in them to vie in various opinions when
no such thing ought to have been done, except when some¬
thing that was both sure and very simple according to the
figures of grammarians and rhetoricians should have been
brought forth, as Erasmus advises in his method. Or, as
the Greeks say, one thing should have been compared with
another. For Scripture has not been produced in order that
it may not be understood. Rather, the merciful Spirit of God,
who is light, did this that it might be understood in common
by all the pious. Let praise depart, if any praise there be,
from the philosophers of obscurity, the Spirit of God arrogates
this praise to himself, in that he equally well both instructs
the tender and unpolished and gives each of the most
brilliant a workout. Saint Augustine, a man of both singular
genius and great experience in sacred matters, said that the
apostle does not desire a man of acute understanding, but
only an attentive hearer. 2
Melanchthon, like Luther, tolerates the judicious use of
allegory, as his theoretical statements and his occasional practice
indicate, but he is rigid in his qualifications:
In passages of this type it is necessary to allegorize,
but one must do so with prudence. For as touches
allegories even great authors often talk with more than




puerile non-sense. Nor do they admit of the allegorical
interpretation except that the rites and duties were
handed down in this respect, that they were to be signs
of other things; that the sacrifices of the Levitical high
priest have been handed down in this respect to typify
the sacrifice of Christ.
Unless an individual is thoroughly conversant with
the whole of Scripture he will unsuccessfully treat of
allegories. But moreover the Spirit will easily judge,
nay more, common sense will tell you how far and to what
degree, the use of allegories is permissible. However
they lead to an understanding of the power of the law and
the gospel, provided they are fitly used. ^
Clarification Through Strife II
Melanchthon's favorable comment on the method of Erasmus in
a previous citation is the kind of relation we would expect from him in
view of his notable humanist training and apparent leanings. Although
the breach between the two men was not as notorious as that between
Luther and Erasmus we must realize that Philip's simple presence and
association throughout his career with the Wittenbergers separated him
effectively from both Reuchlin and Erasmus. The tempered expression
of his differences with the leading humanists of this time may be
attributed to Melanchthon's temperament, it may well be also that in
his own acknowledged competence in the liberal arts he was not
troubled by the least sense of inferiority. To say that Erasmus sought
to be a Christian humanist while Melanchthon considered himself a
'''Philip Melanchthon, The Loci Communes of Philip Melanchthon,
trans. Charles Leander Hill (Boston: Meador Publishing Company,
1944) , pp. 129-30.
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humanist Christian may suggest the basic difference between the two.
We contend that there was a deep, substantial difference, clearly re¬
vealed in Melanchthon's writings, a difference which parallels that
which we marked in the earlier comparison of Erasmus and Luther. Thus,
although the precise mode of expression may be quite different, we
would disagree entirely with the too-typical, too-trite statement of
Erwin L. Lueker:
Melanchthon's rationalism shows itself in rational proofs
for the Scriptures, proofs for God, the combination of
logical, impersonal, and living Biblical characteristics
in his God thoughts. It is interesting to note that while
Luther often found paradoxes in the Scriptures and
problems which he admittedly could not solve, such
admissions, at least as far as I have been able to ascer¬
tain, are rare in Melanchthon. Yet Melanchthon did not
intend to place reason above revelation, but he thought of
taking reason into the service of revelation. *
Over against the Erasmian picture Melanchthon argues that the
Scriptures are clear and understandable. This he states in defending
Luther against the Paris theologians:
If you will deny that the meaning of Scripture by itself is
certain without glosses, I do not see why it was necessary
that Scripture be produced if the Holy Spirit was unwilling
to establish with certainty what he wants us to think. Or
why do the apostles invite us at all to the study of
Scripture, if its meaning is uncertain? . . .Therefore, you
will grant me that the meaning of Scripture is certain and
clear, so that if any passage anywhere is rather obscure,
Scripture itself explains itself.^
^Erwin L. Lueker, "Luther and Melanchthon, " Concordia




History has shown that men do not accept such a clear sense, but
rather Melanchthon "saw that the authority of Scripture was being
everywhere diminished by human decrees. Not only were things human
compared with the divine but even seemed to be preferred. " ^
Melanchthon asserts flatly what we are today probing as a very
sophisticated problem, the nature of human language itself. To him,
this is further proof that man could get the message:
For since God wills to reveal himself and his purposes
in the language of prophets and apostles, it is not to
be imagined that that language is as ambiguous as the
leaves of the Sibyl, which, when disturbed, fly away,
the sport of the winds . ^
Nevertheless, such clarity does not rule out the mystery and
the hiddenness. In an unusually long set of notes on I. Cor. 13:12,
we find some of the most incisive treatment of this problem by
Melanchthon. These are some of the key affirmations:
Sunt speculum et aenigma. Speculum est cognitio,
aenigma est forma Dei obscura, qua cognoscitur. Speculum
seu cognitio est fides non ilia sophistica, sed ea, quae in
corde est, verax, quae glorificat Deum, hoc est: timet, et
in fiducia misericordiae seu gratiae Dei gubernat nos. . . .
Quod dicit: "in aenigmate, " designat illius fidei verbum,
illius cognitionis formam, qua cognoscitur Deus, sed
- obscurum verbum est; voco verbum fidei et Dei id, quod
efficax est spiritu Dei in cordibus nostris. . . .Adhuc formae
illae Dei sunt obscurae, quia non comprehenduntur totae.^
'''Melanchthon, Writings, 48.
^Spitz, The Protestant Reformation, 72.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 73.
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The word "hidden" may be ambiguous by itself in Melanchthon's state¬
ment that "This Son of God announced the hidden wonderful news of
Incarnation, redemption, grace and salvation for man first to Adam and
1
Eve. " What follows however, is a lengthy statement on Christ's re¬
lation to the external, or preached Word, where we would have to utilize
the whole concept of hiddenness, in view of Luther's emphasis.
Employing the prerogative of his familiarity and his own great love for
his spiritual leader, Melanchthon could say in his parting words over
Luther that God had worked in a strange way through this man. "Over
against these enemies God set this mighty destroyer. In vain do they
find fault with God. Moreover, God does not govern the church by
human counsels; nor does he choose instruments very like those of
men." God's hidden work, the opposite, is stated more formally by
Melanchthon, but the life by death motif is still there: "How much
more truly does Paul teach that human souls are terrified and slain by
3
the law, but made alive by the Spirit of Christ. "
Now such questions are very difficult for man to deal with, and
how shall he confront them?
Quamquam autem multae quaestiones adhuc haerent in
hoc negotio, tamen, ut dixi, fas sit aliqua nescire
homines, et profecto modus ac finis aliquis
^Melanchthon, Christian Doctrine, 14; cf. Melanchthon, S. A. ,
IV, 204.
2





disputationum esse debet. Et multo satius est exerceri
animos timore et fide quam speculationibus sapientiae
Dei, cum ideo Christus nobis propositus sit, ut peccata
nostra et ipsius misericordiam consideremus nec scrutemur
alia. *
In a similar vein a little farther on, Melanchthon said:
Vide autem, quomodo revocat eos ad promissionem!
Iubet hanc apprehendere; non iubet arcanum consilium
praedestinationis inquirere. Ita praemunit lectorem
prop°sita promissione, antequam accedit ad disputationem/' O
de electione. c
It is proper to respond in adoration rather than by understanding, since
some of the profound teachings resist human grasp: "Adorari et credi
volunt sublimia de trinitate, de providentia, de incarnatione verbi
3
mysteria, rationibus humanis penetrari non volunt. " It is noteworthy
that Melanchthon opened his Loci Communes, that work so often re¬
viled as a rationalizing statement, with the same caveat. In the
Introduction to the 1521 edition we have the admonition: "Mysteria
4
divinitatis rectius adoraverimus quam vestigaverimus. " The 1555
edition has no change in tone:
For those who fear God, this reminder should be enough.
We are to consider this truly wondrous mystery with
humble hearts and pray that God himself will teach and
enlighten us. We are not to waste time with inpertinent
"''Melanchthon, S. A., V, 258.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 259.
3
C. R. 1, 313; Cf. Melanchthon, S. A. , IV, 408, 444.
^Melanchthon, S. A., Il/l, 6.
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questions, as unfortunately, we have done too often.
Clarification Through Strife III
Melanchthon was not so furiously involved with the Schwarmer
as was Luther, but he had strong opinions in the matter and expressed
them bluntly. According to Stupperich, Melanchthon revealed in his
popular History of Thomas Muntzer that
his own conviction remained firm: everything that bore
the semblance of spiritualism he bluntly rejected. The
judgment that he had formed of the Zwickauers and
fanatics he later carried over into his views of the
Baptists. ^
One of the primary charges against them was the same as that against
scholastics and humanists, that is, that they depended too much on
reason. The mysteries of God, Melanchthon charged against Zwingli,
3
were made subject to reason. In his tract, Against the Anabaptists,
Melanchthon asserted that they preferred their poor reasoning to the
Scripture: "Not often do they cite the Scriptures, but for the most part
4
rely upon reasoning, and this reasoning is indeed quite inconsistent. "
This amounts to a contempt of the Word and its ministry.
"''Melanchthon, Christian Doctrine, 36.
2
Stupperich, Melanchthon, 58-59.
^C. R. 23, 749. Cited by Peter Fraenkel, Studia Theologica,




Nos autem sciamus hos "pedes" amandos esse et apud
nuntios evangelii consolationem et vitam quaerendam
esse. Et quia his traditur ordo, quomodo fides
concipiatur, habemus testimonium adversus fanaticos
spiritus, qui contempto ministerio verbo volunt
sanctificari per alias quasdam illuminationes. ^
Melanchthon stood firm on his asseveration that the Holy Spirit
2
worked through the Word, and not apart from it. He was not impressed
with the fanatics' claim, their dream, as he put it, that the Spirit was
3
given without the Word. He charged that this was subjectivism,
4
"confidence in one's innate ability" and that the "enthusiasm of the
Zwickau men rested on self-stimulation and self-deception."^ Such
attitudes should not be regarded as holy acts, but rather as breaches
of the first commandment in self-love.
The spirituals were noted for their claim to superior and
sovereign experiences, but Master Philip contends that these were not
deep enough to be weighty considerations, for "they do not yet know
7
how hard it is to stand before God without God's Word. " This
"''Melanchthon, S. A., V, 275, cf. V, 65.
2
.Melanchthon, S. A., V, 273.
3







Luther, Correspondence, II, 477.
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argument is adduced against Oecolampadius on the Sacrament:
But these absurd arguments will be less offensive to
him who remembers that a judgment about heavenly
things must be made in accordance with the Word of
God, and not geometry, and who has learned through
being tempted that there is no reasoning which can in¬
struct a conscience satisfactorily when it has abandoned
the Word of God. *
Although Melanchthon does not so commonly use the term Anfechtung as
does Luther, his writings are simply dotted with reference to the con¬
cept, as may be noted in the preceding citation. Knowledge of God,
he maintains, is not to be otiosa cogitatio, but that developed out of
all the terrors of Anfechtung. Thus:
Interea his ipse motus fidei in animis nostris, non est
otiosa cogitatio, sed luctatur cum terroribus peccati,
cum morte, dimicat cum diabolo, qui horribilibus modis
oppugnat infirmas mentes, ut vel ad conten?tum Dei, vel
O ^
ad desperationem eas impellat.
Melanchthon views afflictions as veritably programmatic to knowledge,
as we gather from this type of statement: "They are afflicted in various
ways so that by prayer their faith, their knowledge of God, and their
3
spiritual newness may increase. " Even the term Sacrament may be
applied to the experience, by this reasoning: "Affliction is a sacrament,
for it is a thing to which God has joined the Word by which he promises
'''Melanchthon, Writings, 127.
2C. R. 15, 515.
3
Melanchthon, Writings, 173; cf. Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 69.
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his grace. "*
Melanchthon's view of Anfechtung incorporates the life from
death theme we observed above. Note here:
Et "mortificatio" intelligi debet de seriis terroribus
et doloribus, videlicet de vera poenitentia et de veris
afflictionibus.
Sed hi terrores opprimerent atque occiderent nos, nisi
sustentarentur atque erigerentur animi promissione
Christi. Ita Paulus proprie appellat mortificationem
terrores, qui mortem afferunt, nisi evangelio erigatur
animus.
Stupperich calls attention to a touching personal response in the latter
years of life of the great Master. In contemplating the domestic sorrow
over the death of his daughter Anna, he considered how, in Stupperich's
words:
Misfortune never happens by chance, but is God's will.
If man is visited by misfortune, God does not mean to
destroy him but to call him to repentance and faith.
Therefore, faith takes refuge in God and says with Job:
"Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him.
In a formal, systematic way as well, as in the 1555 Loci, Melanchthon
urged bearing tribulation unto repentance and the exercise of faith. ^
One of the areas of God's testing is that of vocation.
'''Melanchthon, Writings, 105.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 235.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V. , 202.
4
Stupperich, Melanchthon, 123.
^Melanchthon, Christian Doctrine, 286-295.
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To vocation pertain many of the typical characteristics of Anfechtung:
harshness, uncertainty, the necessity of faith and the possibility of
growth. Here are some examples of Master Philip's comments:
Nos sciamus hunc arcanum cultum Dei longe praestantiorem
esse, sc. fiduciam misericordiae in vocatione et in tenta-
tionibus omnis generis. Hunc cultum exercere christiani
praecipue debent; ita enim crescat in eis notitia Dei. ^
I have been brought to Saxony. Here I will do my duty until
the Holy Spirit to whom I shall commit myself shall call me
away. I have such a love for my native land as the gods
might envy; but in all things I must consider the call of
O
Christ, rather than my own inclination.
There were other difficulties for Melanchthon than the physical separa¬
tion from his homeland. Apparently he declined a doctorate because of
his reluctance to accept the deadly responsibility which Luther main¬
tained was the essential nature of the oath to teach the Word in purity
3
against all odds. Ernst Bizer reports a quite credible account of
Melanchthon's desire to escape the responsibility of Scriptural
exegesis:
Nach dem Abschluss der Vorlesung uber das Johannesevan-
gelium hatte Melanchthon den Wunsch, die theologischen
Vorlesungen einzustellen; er sei ihnen nicht gewachsen
und komme sich dabei vor wie ein Esel in den Mysterien,
es gebe genug theologische Lektoren in Wittenberg und
"''Melanchthon, S. A., V, 154.
2
James William Richard, Philip Melanchthon: The Protestant
Preceptor of Germany (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898), p. 67.




er eigne sich besser fur den "kindlicheren"
griechischen Unterricht. ^
Luther, as usual, dissuaded him from such a step and persuaded him to
continue, consistent with his appraisal that Melanchthon was "called
9
of God" and that he performed "the ministry of the Word. "
In more confident hours, his witness to the reality of vocation
was incisive: "Sic nos a Deo missi sumus ut Moses et alii prophetae;
fidite, nostra praedicatio. . .Dei voluntas et Dei verbum est, quod
3
nuntiamus. " Similarly he could accept for the minister of the Word
4
the promise, "Do verba mea in ore tuo." But this meant, as against
the Schwarmer, that Philip was claiming the unique grace of vocation
and further insisting that the spirituals wrongly denied the efficacy of
5
a human ministry. This, moreover, is to reaffirm the concretness of
God's working through men in history. Fraenkel makes a seminal and
provocative comment on such an interpretation of the office:
But most frequently of all "ministerium" is quite clearly
an activity, function or process. Sometimes it is quite
generally the process by which God reveals Himself
and gives His grace to us by external means. More
often it is the activity of Gospel preaching and teaching,
either specifically or as a paradigm for the whole of
^Bizer, Theologie der Verheissunq, 288.
O
^■Luther, Correspondence, I, 58.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 103.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 100.
^Fraenkel, Studia Theologica, XIII, No. 2, 114-15, n. 4.
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grace-giving:. . .ministerium ipsum, hoc est munus
docendi. ^
Summary and Prospect
We have now surveyed in our last two chapters three major areas
of polemical confrontation involving hermeneutical perspectives. We
have shown how the scholastic, ontological presupposition tended
toward the use of allegory and how this was answered by both reformers
through an emphasis on the dynamic character of the Scripture. Since
the Scripture was the living Word of the living and working God it
could not properly be treated simply as a source of confirmation of the
ontology derived from philosophy nor could it be the support of a
tradition accepted as authoritative by the church. This view of the
Scripture, developed hermeneutically meant a new emphasis on the
historical or literal meaning of the text.
The second confrontation, presented through the offices of the
humanist Erasmus, represented the problem of a simple, historicist
literalism supported by the new technical aids of grammar and philology.
We drew the conclusion here, not alone that the reformers incorporated
theological insights into their hermeneutics, but also that from their
theology of the Deus Absconditus they pointed out that it was invalid
to interpret Scripture as if man could comprehend the entire mystery of
■'"Fraenkel, Studia Theologica, XIII, No. 2, 114-15.
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God within his human speech. This concept of the hidden God set a
limit on the attempts at an ultimate rational statement about the will
and work of God, and called into use the doctrine of opposites, the
paradox, the "strange work" of God. This means the admitting of the
ultimate Mystery, Mystery to be worshiped, adored, accepted in His
holy Otherness.
The problem of religious, spiritual interpretation was brought
into conflict with the reformers by the Schwarmer or spirituals. Their
rejection of history was indicated by their minimizing of the function of
the Scriptural Word and of the stated ministry. Their claim was for a
direct, unmediated experience of the work of God, hence of the truth.
The answer of the reformers was to reemphasize the absolute necessity
of the given Word of God, in a historical record and in a historical
ministry. Whereas the spirituals insisted on the primacy of their
religious experience, the reformers insisted on the ambiguity of experi¬
ence per se, and brought to bear the concept of Anfechtunq. In the
ambiguous experiences of the religious life it must be conceded that
God again works in His own way, bringing life out of our death, and
that only by the reassurance of the living Word of God is man able to
tolerate the vicissitudes not only of life in the world, but the tempta¬
tions of the devout life as well.
As we have indicated, largely allusively, in the selective
history of hermeneutics, we have been concerned about the play of the
idea of history in the working out of hermeneutical theory and practice.
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These allusions have been developed into more specific principles
through our study of the polemical dialogues. In the nature of the
analyses, the problem has been developed mainly along negative lines,
by showing the rejection of untenable positions and the correction by
new and inescapable facts. We must proceed to a more positive ex¬
plication of the involvement in our basic question of the problem of
history and of the historical interpretation of the Scripture.
One more significant conclusion should be reviewed. At this
point in what is to some degree a comparative study of Luther and
Melanchthon, we found no significant differences in their basic under¬
standings of the questions so far posed, or in their basic answers to
those questions. What may be more important, the diversity in their
style of statement appears to be little more than a merely verbal,
formal difference. One possible implication is that each of the two
reformers, starting with the same central convictions, operated on the
basis of those accepted conclusions, freely and committedly, as an
individual, and not as an imitator. The next major division of our study
will inquire more precisely into the plausibility of these preliminary
conclusions.
CHAPTER V




In order to establish a structure for the remaining statement and
defence of our hypotheses, we shall set forth this thesis:
The subjective element of hermeneutics for Luther and Melanchthon
consists in this: that the saving work of God, graciously applied to the
interpreter in the midst of human history, is accepted as the heuristic
paradigm for the understanding of God's living Word to man. It is
important that this saving work is seen as bringing man into the new
life of faith and hope, that this work has already established a new
reality together with openness to the ultimate fulfilment of the work and
will of God.
We are now involved in our own species of hermeneutical circle.
It is evident that the preceding thesis is more than a congeries of parts
negative and positive, and yet it can be appraised only in view of the
disparate parts. We must now proceed to the parts, having by so much




The Use of History
The term "history, " is highly ambiguous in itself and requires
clarification. Historical interpretation of Scripture has come to mean
many things, including quite opposite attitudes and practices of inter¬
pretation. Karl Barth removed much of that vagueness as concerned
understanding the reformers by declaring:
The encounters between God and man in the sphere of
that secondary objectivity of God mean singly and in the
aggregate the taking place of a history (Calvin: a
negotium) between God and man. This history begins
with a voluntary decision of God and continues in a
corresponding voluntary decision of man. . . .The will of
God offers itself as good will towards men and is met by
faith. 1
Professor Torrance corroborates the appropriateness of this evaluation
in his statement: "The Reformation opened up the historical perspective
of understanding and initiated a historical mode of thinking, due as
2
much as anything else to its old Testament studies." A healthier, more
concrete perspective on the entire Scripture has to some degree con¬
tinued in the church by virtue of that same Hebraic influence, as a few
random references will indicate. The Danish Luther scholar, H.
Qfstergaard-Nielsen, oriented his study, Scriptura Sacra et Viva Vox,
to the concept of the Name of God.
1Barth, C. D. , Il/l, 28-29.
2
Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 72.
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Die judische Auffassung dagegen ist von dem Wunsch
geleitet, zu einer geschichtlichen Weltbetrachtung zu
gelangen. Durch das Wort lernt der Jude Gottes Namen
kennen und er lernt seinen eigenen Namen kennen, er
lernt sich selbst als Jude, als zum erwahlten Volk
gehorend, kennen. Der Ausgangspunkt der jildischen
Auffassung vom Wort ist das Wort, das von Gott
gesprochen wird, der seinen Namen geoffenbart hat und
zu seinem eigenen Volk redet. *
C^stergaard-Nielsen goes on to employ this point as the weapon against
a subject-object view in theology, obviously with more recent villains
in mind than the scholastics.
In a passage of brilliant linguistic and literary insight, Denis
de Rougemont concludes
No abstractions, for immediate obedience, both "in
spirit and in truth, " is the worship to be given to the
living God. To abstract is, first of all, to remove one's
self from the immediate; in a certain sense it is also
to doubt. For the Hebrew, then, to be limited to the
concrete is to remain faithful to the Law. From the
very beginning, even his language is dedicated to this
higher calling. . . .Bare of abstract terms, useless for
any metaphysics. . . .Among all the songs ever written,
only the great prophetic passages have captured the
true meaning of the Greek word "poetry"—to make, to
act. ^
In the Scandinavian tradition of Old Testament interpretation, Sigmund
Mowinckel agrees,
The revelation of God is God's own self-giving activity
^"H. C^stergaard-Nielsen, Scriptura Sacra et Viva Vox, (Munchen;
Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957), p. 60.
^de Rougemont, Christian Opportunity, 60; cf. Rudolf Bultmann,
History and Eschatology (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 118 —
20.
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and the religious-moral life and the religious-moral in¬
sight that is created by it. It unfolds itself through
history in the widest sense of this term: that which
actually occurs. . . .It is in this drama that God "makes
himself known. " ^
Unfortunately, whatever their sources, the historical insights of the
Reformation proved virtually impossible to preserve and transmit in their
intended form, as Torrance makes clear:
The Reformation did not have the philosophical or in¬
tellectual tools with which to consolidate that insight
and elaborate the change in method, and so Protestant
theology soon fell back upon the old Aristotelian tools
of thought. Consequently the development of historical
thinking was severely retarded. ^
What,exactly, are some of the recurring representative errors in
the concept of history which, in turn, deflect the understanding of the
Scripture? Gogarten reports, drawing from Dilthey, on the medieval
view of history as involved in the plan of God, so that man is seen as
a unit passing through the stages of development according to this
plan. This idea of wholeness, of universal history, was suited to the
metaphysical perspectives of the era, and could readily embrace the
3
church and its traditions as part of this total view. What is noteworthy
here is the absence of the contingent, the concretely historical in terms
of person or event. It is really an extension of this situation which
^Sigmund Mowinckel, The Old Testament as Word of God, trans.
Reidar B. Bjornard (New York: Abingdon Press, 1959), p. 45.
2
Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 72.
^Friedrich Gogarten, Reality of Faith, 20-21.
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Croce notes critically with the comment that "it has even been possible
to note a pause in historiographical interest, where scholasticism has
prevailed. " *
The late Professor Carl Michalson acutely criticized a subtle but
powerful contemporary view, ascribed to Heidegger and Heinrich Ott,
with their accent on language as the house of being. . . .
Protestant faith is a religion of maturity in which man
is oriented toward the world through the mediation of
an historically illuminating Word. Ott, with Heidegger,
tries to draw his faith back into the days of silent
meditation on mysteries deeper than word. 2
It might be well for the ill-informed qua si-devotees of exotic
Oriental religions today to consider Gilbert Chesterton's commentary
on some underlying metaphysics of those views as over against
Christian understandings. The statement is not too typical of the
Roman Catholicism to which Chesterton converted, but an Anglo-
Catholic like C. S. Lewis found the book, Everlasting Man, from which
our quotation is drawn, making sense out of "the whole Christian out-
3
line of history. " Chesterton's paragraph reads:
And there really is this ultimate unmorality behind the
metaphysics of Asia. And the reason is that there has
been nothing through all these unthinkable ages to bring
the human mind sharply to the point; to tell it that the
time has come to choose. The mind has lived too much
•'•Benedetto Croce, History, Its Theory and Practice (New York:
Russell and Russell, 1960), p. 248.
2
Michalson, Worldly Theology, 111-12.
3
C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Toy (London: Fontana Books, 1959),
p. 178. ~ ~
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in eternity. . . . It has had too much of eternity, in the sense
that it has not had enough of the hour of death and the day
of judgment. It is not crucial enough; in the literal sense
that it has not had enough of the cross. . . .Europe has not
merely gone on growing older. It has been born again. *
History and the Unique
Whatever complex of reasons we may ascribe to the phenomenon
we do observe the historical concern of the post-Reformation Western
world with the unique, concrete historical event. Walther von
Loewenich has even attempted to clear Lessing of the charge against
his "particularities of history." In the monograph, Luther und Lessinq,
von Loewenich suggests that Lessing may not have attempted to militate
against all religious conclusions from the one unique event but may
have sought to question the regnant "orthodox" positions in order to
make way for his own religion of conscience. The citation of
Lessing's recognition of Christ as the unique teacher of immortality
emphasizes the questionable character of the standard judgment against
2 **
Lessing on history.
We find further supporting evidence of the historian's concern
for the singular in Eiliv Skard's restatement of the position of Heinrich
Rickert:
■*■0. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man, (New York: Dodd,
Mead & Co., 1926), p. 293; cf. Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, trans.
Emma Craufurd (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1951), p. 32.
2 ,f
Walther von Loewenich, Luther und Lessinq (Tubingen: J. C.
B. Mohr, 1960), pp. 13-14.
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Natural science seeks the universal and the general. . .it
is entirely different with history, which concerns itself
precisely with the single person or situation, with the in¬
dividual and special, with that which the Germans call in
an untranslateable word das Einmalige. ^
History as Paradigm
But is it legitimate to move from the willingness of some his¬
torians to concern themselves with the singular to the thesis that the
singular may be designated "paradigmatic" and eventually "heuristically
paradigmatic? " The thesis we have advanced at the beginning of this
chapter depends on this progression if we are to establish any act of
God in history as capable of extension to this decisive role. Two
leading American theologians of this mid-twentieth century have
affirmed this point as a central expression of their views, not only on
the specific question of revelation, but as a focal point in their
theology as well.
Professor Carl Michalson's work, The Hinge of History, was
one of his most acute contributions to our theological literature before
his untimely death. Michalson was thoroughly informed on existen¬
tialism, and the position he affirmed in this book indicate that he was
led by some existentialist considerations, but that he guarded himself
against a non-historical surrender to subjectivism or to the chimera of
■''Eiliv Skard, Mennesket og Historien (Oslo: H. Aschehoug &
Co. , 1957), p . 8 .
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existential choice. Because we find in Michalson some of the key terms
in our proposition, and some clearing of irrelevant elemens from our way,
we shall quote at some length from two passages of The Hinge of
History.
What happened and is past is nevertheless a kind of
history. Historicism is wrong, however, in refusing to
concede as a valid dimension of history events impervious
to objective methods. For paradigmatic events are in¬
trinsically inaccessible. The events of Biblical history
are not the events one knows. They are the events with
the help of which one knows. With them he knows, not
knowing them, what he would not know without them.
This is the reason they are called events of revelation.
They occur with apocalyptic suddenness and with a
luminousness which leaves the event itself unfathomed
while illuminating the whole landscape of life.
Biblical history, then, does not refer to events in
general, but to special events. They are not unique in
the sense of being isolated events. On the contrary,
they are unique in supplying the hinges between events
which would otherwise leave our lives in paratactic in¬
completeness. The Apostle Paul set out to make this
clear to the Corinthians who mistook Christ's resurrection
for an isolated event. Paul made it clear that this was
rather the event by which their own resurrection was to
be affirmed. The resurrection had been the very event by
which Paul was enabled to see the crucifixion not as a
paratactic defeat in history but as a holy victory. ^
There is no knowledge of God which is not at the same
time historical knowledge, that is, knowledge of oneself.
Hence the Christian man does not live in time as a sailor
in a boat. . .man lives in time like a fish in water, moment
by moment straining out his means of livelihood from that
"sea of lost illusions, " until he comes upon the Christ
who in time is the Lord of time. And in his dying he begins
to live again. . . .He hears the story of Jesus Christ and
falling to knees he cries, "He saved my life. " This is the
'''Michalson, The Hinge of History, 41.
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mood of the Christian apprehension of truth. The
Christian does not find a fact in time which hinges to¬
gether past with future. He is found as one who is
hinged pathetically to a past that pulls him down, and
who is turned about in an inexplicable metanoia which
hinges him anew to a source of hope. . . .When one has
met this Christ across the arithmetical expanse of time
and felt his life hinged to the author of life, he can
know he has come upon "time's other dimension of
depth and inwardness, " where history has a future. *
Although he seems to play the same hazardous game with sub¬
jectivity, H. Richard Niebuhr emerges with the same pellucid affirma¬
tion of the paradigmatic character of the knowledge of Christ in his
influential book, The Meaning of Revelation:
Revelation means for us that part of our inner history
which illuminates the rest of it and which is itself in¬
telligible. Sometimes when we read a difficult book,
seeking to follow a complicated argument, we come
across a luminous sentence from which we can go for¬
ward and backward and so attain some understanding of
the whole. . . .The special occasion to which we appeal
in the Christian church is called Jesus Christ, in whom
we see the righteousness of God, his power and wisdom.
But from that special occasion we also derive the con¬
cepts which make possible the elucidation of all the
events in our history. Revelation means this intelligible
event which makes all other events intelligible. ^
Temporal Disjunction and Contemporaneity
What is a noteworthy conclusion from the preceding paragraphs
^"Michalson, The Hinge of History, 184-85.
9
H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 93.
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is that the temporal disjunction of past and present is overcome. The
problem is not construed as one of becoming contemporaneous with the
historical event. This bold thrust would deny even the emphasis on
subjectivity, as in Troeltsch's apparently faith-allied emphasis on the
subjective factor of personal commitment effecting a union with the
essence of the historical events. * At another extreme, this view under¬
cuts what Ebeling calls a biblicist view--the type is easily recogniz¬
able—which maintains
that he is doing justice to Scripture if he adapts him¬
self to the period from which it comes, if, for example,
he tries to realize early Christianity as a timeless
ideal, instead of letting Scripture encounter him where
he is really living. ^
That view may be naive, but even the highly intellectualized,
historicist views of history and interpretation toy with the principle of
contemporaneity. Thus, for example, Johannes Opp, in his review
article on Hans-George Gadamer's book, Wahrheit und Methode, reports
Gadamer's challenging of
the naive presupposition of historicism. . .that one
placed oneself in the spirit of another time, thought in
its language and ideas and not in one's own, and thus
achieved historical objectivity.
Hans W. Frei, "Niebuhr's Theological Background, " Faith in
Ethics: The Theology of Richard Niebuhr, ed. Paul Ramsey (New York:
Harper & Row, 1957), p. 59.
2
Gerhard Ebeling, The Nature of Faith, trans. Ronald Gregor
Smith (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961), p. 39.
3
Johannes Opp, "Truth and Method: A Review Article, " Student
World, LX, (Fourth Quarter, 1967), 312-13.
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Even Sigmund Mowinckel lapses into this jargon when he speaks of be¬
coming "contemporary with the witnesses... so we can share their
experiences of God. " ^ That it is not the interpreter who becomes
contemporary with the witness, but the Witness who is_ contemporary
to the interpreter, is put sharply by Ebeling:
In diesem Ereignis des glaubenden Verstehens ist, nicht
kraft geschickter Auslegungsmethoden, sondern kraft
dessen, dass das Zeugnis von Jesus Christus jetzt und
hier schopferisches Wort Gottes selber ist, der Zeitraum
der Kirchengeschichte aufgehoben und die Gleichzeitigkeit
mit Jesus Christus Wirklichkeit. . . .Die Kirchengeschichte
als Geschichte der Auslegung der Heiligen Schrift ist also
die Geschichte der Gegenwartigkeit des unter Pontius
Pilatus gekreuzigl^und auferstandenen Jesus Christus. ^
In Adolf Sperl's analysis we find a profound convergence of
cultural and theological criticism, which is highly revealing for any
continuing appraisal of the problem of contemporaneity, and enlighten¬
ing specifically in the Reformation situation:
Diese im Grunde romantische Vorstellung von der Wieder-
belebung einer vergangenen Zeit durch Vergegenwartigung
in der Vorstellung dessen, der sich mit der Literatur dieser
Zeit beschaftigt, liegt aber dem humanistischen
Traditionsverstandnis zugrunde. In dem Moment, in dem
dieses Verhaltnis zur Vergangenheit nicht auf eine mehr oder
weniger unverbindliche Romantik beschr&nkt bleibt, zeigt
sich die grundsatzliche Unterschiedenheit von dem
reformatorischen Schriftprinzip besonders deutlich. Wenn
dieses Traditionsverstandnis zu einem Prinzip wird, nach
■'■Mowinckel, The Old Testament as Word of God, 130-31.
^Gerhard Ebeling, Kirchengeschichte als Geschichte der
Auslegung der heiligen Schrift (Tubingen: J. C. B. Johr, 1947), pp. 26-
27. Cf. Regin Prenter, The Word and the Spirit, trans. Harris E.
Kaasa (Minneapolis; Augsburg Publishing House, 1965), p. 132.
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dem gegenwartige Verhaltnisse gestaltet werden sollen,
wird es gesetzlich und vermag h&chstens zu einer
anachronistischen Repristf anation auf den verschiedene
Lebensgebieten fuhren, weil der Mensch etwass' Unmogliches
versucht: Er will durch seine Aktivitat die Vergangenheit zu
neuem Leben erwecken. 1
Let us accept the temper of these strictures against the evasion
of history by an attempt to contemporize- the past. Assuredly, our
two reformers would not have looked with good will on any enterprise
that assumed such god-like capacities in man or which demanded of
man the impossible work before he might receive the necessary revela¬
tion. This returns us to the prior statements on the paradigmatic and
the heuristic, and demands attention to the question of the appropriate¬
ness of these designations and their hermeneutical consequences to a
descriptive analysis of the subjective element in the hermeneutics of
Luther and Melanchthon.
God Gives Man History
In order to make a closer comparison possible of the positions
of Luther and Melanchthon in this section we shall consider both of
them in a step by step progression, rather than attempting to cover the
total Luther material first, as we did in the polemical section. We have
described the theology of the two Wittenberg reformers previously as
Christocentric, evangelical, emphasizing the act of God in Christ for
''"Sperl, Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation, 70.
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man. This is the basic paradigm. If, however, it is subjectively
paradigmatic as a private experience of salvation, as is so often
alleged against Luther, its interpetive function would be not only
questionable but improper. If we maintain a subjective element which
is not subjectivity, what, then, have the reformers made of the paradigm
of grace and Christ?
For Luther it was always "was Christum treibt" that was central
in the entire Scripture. He used the geometric image in saying "Christ
is the center from which the circle is drawn. " * Against opponents he
would say:
These texts give us a faithful portrayal of Christ, of His
person and of His work. I rub this text under the noses
of the hypocrites and the work-righteous when they attempt
to teach me something apart from this light; and I refuse
to believe them even if St. John the Baptist himself were
their spokesman.^
3
Christ's work is the forgiveness of sins, that is the " summa doctrinae. "
This total work of Christ, whether we call it forgivenss, life, salva¬
tion, faith is always to be taught so that it is clear "that the knowledge
of Christ and of faith is no work of man, but simply the gift of God,
4
who as he createth faith, so doth he keep it in us. "
'''Erlangen, 46, 386. Quoted in Grant, Bible in the Church, 111.
Cf. W. A., D. B. 7, 384; Luther, Lenker X, 150-53.
^Luther, Am. Ed., XXII, 71-72.




Melanchthon was no less precise in his Christocentricity:
Quia Christum cognoscimus, cognoscimus voluntatem
patris in Christo, cognoscentes voluntatem patris
spiritualiter de operibus Dei, turn in nobis, turn extra
nos, iudicare possumus. 1
Like Luther, Melanchthon saw the Old Testament also oriented to the
gospel, as Sperl has pointed out in connection with the exposition of
2
Proverbs. He combined a strong emphasis on the "misericordia" of
3
God with the centrality of the forgiveness of sins. Stupperich
summarizes the application of these ideas by Master Philip:
Why does one read the Scripture, he asks, if not to
comprehend the meaning of justification? Of what use
is it to know that God is merciful if one's own heart is
not touched by the realization "that he is merciful to
you? " To have this experience is "to know God truly.
Melanchthon's emphasis on the "for you" of the work of justi¬
fication is not only sharply Lutheran, but suggestive as well of the
personal element in the recognition of the salvation as paradigm. One
consistent element in the too frequently slipshod definitions of faith is
at least "the readiness to know that I am meant. " Emil Brunner has
warned that we ought not to misconstrue faith as mystic experience of
oneness, or primitive religion's encounter with the numinous, or
^Melanchthon, S. A. , IV, 28; cf. IV, 24.
2
Adolf Sperl, Melanchthon als Ausleger des Alten Testaments
(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1959), p. 19. Cf. Melanchthon, S. A., V,
228.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 135.
^Stupperich, Melanchthon, 46. Cf. C. R. 13, 1466.
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speculative religion's philosophical knowledge as surrogate for Biblical
faith. * The strictures of both reformers, earlier in this paper set forth,
against religious experience as such, or mysticism or scholastic
speculation, indicate the appropriateness of Brunner's warning at this
point. Let us suggest briefly here that the operative, permissible factors
remaining for the definition of faith understood in the reformation sense
were trust in Christ and commitment.
Faith as Heuristic
The apprehension is by faith, not by understanding or the senses,
Luther insists:
Da gehort nu Glaube zu, sonst lesst sichs nicht fassen,
und wer nicht gleuben wil, sondern wils mit seinen funff
sinnen und Vernunfft ausforschen und nicht erst gleuben,
denn ers verstehet, der far imer hin, denn diese lere gehet
in unsern Kopff nicht, es ist der vernunfft zu hoch, der
Glaube fassets allein, so zeugets die Schrifft, wer da
nicht gleuben wil, mags lassen.^
"Unless you lay hold of this by simple faith, you will never understand
r>
anything. "Sine fide ista nemo intelligit. . . . Sed nos dei gratia
intelligimus. Habemus enim Euangelium et verum intellectum
4
scripturae." Those who cast away the precious pearl Christ do not
^Brunner, Faith, Hope and Love, 17.
^W. A. 46, 543; cf. Luther, Lenker X, 160, 207, 251, 407.
3Luther, Am. Ed., XII, 203.
4W. A. , 41, 167.
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have faith and cannot teach faith. * The vision of faith is preferable
to actual sight: "Even if I do not see this with my physical eye, . . .1
can still behold it with my spiritual sight of faith. And I prefer this to
2
seeing it physically. " All of this is, typically, Luther.
Moreover, Luther maintains, it is clearly all men of faith, i.e. ,
the godly, who have this special understanding: "Moses. . .purposely
3intended to show to the spiritually minded, " "to the godly all things
which are revealed and handed down to us in the Holy Scriptures are
4
firmly founded and sufficiently clear. " When the godly look into the
Word they are able to perceive the wiles also of Satan. ^ By contrast,
sin, not lack of intellect, prevents us from understanding.
Stated in another way, "the heretics, the Jews, the folk of
spiritual pride, and all who are outside God's grace" lack understanding
of the deep things of God. "For no one can think rightly about God
7
unless the Spirit of God is in him. " He dares to assert that the
Spirit came to all the saints.
^Luther, Galatians, 99.
^Luther, Am. Ed., XXII, 203.
^Luther, Lenker, I, 49.
4
Luther, Lenker, I, 61.
^Luther, Lenker, I, 291.




This same Spirit who was in Isaiah in the midst of his
time and tribulation was also in Job, in Abraham, in Adam,
and is still in all the members of the whole Body of
Christ from the beginning to the end of the world. . . .
Judging not according to the Spirit, but according to works,
you look at the surface of the divine writings just as the
Jews in the desert stood at their tent doors and saw
nothing except the back of Moses entering into the tent
of the tabernacle of the Lord.
The Holy Spirit is the schoolmaster who performs "his office of teaching
2
the heart." Such instruction is essential, for
Maiora nobis data, quam homo concipiat. Quis concipit
fideliter se habere vitam aeternam? Vix capimus transi-
toria, taceo stabilia et aeterna. Nobis donatus spiritus,
ut sciamus sc. Nosse, scire, quanta donata, est
spiritus sancti opus.3
Not only has the Spirit "explained the Scriptures and Christ and made
4
them clear, " He is sent of Christ:
For Christ says: "He shall teach you and bring to your
remembrance all that I said unto you:" that is, he will
beautifully explain (glorify) what I now say to you,
better than I am able to teagh with words, so that you
will need no further words.
In very similar thoughts, expressed in his own imagery,
Melanchthon concurs on the role of faith. "Summa, velamen non
tollitur, nisi conversi fuerimus ad Christum, et cum convertimur,
Luther, Am. Ed., XXXII, 176.
^Luther, Lenker, XII, 320-21.
3W. A. , 20, 788.
^Luther, Lenker, XII, 293.
^Luther, Lenker, XII, 284.
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renascimur, ut simus idem spiritus cum eo."* He is very concerned
to correct any false simplistic notions of faith, hence the et. . .et in the
following, and the emphasis on profferred forgiveness in Christ:
Est /fides/igitur assensus in intellectu, et velle hanc
divinam consolationem, et in ea acquiescere, cum
audimus nobis D^um propicium esse propter filium
Iesum Christum.
Faith is not to be confused with "historical" knowledge thus
defined: "Historica cognitio, qua certo scio, quod Christus est deus
3
et homo etc. . . .Talis historica cognitio de Christo non justificat. "
And again, "Fides significat fiduciam misericordiae. Nec est tantum
notitia historiae, sed proprie significat assentiri promissionibus
divinis seu velle et accipere promissam misericoridam." Self-righteous¬
ness forcloses understanding: "For the conscience intent on its own
merits can not understand the remission of sins, nor true prayer and
waiting on divine help, etc. "^
The doctrine of the Spirit is essential also in Melanchthon's
interpretation. Without the Spirit one has only the "littera" of
Scripture. Littera' est omnis cogitatio et observatio, qua verbum Dei
'''Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 108; cf. V, 202.
2C. R. 15, 514.
3C. R. , 20, 706.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 40; cf. Melanchthon, Writings, 166.
^Melanchthon, Writings, 136.
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conatur humana ratio per sese facere sine spiritu sancto. " Christ's
words of warning concerning false teachers are construed thus: "Immo
2
nemo nisi habens spiritum et vivens spiritu potest spiritualia docere."
Not only does the believer enjoy privilege over against revelation, he
also perceives God's work in the world. Adolf Sperl summarizes:
Wie aber die Offenbarung Gottes zugleich seine Verhullung
vor dem Fleisch ist, so ist auch die Wirklichkeit der
spiritualia in dieser Welt eine verborgene, nur mit
geistlichen Augen wahrnehmbare. Es ist die Wirklichkeit
des Glaubens, die dem naturlichen Menschen verschlossen
bleibt.3
In a sharply concrete statement, Melanchthon asserts:
Spiritus sanctus per evangelium datur, per legem non
datur. . . .evangelium non est praedicatio doctrinae
alicuius tantum, sed est donatio ipsa Spiritus sancti.
Minister sum non litterae, sed Spiritus sancti, id est:
non doceo, sed dono Spiritum sanctum.
The tidy play on words "non doceo, sed dono" is pleasant, but the
meaning conveyed is unusually revealing. If we take such evidences
as this text and the preceding argument seriously, we can hardly con¬
clude with McGiffert that Melanchthon recognized "reason and revela¬
tion as co-ordinate sources of theology.
1Melanchthon, S. A., V, 88-89; cf. IV, 101, V, 167.
3Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 35.
3
Sperl, Melanchthon als Ausleger des Alten Testaments, 24.
^Melanchthon, S. A. IV, 103.
5A. C. McGiffert, Protestant Thought before Kant (New York:
Harper & Bros. , 1962), p. 76.
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The Proper Heuristic Function
In the elements of gospel, faith and Spirit we have set out
facets of the paradigm of the Word of God. As we turn to the problems
of the heuristic function, we must clarify our intentions in using the
word, admitting that a purely philosophical definition would convey a
false impression of our meaning in this total context. We accept the
proposition that the heuristic aids in the discovery of truth. But that
is not to say that a result or corollary is the attainment of knowledge
as such. Unfortunately, the idea of "Scriptura Scripturae interpres"
has been understood to mean something like that, so that clear
passages will illumine obscure passages and gradually more complete
knowledge will result. The idea that Scripture study develops greater
certainty, greater assurance of the ultimate Tightness of the assertions
seems to us to be of the same order of reasoning from the same
starting-point. Another fallacy has been the hoped-for achievement
of an enlarged authority principle. A last extension of these modes
of thinking would contend first that the Scripture convinces man of
absolute moral demands and then effectively coerces him to conform to
those standards.
Now if we accept thetically a norm like Professor Torrance's
"from the historical involvement of Christian Truth, which only can be
known and communicated in a way corresponding to its nature as
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historical and spiritual Truth" * we shall begin more correctly by asking
the question, "what is 'conformity' with this Truth?" Obviously,
gospel can not be converted into non-gospel, whether Law or works or
condemnation. Even more important, from a methodological point of
view, faith can not be made unfaith. That is, faith can not be over¬
come by a knowledge which no longer requires faith, or certainty which
no longer has the unproved and unprovable basis of faith, or authority
which is so unquestioned that utter subjugation is demanded, not the
humble response of faith. The point of this is, moreover, that we err
if we make the misguided attempt to speak of a self-authenticating
character in Scripture, or a self-verifying, or, for that matter, an
ineluctable authority structure. In an attempt to replace these terms
with a more apt and responsive term, we have been immoderately un¬
successful. The term self-edifying has the flaw of a difficult re¬
flexive, although the edificare root commends itself to us as pointing
in the proper direction.
A second major problem area in anticipating the development of
the heuristic motif is the renewed problem of the personal. The
paradigm concerns personal salvation through the gospel, a personal
faith, a personal Spirit working in the spirit of man. This means, as
Professor Torrance has said in another context:
^Thomas F. Torrance, The School of Faith (London: James Clarke
& Co., Limited, 1959), p. xxix.
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Because God brings man into living and personal com¬
munion with him, the place of the human subject in the
knowledge of God cannot be excluded from the full con¬
tent of that knowledge. Our knowing of God is part of
our knowledge of God. *
Just what we may say about this knowing subject varies according to
our theological presupposition. Dietrich Bonhoeffer delineates the
relation in sophisticated style with an existentialist flavor:
In accordance with the being of revelation, the being of
man should be conceived neither frozen as entity nor
spirited into non-entity. In either of these cases the
total existence of man would, in the end, stay unaffected.
No; the man we must consider is the historical man who
knows himself transplanted from the old into the new
humanity and who is, by membership of the new, a person
re-created by Christ, a person who "is" only in the act-
reference to Christ and whose being "with reference to"
Christ is based on being in Christ and his communion in
such a way that the act is "suspended" in the being,
while the being itself "is" not in the absence of the act. ^
From H. Richard Niebuhr we glean a similar view of man, couched in
another, but familiar, jargon:
Meeting with such a Thou, the I is changed. The self
which is known by another and so knows itself through
another's eyes is not an impersonal process of thinking.
It is a person with a definite character, just this par¬
ticular self; it is a self which can no longer retreat
infinitely behind its actions but is caught fast and held
in the act of the other's knowing of it. The self which
is known and so achieves self-knowledge is a committed
Thomas F. Torrance, "The Influence of Reformed Theology in
the Development of Scientific Method," Dialog, II (Winter, 1963),
p. 45.
9
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, trans. , Bernard Noble
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 130.
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self--an I which must acknowledge what it is and so
accept itself. *
It would be anachronistic to impose these types of analyses back into
the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, our awareness of the develop¬
ment of this type of appraisal of the nature of the believing person may
help to alert us to nuances in the attitudes of the reformers to which
we might otherwise be blind.
Knowing Person as New Man
In Luther's language, the forgiven man is born again, a new
man. This is a reality: "Ergo non adumbremur specie sed nascamur
Christiani, ut simus iam natura boni, qui antea mali." Professor
Wingren has amplified this statement in consonance with Luther's
thought to see the new man as "spontaneous, free and outgoing, for the
3
new man is a divine reality. His freedom is God's own freedom. " At
the same time, the reality is a hidden reality. Thus Luther speaks of
it in his gloss on Romans 6:7-11.
Now if we be dead by a spiritual death through baptism,
in order to end sin with Christ: we believe, because this
new life cannot be experienced but must be believed.
For no one knows that he lives again or experiences that
he is justified, but he believes and hopes that we shall
*H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation, 146.
2W. A., 20, 692; cf. Luther, Lenker X, 214; XII, 277-78;
Pedersen, Skriftfortolker, 151.
3
Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation, 204.
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also live in spirit and newness, now and forever, with
him. 1
Note that here the faith element of the paradigm is preserved in dealing
with the new man in Christ. Here is Luther's notable simul justus et
peccator. The old man has been supplanted by the new, the future has
come into the present, but present and old man still remain.
In terms of interpretation, this view means that Scripture will
not be totally and completely understood. One can only say:
So we now understand them, to the extent that we hear
and read them; but that they should be understood to
their depth, that will not be in this life. But as I said,
the longer and the more one learns from them, the less
one can, and the more one must, learn. ^
On the reality of the new life through faith Melanchthon concuPs
wholeheartedly. We read his comments on Col. 2:10 to this point:
Pertinet et hue, quod dixit: "Per eum estis consummati, "
id est: perfecti, renovati, facti nova creatura accepto
Spiritu sancto. Humanam vero iustitiam efficit ratio seu
liberum arbitrium, quae tamen cor non mutat aut sanctificat,
manet enim in corde contemptus Dei et diffidentia et omnes
concupiscentiae, IeremPae 17: "Pravum est cor hominis et
inscrutabile.
The apparently gratuitous slur on free will is not uncommon in
Melanchthon; it is obvious that he does not share the humanist optimism
4
in the powers of man. Master Philip is at pains to indicate that what
"'"Luther, Romans, 184.
^Luther, Lenker, XII, 98; cf. X, 211; Luther, Romans, 105.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 244; cf. IV, 284.
^Cf. Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 20, 219.
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Christ has effected is vera: "Haec vera pax est, quam Christus in
terris efficit erga Deum, quae plane est ipsissima vita aeterna et
summum et ineffabile solacium in omnibus afflictionibus. " ^
But this real life is also hidden in God:
Sicut infra ait vitam Christianorum absconditam esse in
Deo, ita hie inquit nos cum Christo sepultos esse, quia
sancti non statim accipiunt plenitudinem spiritus, nec
statim penitus mortificantur, sed donee in hac vita sunt,
sunt testacea vasa, tolerant crucem. . .tamen fide
O
sustentantur et exspectant redemptionem.
To express the simul Melanchthon opposes the elements in pairs like
this: "lam nihil apparet praeter peccatum. Iustitia et vita est in
O
Christo abscondita, siquidem creditis. The new life, then, is
necessary for understanding. "Nisi enim corde audiatur, non
cognoscitur. . .necesse est novum cor fieri.
Knowing Person as Simul. . .Et
With the constant reminder of the intransigent presence also of
the old man, have we been guilty of just one more kind of optimistic
folly, or of pure falsification? To compound the problem, neither
Melanchthon nor Luther allows even a kind of formal division of man
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 227.
2Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 248; cf. IV, 283; V. 159.
3Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 18; cf. IV, 386, 389, 401, 460.
^Quoted in Sick, Melanchthon als Ausleqer des Alten Testaments,
17; cf. Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 287, 424.
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into a spiritual-rational-eternal component over against a physical-
material-temporal component. Both explicitly argue for the totus homo
view of man. Man cannot then experience the new life in its absolute
sense of "already, " but must deal with the "not yet. " This means that
he remains bound to the hurtful fact of history, with its limitations and
its contingencies, rather than finding in ascetic ways or moral purifica¬
tions or mystic escape from reality the resolution of his dilemma of
2
hanging between the two worlds, as Luther put it often.
The way out of the dilemma for both the reformers, was to grasp
the nettle firmly, and maintain that in and through his own history, the
believing interpreter was led to understand the central word, the
evangelical paradigm of the Scripture. This was not without a move¬
ment, we might even conclude a special kind of hermeneutical circle,
a movement from history to eschatology and back, neither one giving
meaning without the other. That seems to be what Bonhoeffer concluded
and it is hardly illicit to suggest some typical influence of Lutheran
thought on his argument:
Our thinking, that is, the thinking of those who must go
to Christ to know of God, this thinking of fallen man,
has no beginning because it is a circle. We exist in a
circle. We feel and will in a circle. We exist in a
circle. We might then say that in that case there is
beginning everywhere. We could equally well say that
there is no beginning at all: the decisive point is that
^"Luther, Am. Ed., XXVII, 363; Melanchthon, S. A., V., 205.
2W. A. , 25, 328.
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thinking takes this circle for the infinite and total
reality and entangles itself in a vicious circle. ^
The actual temporal notions, as Bonhoeffer has stated, thus tend to be
obscure, and there is no immediate question of which is prior in point
of time, or which realm is dominant.
Even the trials which come to men in time, then, are not sheer
accident, but sent of God for His purpose. The principle becomes so
broad that Luther could say in a tidy summary: "Whoever believes, to
him everything is helpful, nothing is harmful. Whoever does not believe,
o
to him everything is harmful, nothing is helpful. " One of the helpful
functions is seen to be a proper self-knowledge:
To such a trial one can come only through patience. And
this test takes place in order that everyone may see his
inner state of mind (i.e. , in order that everyone may come
to know himself), whether he really loves God for God's
sake; but God knows this, of course, without an
3
examination.
Such self-knowledge is essential because "perfect self-knowledge is
perfect humility, and perfect humility is perfect wisdom, and perfect
wisdom is perfect spiritualness. " ^
That self-knowledge, for Luther, tends to be an apparently
'''Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 10.
^Luther, Am. Ed., XXXV, 32; cf. W. A., 5, 165-66; Luther,
Lenker, X, 362; Luther, Galatians, 191-92, 400.




morbid preoccupation with his sinful inadequacy. Aside from the
theological necessity of showing the absence of merit in man, this
emphasis develops the insistent practical lesson that man must con¬
tinually turn from his own thoughts, his own reasoning, his own
strength in trial to the Word and Christ.
Das man hie nidden bleibe und sich henge an das fleisch
und blut, ja an die wort und buchstaben, die aus seinem
mund gehen, dadurch er uns auffs aller feinste hinauff
furet zum Vater, das wir keinen zorn noch schrecklich
bild, sondern eitel trost, freud und fride finden und fulen. *
This is a negative learning, but it can be welcomed with joy,
although the turning to the Word results in another negative, that is
the opposite, the humiliation of Christ:
Die Anfechtung gehort so zum Christen, und es gibt kein
anderes Zeichen der Gnade wie das dem Propheten Jonas
gewahrte, drei Tage im Bauch des Walfischs, und das
heisst drei Tage in der Holle zu sein. Deshalb soil der
mensch sich freuen, wenn er leiden darf, und wenn Gott
das Gegenteil von dem tut, worum er ihm bittet. Nur
dort, wo Demut ist, Verwerfung seiner selbst, ja das
Nichts, ist die Anerkennung Gottes und die Verwirklichung
seiner Ehre moglich. Denn Gott wirkt nur in das Leere
hinein.^
In the explanation of the 1518 Heidelberg Theses Luther had put it this
way:
The visible and hinder parts of God are set over against
those which are visible. These invisible parts mean
the humanity of God, his weakness, his foolishness.
Paul calls these "the weakness and foolishness of God"
■*W. A., 28, 28. Cf. Luther's letter to Wenzel Link, Luther,
Correspondence, II, 448-49.
2 u
Seeberg, Erich, Luthers Theologie in ihren Grundzugen, 56.
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(I. Cor. 1:25). For because men put to wrong use their
knowledge of God which they had gained from his works
God determined on the contrary to be known from
sufferings. . . from now on it could never be enough for a
man, nor could it benefit him to know God in his glory
and majesty unless he knows him^at the same time in the
humility and shame of the cross.
The themes of the deus absconditus, of the strange work of God, of
the Christ as true man, all converge at this point. It must be noted
further that the emphasis is on Christ's cross, and that man's suffer¬
ings are not a kind of imitation of His, even though the experience of
a cross may lead to consideration of the Cross. The meaning of our
cross/suffering, to belabor terms suggested earlier, is heuristic and
edifying:
As it is written in Rom. 5:3: "We glory in our tribulation. "
The Apostle says this in this place, because he had said
we were the house which Christ "builds. " A building, how¬
ever, is nothing else than tension and pressure. Put into
other words, we are built by experiencing the cross and
sufferings which we go through in Christ. In this way,
therefore, he wants us to know that it is necessary for us
to be raised and fashioned by a firm faith and glorious
hope in him, lest we fail, and in the course of building
are the more ruined. ^
In view of Melanchthon's acknowledged concern for objectivity
and his care in setting forth the subjective in a secondary
■'■Luther, Early Works, 290-91. The classic exposition of this
theme is Walter von Loewenich, Luthers Theoloqia Crucis (Miinchen:
Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1954).
^Luther, Early Works, 72; cf. W. A., 24, 15; Luther, Galatians,
20; Karl Barth, Lutherfeier 1933 (Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1934),
p. 14.
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position * he seems to have dealt uncommonly often with the matter
of faith's testing and the resulting learning. For him, too, Romans
5:3-5 is decisive in setting forth the meanings of suffering:
At Christiana patientia haec duo complectitur: oboe-
dientiam et fidem seu fiduciam misericordiae et auxilii
Dei. Itaque quando sustinemus afflictionem, simul
experimur fidem. Ita "patientia parit probationem;"
exercemus enim et experimur fidem, dum patienter
toleramus afflictiones. Et significat "probatio, " ut ita
dicam, explorationem et experientiam fidei nostrae,
quam cum exercemus, experimur etiam praesentiam et
bonitatem Dei.2
Melanchthon speaksof a growth in newness as a result.
Immo tantum habemus novitatis et vitae, quantum habemus
fidei. Quare hanc fiduciam misericordiae teneamus et
exerceamus; ita simul etiam crescet novitas. Sed tamen
in illis maximis et horribilibus terroribus, cum conscientia
sentit peccati magnitudinem et iram Dei, opus est hac
consolatione, quod videlicet iusti, h.e. accepti simus non
propter nostram novitatem, sed propter Christum.2
We must note again how the movement has been made back to
Christ. In further direct paralled with Luther, Melanchthon sees the
consoling Christ here as the crucified, under the figure of the opposite
again:
Inest in hoc ipso loco et haec consolatio sumpta ab
obiecto et causa pavoris. Disputamus enim in afflictionibus,
utrum a Deo diligamur, utrum Deus iratus abiecerit nos.
Huic tentationi occurrit, cum proponit imaginem Christi.
Christus sic afflictus est. Et pater vult nos fieri similes
^Stupperich, Melanchthon, 94.
2Melanchthon, S. A., V, 163-64; cf. IV, 69, 367, 390, 397,
400, 425, 427.
2Melanchthon, S. A., V, 160.
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filii. Igitur non affligit, ut perdat, sicut nec filium
afflixit, ut perderet. Et hanc praecipuam consolationem
sumptam a voluntate Dei hie in fine copiosissime atque
ornatissime exaggerat.
Herein is the true sapientia.
Spiritualis cognoscit stultum Deum per stultitiam.
Quomodo stultum? quia comprehendit in Dei stultitia
bonitatem et misericordiam; quid enim stultius est
quam Deum carnem fieri, id est: peccatum et maledictum
per stultitiam et mortificationem, hoc est: contra sensum
O
et iudicium carnis.
The one efficacious sign is the sign of Jonah, "hoc est: Christi
-3
mortui et resurgentis. In further testimony: "Altior est sapientia,
quam ut stultus adaequatur: Altum esse, est cruce tectum esse.
4
Thesauri enim Dei cruce sunt absconditi. "
Heuristic History sub Contraria
Emil Brunner summarized these thoughts most perceptively in
these words:
The meaning of history. . .is embodied in actual world
history only sub contraria specie, concealed, muddled,
falsified, by self-deification and world deification and
by the consequent egoism and egocentricity of man.
This mixture of meaning and non-meaning in history
looks at us from the face of Him who wears a crown of
^"Melanchthon, S. A., V. 245.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 22.
^Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 23; cf. 340, 357, 437.
4
Quoted in Sick, Melanchthon als Ausleger des Alien
Testaments, 17.
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thorns, over whom the representative of Caesar speaks
the "Ecce Homo. " ^
We cite this statement not only to underscore the motifs of the contrary
and the cross, but to move to a brief consideration of the hope element
in these perspectives. (Brunner set the above sentences in the context
of his book study on Eternal Hope.)
As the Apostle Paul stated so memorably in I Corinthians 13,
faith, hope and love are always allied. We intend no neglect of love,
but programmatically would contend that our concern in this study is
2
with faith and hope in their interplay. Peter Lombard's confusion on
the relation of faith, hope and reward provided the polemical occasion
for both Luther and Melanchthon to counter with major evangelical
statements on hope. Lombard's offensive statement was, "Spes est
certa expectatio praemii, ex meritis proveniens." These are the high¬
lights of Luther's correcting assertions:
Ex qua sententia quid aliud potuit sequi quam ruina
universae theologiae, ignorantia Christi et crucis eius
et oblivio dei diebus innumeris:. . .At quis sine spe
toleret quicquam tribulationis? Desperans enim non ad
patientiam nec ad probationem nec ad gloriationem in
tribulatione pervenit umquam, sed contra peior fit
tribulatione semper. . . . Ubi erit iustus, si nullus peccator
poeniteat? At quomodo poenitebit, nisi speret
misericordiam dei? . . .Primum certum est, gratiam,
idest fidem, spem, charitatem non infundi, nisi, peccatum
'''Brunner, Eternal Hope, 86.
2
Cf. here the incisive statements of Prenter in "Jesus Christ,
the Hope of the World, " Lutheran World, I, (Spring, 1954), p. 46; and
Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 109.
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effundatur simul, hoc est peccator non iustificatur, nisi
damnetur, non vivificatur, nisi occidatur. . . ut habet tota
scriptura. ^
Melanchthon reacted similarly:
Nec est somniandum, quod causa spei sit nostra qualitas
et dilectio, qua nos Deum diligimus, sicut hunc locum
scholastici interpretantur; neque enim hoc dicit Paulus.
Ac plane desperandum esset, si nostra dilectio esset causa
spei, cum diligere non possimus, nisi prius fide
apprehenderimus misericordiam. Et constant, quam sit
immunda et exigua dilectio etc. Quare tenendum est obiecta
fidei et spei esse non nostras qualitates, non nostras
virtutes, sed dilectionem Dei srga nos ostensam in
promissione certa et infallibili.
The reformers' further commentary on Romans 5 and 8 passim elaborates
on these themes.
If faith and hope are thus such close correlates, what distinctive
character is to be seen in hope? Let us look at a compact definition from
Melanchthon as representative:
Ideo sequitur: "Probatio spem efficit, " i.e. cum fide
experimur bonitatem Dei, cum fidem exercemus,
crescit spes, quae est quaedam perpetua fiducia et
exspectatio eventus. Nam fides accipit in praesentia
reconciliationem et promissionem de eventu, spes vero
exspectat futurum eventum. Quamquam enim sunt cognati
et coniuncti motus et affectus fides et spes, tamen hoc modo
discerni possunt.
1W. A. , 5, 163-64.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 166.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 164.
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Openness to the Future
What is so distinctive and significant here is the exspectatio
of the futurum. Some of our recent theological movements have trained
us to think in terms of "openness" as the equivalent of these sixteenth
century terms of Melanchthon's. Not every theologian who employs
the idea of openness to the future is in the direct line or intention of
the reformers, but the term may be baptized into our analysis. ^
Professor Torrance has made a qualifying statement in the reformation
tradition where he clearly indicates the point at which some theologians
have forgotten the underlying theology and have made openness captive
to their particular systems. Torrance writes:
That openness or indefinitenes is part of their adequacy
to the object, and belongs to the logic of their reference,
and hence it would be most inaccurate or imprecise if it
were to be reduced through assimilation to the kind of
precision that characterizes the logic of coherence-
statements. ^
In other words, openness to the future means that eschatological
considerations are involved. In Torrance's phrases, this means that
eschatology is part of the "adequacy to the object, " has a'logic of their
reference, " but may not be "reduced through their assimilation. "
•'■Examples of helpful applications of the concept of openness to
theological problems are found in J. V. L^ajgmead Casserley, Graceful
Reason: The Contribution of Reason to Theology (Greenwich, Conn.: The
Seabury Press, 1954), p. 30; and W. R. Crockett, "The Theology of
Revelation and the Principles of Union, " The Ecumenist, VI (May-June,
1968), p. 156.
^Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, 60, cf. p. 50; Hans Urs
van Balthasar, A Theology of History (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963),
pp'. 118-19.
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Eschatological matters, to be truly open, must be matters of the un¬
known, of faith and hope and not of sight. This accounts for the great
difficulty in incorporating eschatology in a thorough-going way into
theological systems. Isaac C. Rottenberg reports the plaint of Noman
Pittenger: "Pittenger is convinced that the usual Protestant
eschatological theology must be supplemented by a theology that knows
of a real presence of the future in this present time of grace. Jacob
Taubes views with sorrow what he calls the tragic history of Christian
theology:
The history of the development of Christian theology is
a tragic history because there is no "solution" to the
conflict between eschatological symbols and the brute
fact of a continuing history. One may admire the achieve¬
ment of theology but at the same time b^ aware of the
price involved in such an achievement.
One of the recurring atte mpts to incorporate eschatology has
been the effort to exploit an apocalyptic view. Though we must admit
that Luther, too, was intrigued by apocalyptic in some periods of his
3
life his eschatology is far more complex than the question of the time
■®Tsaac C. Rottenberg, Redemption and Historical Reality
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), p. 121. The Pittenger quotation
is from "Christianity and the Eschatological, " Anglican Theological Re¬
view, XLI, No. 4 (October, 1959), p. 255. Cf. Paul Tillich, The Inter¬
pretation of History, pp. 283-84. For a philosopher's critique of the
concept of openness, v. Jose Ortega Y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, trans.
Helene Weyl (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1946), pp. 73-74.
2
Jacob Taubes, "On the Nature of the Theological Method: Some
Reflections on the Theological Principles of Tillich's Theology, " The
Journal of Religion, XXXIV No. 1 (January, 1954), p. 13.
Torrance, Kingdom and Church, 18-21.
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of the end. We may conjecture that the very fact that the end did not
come as or when Luther had expected was a major factor in forcing him
to rethink the problem. If this conjecture is valid, we see the corrective
force of history at work. Melanchthon expressed his rejection of
apocalyptic views in the Loci of 1555.
As the apostles were commanded only to preach the
gospel, the doctrine of the Anabaptists and their ilk
is a devil's doctrine, for they say that before the Day
of Judgment the kingdom of Christ must be established
on earth with physical pomp, and that in this there will
be neither godless men nor hypocrites, that only the
saints will rule, and that they will forcibly subdue all
the godless. The devil has again and again raised up in
the church this Judaic dream and fable, for (as history
shows) from early times there have been enthusiasts,
chiliasts, and Pepuzianists . ^
Heuristic Function of Hope
The paragraph above not only discloses Melanchthon's strong
feelings against false teachings on the future but also introduces
effectively the basis for our final section on the heuristics of hope. We
do not intend to develop a full-scale eschatology or eschatologized
theology. We believe, however, that the scene is set for bringing out
the culmination of the reformers' hermeneutical views as they related to
the future, to hope and to the Word.
Melanchthon's clause, "As the apostles were commanded only
to preach the gospel," in the paragraph above, is our key. In context,
'''Melanchthon, Christian Doctrine, 277.
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this means more than a simplicist admonition to preachers of all times
to tend to their homiletical knitting and abjure political or military in¬
volvement or the like. Rather the words imply that the way for the be¬
lieving man to act in hope over against the expected future of God is to
proclaim the gospel of Jesus Christ, which is the power of God, the viva
vox of God in this human history. This is not primarily an act of
obedience, rather it is an exercise in hope, which accepts the unknown
future of God, and trusts superbly in the Word alone. Moreover, since
the reaction to the Word is so often negative, hope must see the future
sub contraria specie . In the continuing activity of proclaiming the Word
in such faith and hope, the interpreter is led to such greater knowledge
as is consonant with, proper to, the openness of the expected future
in God.
It would hardly be proper for the interpreter himself to make
highly precise, personal claims for the experiencing of success in the
interpretation of Scripture because of the religious exercise of hope. In
the nature of the case, the heuristic character of hope must be hidden
even from the teacher of Scripture, in an ultimate sense, if that teacher
is not to be presumptuous and to claim a work of righteousness. In view
of these arguments, we may legitimately bring to bear the external
validations of the effectiveness of hope in opening out the Scripture for
the reformers.
We have noted above the personal religious positions of Luther
and Melanchthon. We can not deny to either of them the designation of
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giants of faith. In their callings and in their primary interests they
were men of the Word. They ventured their lives on that Word. We may
not always see dramatic challenges to their safety or public acceptance
such as the roof-tile-numerous demons of Worms for Brother Martin,
but they both knew the hazards, yet believed and hoped. The Christian
world has acknowledged how singularly, out of this faith and hope, the
Word of God was interpreted for the salvation and edification of so many
millions. The argument is not limited to these two men, it is self-
evidently proven by the other great Biblical reformers, by those pre-
reformation forerunners in the gospel understanding whom Heiko Oberman
has delivered up for our study and appreciation. It is at this point that
the attestation of every pious believer is circumstantial evidence.
What we must still do is to adduce some testimonials in which,
as it were inadvertently, the heuristics of hope is betrayed. In his
notes on the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, Luther imaginatively and
movingly describes Noah as witness to the Word:
The usual consequences follow when faithful teachers
teach faithless hearers. They are mockery and slander;
blasphemy, contempt and ignominy; especially when the
evil threatening them is delayed, and the delay gives
them new heart and assails the faith of the preacher with
obvious and manifest proof. How often was Noah con¬
demned as a fool, how often as a liar, how often as a
babbler of utter nonsense, and not just by one person but
by everybody, especially during the time that he was
carefully building the ark, trusting only his own judgment
and standing against the opinion of every man! This he
did to such a degree that he discerned the one and only
Word of God before everybody else; he used to listen to
it, put it to the test, and always and continually pre¬
ferred it to all else. . . .That is why the faith of Noah was
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not that quiet "quality of soul" that we tend to dream
faith is, but it is the inner life of the heart.
The preacher of the gospel in his own time must expect similar
dishonor, Luther maintained, and could glory only in the disgrace:
We must note that preaching the gospel was a despised
and dishonorable office, as it still is today. For it
receives no honor and glory but is exposed to every kind
of reproach, disgrace, persecution, etc.... Now what
befalls Christ, and this means truth--for Christ is the
truth—befalls also the ministers of Christ, i.e. , of the
truth. . . .Truth gives birth to hatred. But this hatred
brings forth grace. Hence, we must "ambitiously" seek
to be hated, i.e. , we must seek grace even through
hatred. ^
The sub contraria for Luther was not only a personal element
with which the preacher must reckon. The very nature of the proclama¬
tion of the truth of the Word was to evoke strife and dissension. In
spite of this the Word must be set forth, and from the dissension sub
contraria the Word was established:
To sum it up, gracious Lords, your Graces must not inter¬
fere with the office of the Word. Let them go on boldly
and confidently preaching what they can and against whom
they will; for, as I have said, there must be divisions, and
the Word of God must take the field and fight. . . . If their
spirit is true, he will not fear us and will hold the field;if
our Spirit is true, He will not be afraid of him or of any¬
body. Let the spirits fight it out. If some are led astray,
^Luther, Early Works, 212.
^Luther, Romans, 417-18; cf. Lenker, X, 46-47, 131, 154, 167,
225, 285, 405-06, 440, 446; XXIV, 20; W. A., T. R. 2, No. 1240;
Luther, Am. Ed., XII, 7; W. A., 41, 104.
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that is the fortune of war. . . ^
Let us learn therefore even by the title which Christ
giveth to the devil, to wit that he is the father of lying
and murder (John viii.), that when the Gospel
flourisheth and Christ reigneth, then sects of perdition
must needs spring up and murderers, persecuting the
truth, must rage everywhere. ^
John M. Headley has stated that the heuristic character of the persecu¬
tions of the church works in this way:
Luther argues that Jerome and most of his contemporaries
could not understand Paul because they were not exposed
to the necessary tribulations; if one is to arrive at the
true sense of Scripture, he must be exercised externally
by tyrants and heretics and internally by the terrible
weapons of Satan. . . .And even within the medieval under¬
standing of periodization Luther's use indicated that he
considered these persecutions less as periods in Church
history and more as necessary constituents of the Church's
life and the Christian experience.^
That there was progress in this strange life of hope Luther
4
asserted flatly: "Ita de spe in spem proficisci recte dicemur. " Luther's
often-stressed principle of humility was uniquely apropos in this
matter.
Therefore, we must always be ready to surrender our own
point of view so that we do not stumble on this rock of
offense (cf. Rom. 9:32; Isa. 8:14), i.e., the truth which
Luther, Correspondence, II, 246. Letter to Elector Frederic
and Duke John of Saxony (Wittenberg, July, 1524). Cf. Luther,
Galatians, 430-33.
^Luther, Galatians, 435.
^Headley, Luther's View, 153.
. A., V, 164; cf. Luther, Galatians, 460, 464.
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in humility stands over against us and is contrary to what
we think it ought to be. We are so presumptuous as to
believe that only what we think is the truth, and we want
to hear and see as truth only what we agree with and
approve. But this cannot be. ^
When Luther expatiated on that favorite "knight of faith, " Abraham, as
he went out "having nothing to follow except the Word of God, " he cried
out lyrically of this work of God in the man of faith living in hope:
But this is the glory of faith, simply not to know: not to
know where you are going, not to know what you are
doing, not to know what you must suffer, and with sense
and intellect,virtue and will, all alike made captive, to
follow the naked voice of God, to be led and driven,
O
rather than to go.
Whatever happens, whatever is given of experience and insight, like
all else in this life is given, is grace, from the God who "leads and
drives."
We have not been entirely fair to Melanchthon in generalizing
about his character as a timid lover of peace, avoiding controversy.
Even in 1555, after enduring so much of the "rabies theologorum" he
could insist on the necessity of continuing to preach that divisive and
tumult-provoking word:
In our times, as the eternal God out of his great and un¬
utterable mercy has again caused the light of his holy
gospel to shine clearly among us, and has caused many
errors and idolatries of the papists to be rebuked, the
great prelates have grown angry. . .and cry out that we
have caused dissension, departed from the orderly power
■''Luther, Romans, 103; cf. Luther, Lenker X, 367.
^Luther, Early Works, 213; cf. Luther, Lenker X, 410; Luther,
Galatians, 458.
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of the Church. . . .Although such blasphemies trouble
reasonable men not a little, we should nevertheless
maintain that we shall not act contrary to or allow true
doctrine to decrease even though the opponents are
greatly angered and cause dissension and persecution. *
With quiet equanimity, Melanchthon also accepted the unhappy
fact of the troubles which teachers and hearers of the Word faced be¬
cause of that Word:
Observemus autem hie honestissimas laudes ministerii
verbi, quod videlicet evangelii praedicatio, enarratio,
tractatio sint sacrificia necessaria novi testamenti. Id
consolari debet et docentes et discentes evangelium
inter tot molestias, quae utrisque perpetiendae sunt.
Doctores sciant. . ./hunc cultum Dei/ Deo placere,
etiamsi homines alii negligenter audiunt evangelium,
o
alii contemnunt, alji etiam persequuntur.
Melanchthon recognized the question posed by the misery of the
Church and of all believers in this life was a conundrum, especially to
non-believers. His treatment of the question in the Examen ordinandorum
of 1552 is reminiscent of Augustine's City of God. A key paragraph from
that document discloses Master Philip's emphasis on humility and hope
and the heuristic capacity of the Church's struggle for the Gospel of
Christ:
Diese grosse ding kan niemand ausreden. Aber dabey
sollen wir gleichwol lernen, als kleine kindlin, das
Gottes gerechter will ist, das wir uns unter in
warhafftiglich demutigen sollen und sollen dem Herrn
Christo im leiden nach unserer gering mass folgen und
ernach in ewigkeit umb seinet willen Gottlichere
■'■Melanchthon, Christian Doctrine, 318.
2Melanchthon, S. A., V, 366; cf. IV, 172-73, 281.
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weisheit, gerechtigkeit und freuden teilhafftig sein.
Only the Word of the Scripture can effect this. "Non alias
revelationes, non alias illuminationes quaerendas aut exspectandas
?
esse de caelo. " Melanchthon's gratitude for that Word and his simple
confidence in it he acknowledged in the closing lines of his commentary
on Romans:
Deus itaque gubernet corda nostra propter dominum
nostrum Iesum Christum spiritu sancto, ut evangelium
de caelo traditum retineamus et in agnitione et fiducia
Christi proficiamus et ut gloriam evangelii omnibus
piis officiis ornemus et reddat ecclesiae concordiam
piam et perpetuam! Amen. Deo gratia. ^
Luther's encapsulation of his attitude we draw from that noble
hymn which has informed not only Protestantism, but the whole Church
of God of these intervening centuries, and encouraged the living hope
in the Word of the promise:
And though this world, with devils filled,
Should threaten to undo us;
We will not fear, for God hath willed
His truth to triumph through us:
The prince of darkness grim,
We tremble not for him;
His rage we can endure,
For lo! his doom is sure,
One little word shall fell him.
1Melanchthon, S. A., VI, 216; cf. IV, 72ff. , 373, 394-95.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 358.
^Melanchthon, S. A., V, 371; cf. IV, 53, 260.
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That word above all earthly powers,
No thanks to them, abideth;
The Spirit and the gifts are ours
Through him who with us sideth:
Let goods and kindred go,
This mortal life also;
The body they may kill:
God's truth abideth still,
His kingdom is forever. *
'''Service Book and Hymnal of the Lutheran Church in America,
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg Publishing House, 1958), 150.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The purpose of propounding academic theses is to project ideas
into the arena of discussion and testing. Quite properly, then, our
theses of the foregoing pages, and in particular those of the chapter
just preceding, are to be scrutinized critically. In these concluding
paragraphs we shall attempt to anticipate some of the general points of
question regarding this dissertation.
We have laid considerable stress on the heuristic function of
the paradigm of God's saving activity. This function is not to be tested
ultimately from a pragmatic consideration. On the other hand, what is
heuristic should stimulate inquiry and lead to the opening of new per¬
spectives. We contend that this is one of the results of our thesis,
and that a renewed study of the history of hermeneutics in general from
this perspective would yield great rewards. In our own historical
section (Chapter II) we touched in a general way on this point of view,
but in the interests of our structure we did not inquire into the specifics
of the heuristic paradigm. It seems to us self-evident that further study
of the hermeneutics of Luther and Melanchthon also along the lines of




We desire to probe briefly along four lines of defence of our
thesis: these are testings of the consistency, coherence, acceptability
and applicability of the subjective element as developed in the heuristic
paradigm.
In defence' of the matter of consistency, we maintain first that
our propositions are consistent with the general theological positions of
Luther and Melanchthon. We believe that their understandings of the
free grace of God in Christ, of the sinfulness of man, of the nature of
faith and the character of the Scripture as Word of God are not only
recognized by our position but enhanced and given deeper understandings
through our hermeneutical perspective. We have attempted to adduce
sufficient evidences from the primary sources to convince the reader
that we have here represented not some remote and occasional comments
of the reformers, but their central and essential position. We believe
that our citations are representative of a mass of similar statements
which might be brought in evidence, from both Luther and Melanchthon,
at all stages of their reforming life.
We contend, further, that our thesis is consistent with the self-
expressed sense of vocation of the reformers. This means two things:
the one that at the center of their evangelical concern they are united,
the other that in their individual response to the demands of vocation at
given times and in given circumstances, they worked out from this
center in ways somewhat differing methodologically, but appropriate to
the situation in their intentions. We do not feel obligated to defend the
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utter Tightness of the exegetical conclusions in those given situations,
since we have adequately affirmed above that both men understood the
human limitation and the propensity to error which required continual
humility unto prayer. In support of these conclusions on vocation we
cite the work of Ernst Bizer and Wilhelm H. Neuser as key witness.
We have the results of Ernst Bizer's analysis of Melanchthon in Theoloqie
der Verheissunq. The title is revealing, and suggests the parallel with
Bizer's earlier solid study of Luther in Fides ex Auditu. Bizer is con¬
cerned about the center, faith and the promise of God. At that point he
concludes the two reformers are at one:
Das Ergebnis unserer Untersuchung scheint mir eindeutig.
In alien hier beruhrten Themen stimmt Melanchthon mit
Luther uberein. Unser Kommentar zeigt, soweit ich sehen
kann, keine einzige sachliche Differenz. Melanchthon
hat das Zentrum der Anschauung Luthers aufgenommen und
von da aus auf seine Weise und mit seinen Mitteln
weitergearbeitet. *
Bizer has in mind specifically the matter of exegesis. On this he con¬
cludes "Melanchthon und Luther auch in Detail ihrer Auslegung eng
H 2
ubereinstimmen. " In this latter judgment we concur heartily;
similarities are often almost suspicious.
Wilhelm H. Neuser has done a sober and impressive short mono¬
graph which betrays its conclusions in its title, Luther und Melanchthon—
■'■Bizer, Theoloqie der Verheissunq, 286.
2
Bizer, Theoloqie der Verheissunq, 278.
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Einheit im Geqensatz. ^ After studying a broad selection of source
materials, Neuser concludes that Luther recognized and accepted
differences between his own statements and Melanchthon's. Neuser
writes: "Luther liess ein Vielfalt in der Lehre bestehen, weil er seine
eigene Lehre nicht verabsolutierte. Das Evangelium war sein Mass stab,
2
wann aus der Vielfalt ein unertraglicher Lehrgegensatz wurde. " He notes
further that Melanchthon himself recognized two goals for his theology
which would determine respective styles. One was for Christian under¬
standing, especially for the youth, the other was the professional, more
3
philosophical approach. Melanchthon could thus make different
approaches in view of his own varied goals, and he recognized that he
and Luther at times were confronting different tasks, hence operated in
4
differing ways. Luther did not insist on a system of theology: he
worked out from the middle point of the gospel of Jesus Christ "und kann
daher Lehrdifferenzen ertragen. " Luther operated from the premise of
his belief that God worked in different ways through different men, and
g
that his gifts and Melanchthon's were quite different. On his side,
^Wilhelm H. Neuser, Luther und Melanchthon--Einheit im
Gegensatz (Muchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1961).
2
Neuser, Luther und Melanchthon, 23.
3
Neuser, Luther und Melanchthon, 24.
^Neuser, Luther Und Melanchthon, 19.
^Neuser, Luther und Melanchthon, 35.
g
Neuser, Luther und Melanchthon, 39.
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Melanchthon maintained that he and Luther were "in der Sache einig"
but he himself taught "weniger schroff" than Luther, and problems arose
because of those who made too much of some of the "sehr groben
Aussagen Luthers. Let these be our final conclusions with respect
to the presumed differences between Luther and Melanchthon--in all
things, and in this present hermeneutical concern. Melanchthon may
indeed have been more concerned than Luther to enunciate clear-cut
2
ethical principles out of the Scripture. He may have been more con¬
cerned for utilizing the structures of rhetoric in his expositions, and
for method in setting forth doctrines as he manifested so powerfully in
the Loci Communes. However, even a most conservative scholar like
3
Robert Preus maintains that in doing so he imported "merely method."
Perhaps our best referee in this debate would be any preacher who has
turned professor and been forced to counter the ridiculous question as
to whether he senses more of a "call" in the classroom than he did in
the parish. Whether or not van den Brink has shared this experience or
not we do not know, but he does say significantly, "Melanchthon is out
to cultivate living faith and therefore he needs an audience. He finds
^"Neuser, Luther und Melanchthon, 18.
2
Heinrich Bornkamm, Das Tahrhundert der Reformation: Gestalten
und Krafte (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), p. 78; cf.
Melanchthon, S. A., IV, 307.
3
Robert Preus, "Melanchthon the Theologian, " Concordia Theo¬
logical Monthly, XXXI (August, 1960), 171. Cf. Rolf Schafer, "Mel-
anchthons Hermeneutik im Romerbrief-Kommentar von 1532, " Zeitschrift
filr Theologie und Kirche, LX, (1963), 222.
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this not only at the university, but also in the congregation. " *
Today's critics can only reflect the records left by the reformers
themselves. The record shows a most warm and trusting personal re¬
lationship throughout the long years of their work together at Wittenberg.
Such tensions as are to be found in the history are hardly more than the
usual difficulties and misunderstandings of friends and colleagues over
the space of almost three decades. When a man as outspoken as Luther
was involved, one does not need to ascribe jealousy or touchiness to
account for the sometimes sharp public criticism which in the last
analysis means next to nothing.
In a letter to Staupitz, Luther commended his young colleague,
writing
Christ willing, he will surpass many Martins and will be
a mighty foe of the devil of the scholastic theology. He
knows their tricks and also the Rock Christ. He will
powerfully prevail. ^
After he had "stolen" Melanchthon1 s lecture notes through a student,
and sent the commentary material on Romans and the Corinthian letters
3
to the printers with his high praise attached Luther "forcibly" took
"against the resistance of the author, his Notes on the Gospel of
^J. A. B. van den Brink, "Bible and Biblical Authority in the
Early Reformation," Scottish Tournal of Theology , XIV (December, 19 61),
346; v. also p. 347.
2
Quoted in Richard, Philip Melanchthon, 59.
3C. R. , 15, 441.
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John. " Luther contended that Philip's work did what a Biblical
commentary should do, and used the work of Paul as the point of com¬
parison.
Melanchthon returned the compliment in according to Luther the
highest praise in his understanding of Paul.
Luther is answering your question on Paul, and what
is more apt than his answer? No one known to me of
all the Greek and Latin writers has gotten nearer Paul's
spirit. ^
The whole of Melanchthon's funeral oration over Luther corroborates this
affirmation of his highest praise and fullest trust.
If our premise of consistency with the total theological positions
of the reformers, as stated above, is correct, we have already affirmed
a coherence in our theme, dictated by the prior coherence of the theology.
More specifically, we argue for a coherence under the premise of "from
faith to faith. " That is to say that the unique type of hermeneutical
circle with which we are here concerned is unified. This circle of
movement begins with either a temporal or a cosmic basis. Temporally
we have pointed out above the movement from present to promised future
and back to present, that is, from history to eschatology to history.
Cosmically, we move from this world to the coming world and back to
this world. In a statement of amazing depth and beauty Luther says
•'•Luther, Correspondence, II, 187-88.
9
Luther, Correspondence, I, 330. Letter of Melanchthon to
John Hess at Breslau, June 8, 1520.
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For generally, when people begin to be pious, they do it
through human teaching and outward holiness, but we must
abandon this and come to pure faith and not suffer our¬
selves again to fall from faith into works. Thus we surely
come into our fatherland, from which we have come, that
is, God, by whom we have been created. The end thus
comes together with the beginning in a golden ring. ^
In a similarly profound passage explicating the difficult statement in
Romans 8:20, Melanchthon concludes:
Sicut igitur tota universitas rerum exspectat liberationem
nec mora frangitur, ita nos sustineamus saevitiam et
iniurias diaboli nec desperemus propter moram, sed
sciamus fore, ut liberemur, etsi neque modum neque
tempus, quo id fiet, praevidemus, sicut nec mundus
praevidet. 2
We are keenly aware of the difficulty of incorporating within a
theological methodology, a theory of hermeneutics, so much of
eschatology. The continuing problem of theology and eschatology out¬
lined above has sufficiently cautioned us about over-confidence in our
ability to conquer this impasse. In the present temper among many
theologians whose catch-word is "secular" we are not expecting a warm
audience. Some words of Gordon D. Kaufman polemicizing against Karl
Barth, relate to our basic paradigm: "His /Barth's/ general conception
of the category of the historical is defective in that he defines it
principally (as is his wont) in terms of God's action upon the historical
'''Luther, Lenker, X, 455.
2
Melanchthon, S. A. , V, 239. On some of the intriguing phil¬
osophical aspects of the hermeneutical circle, v. Karl Lowith, "Knowledge
and Faith, " Religion and Culture, ed. Walter Leibrecht, pp. 209-10.
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being and insufficiently in terms of the self-creative action of that
being."''' Since we on our part cannot accept the naive view Kaufmann
reveals elsewhere in delineating his historicist perspective we are not
gravely troubled. The offending passage completely ignores the
ambiguity of history with which we have concerned ourselves:
If one stands within the Christian tradition, which
knows of a loving and powerful Creator, it is hardly
surprising that he will tend to see the course and
destiny of his own being--i.e. , its limits on all
sides--as determined by the activity of God: God's
mercy and benevolence toward him will be felt in that
which seems good in life; his judgment and wrath, in
the painful and constrictive. 2
We have attempted seriously in all of the material presented in
this dissertation to marshal secondary sources which indicate the
acceptability of the component parts leading up to our ultimate state¬
ment. Thus we have drawn on competent academics who have dealt
with the general problems, not specifically in terms of the problem of
Luther and Melanchthon. How acceptable is our final statement to such
critic s? Let us draw on some representative spokesmen in answer.
We quote first from Paul Tillich as spokesman for a more liberal
point in the theological spectrum:
■'■Gordon D. Kaufman, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Per¬
spective (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 278, n. 13.
Contrast to this Thomas F. Torrance's on history and eschatology in
Kingdom and Church, pp. 2-4.
Gordon D. Kaufman, "On the Meaning of God: Transcendence
without Mythology, " Harvard Theological Review, LIX, (April, 1966),
130.
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In Luther justification is the individual person's experience
of both the divine wrath against his sin and the divine for¬
giveness which leads to a person-to-person relation with
God without the cosmic and ecclesiastical framework of Paul
or Augustine. This is the limitation in Luther's thought which
has led both to an intellectual orthodoxy and to an emotional
pietism. The subjective element was not counterbalanced in
him. But his "psychology of acceptance" is the profoundest
one in church history and confirmed by the best insights of
contemporary "psychology of depth. "
Although this statement represents a qualified endorsement, we feel it
points to some of our own key concepts with approval.
The following lengthy citation from Karl Barth seems also to be
analogous to our primary arguments:
We must approach this matter more closely. When by
God's miracle His Word in its worldliness is addressed
to us and grasped by us, that may mean first that we
really hear the "God with us" there spoken to us, but
hear it only in the worldly form in which it is spoken to
us. But it may mean, on the other hand, that we indeed
hear it in its wordly form, but really hear it in that way.
From God's side that is the same thing, but for us it is
altogether not the same thing but two things, or one thing
only for faith. The one time God unveils Himself to us
in His Word, but by the very fact that He veils Himself.
The other time He veils Himself, but at the same time He
actually unveils Himself also. . . .We can neither remain
rooted before the worldly form as such nor fly beyond
this and hope to enjoy ourselves still with the divine
content only. The one would be realistic, the other would
be idealistic theology, and both would be wrong theology.
Both times, however, we in faith hear only the whole, the
real Word of God. A removal of the distinction, nay
opposition, between form and content we cannot achieve. . . .
Faith means rather recognizing that this synthesis cannot
be achieved, committing it to God and seeking and finding
it in God. By finding it in God we acknowledge that we
cannot find it ourselves and so can neither achieve it in
''"Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 226-27.
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a definite attitude in life nor think it systematically.
But by committing it to God and seeking it in Him, we
do find it, we hear the whole, the real word of God, i.e. ,
now the divine content in its worldly form, now in the
worldly form the divine content. *
In some sectors, at least, of contemporary Roman Catholic
thinking, our conclusions would, apparently be acceptable. Thus, for
example, the validation of a similar hermeneutic by Karl Rahner poses
a fascinating commentary on the foregoing Lutheran study and the
present ecumenical dialogue. At the Symposium held at St. Xavier
College, Chicago, March 31st to April 3rd, 1966, under the auspices
of the John XXIII Institute, Rahner defined a transcendental anthropology
in its relation to the contemporary task of theology and to the problems
of Christian knowing.
After making clear that he did not intend a view of man which
militated against a theocentric, Christocentric theology, Rahner made
these statements:
Such an anthropology must, of course, be a transcendental
anthropology. Transcendental questioning asks about a
thing from the point of view of the necessary conditions in
the subject itself that make it possible for that thing to be
known or done by the subject concerned. Such questioning
presupposes that the knowing subject is not simply a thing
among other things, in such a way that one can indeed
speak about it on occasion if one will, but that in other
statements about other things it is not even implied. . . .
For the statement to be possible, certain necessary con¬
ditions in man himself are presupposed and are therefore
^arth, C. D. , i/l, 199-201.
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implicitly affirmed in the statement. ^
It is of the essence of all knowledge (including, therefore,
theological knowledge) that an inquiry regarding an object
of knowledge is also an inquiry regarding the being of the
knowing subject. . . .The knowing subject must be inquired
about, since it is only in the subject himself as such, be¬
cause of his own subjective individuality, that the whole
has meaning, as that toward which its transcendentality
is directed. 2
Although Rahner, in treating briefly of the presence of this per¬
spective in the church, makes no mention of the Protestant Reformers,
it seems significant that he works with the simul justus et peccator
3
concept. In his concluding statements of the applicability of the
principle the references both to eschatology and to hermenuetics in the
following paragraph are revealing:
An eschatology which would measure up to modern
demands needs as a basis a transcendental anthropology,
in which man appears as that being who projects himself
towards the expanding future, as the being characterized
by hope and which has been made capable of an absolute
future by God. Only in the light of such a futurology
which has a transcendental and anthropocentric form can
we discover those hermeneutical principles for the
interpretation of eschatological statements.
It. Patrick Burke, ed., The Word in History: The St. Xavier
Symposium (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), p. 2.
^Burke, ed., The Word in History, 8-9.
3
Burke, ed. , The Word in History, 15.
4
Burke, ed. , The Word in History, 22-23; cf. the comments of
Stephen Pfurtner, Luther and Aquinas on Salvation, trans. Edward Quinn
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp. 30, 73.
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We find two references from the Orthodox theologian, Georges
Florovsky, very apt to our defence: "Faith does not create a new
value; it only discovers the inherent one. Faith itself is a sort of
vision, 'the evidence of things not seen. That statement alone
might appear very mystical, but in a monograph titled "The Predicament
of the Christian Historian, " Florovsky gives some invaluable background
only partially represented in the following words:
But precisely because history was apprehended as "God's
history," the "history of man" was made possible. Man's
history was then apprehended as a meaningful story and
no longer as a reiteration of the cosmic pattern, nor as a
chaotic flux of happenings. The history of men was under¬
stood in the perspective of their salvation, that is, of the
accomplishment of their destiny and justification of their
existence. ^
In the combination of these two perspectives we find a basic acceptance
of our premises on the heuristic paradigm.
The final test of applicability is virtually impossible to document
in satisfactorily concrete terms. If our thesis is valid, the documenta¬
tion should be drawn from all evangelical preaching through the ages.
We should cite the "strangely warmed" heart of a Wesley on looking
into Luther's Galatians, we should somehow explicate the inexplicable
intuition of the simple believer who has in John Baillie's terms,
■'■Georges Florovsky, "Revelation and Interpretation," Biblical
Authority for Today, ed. Richardson, p. 170.
O
Georges Florovsky, "The Predicament of the Christian
Historian," Religion and Culture , ed. Leibrecht, p. 162; v. also p.
147.
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employed in one of his last lectures at New College, "sucked the
marrow out of Scripture. " ^ Let it be sufficient to cite cneparagraph for
all of these possibilities. Let that paragraph be from John Donne,
standing aside from denominational and systematic divisions in the
position of one of the classic preachers in the Church's history. Let
the words come from the heart of a man troubled by the hurts of history
he had invited on his own person, compounded by the pains that came
without invitation. Let the preacher say:
Now, how is this future thing, (There shall be a Messias)
a signe of their present deliverance from that siege? First,
In the notion of the Prophet, it was not a future thing; for,
as in Gods owne sight, so in their sight, to whom he opens
himselfe, future things are present. So this Prophet says,
Puer datus, filius natus, unto us a child is borne, unto us a
Son is given: He was not given, he was not borne in six
hundred yeares after that; but such is the cleareness of a
Prophets sight, such is the infallibility of Gods declared
purpose. So then, if the Prophet could have made the King
beleeve, with such an assurednesse, as if he had seene
it done, that God would give a deliverance, to all mankinde,
by a Messias, that had been signe enough, evidence enough
to have argued thereupon, That God who had done so much
a greater worke, would also give him a deliverance from that
enemy, that pressed him then: If I can fixe my selfe, with
the strength of faith, upon that which God had done for man,
I cannot doubt of his mercy, in any distresse: If I lacke a
signe, I seeke no other but this, That God was made man
O
for me.
*Cf. J. C. K. von Hofmann, Interpreting the. Bible, trans.
Christian Preus (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1959), p. xiii.
2
Theodore Gill, ed. , The Sermons of Tohn Donne (New York:
Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), p. 101.
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